Leadership under fire: the pressures of warfare in Ancient Egypt

Anthony Spalinger

Four leçons at the Collège de France

Paris, June 2019

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Leadership under fire: the pressures of warfare in Ancient Egypt

Anthony Spalinger
to Mathew Trundle
sorely missed
12 October 1965-12 July 2019
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This work is a final result of a series of four lectures given by me at the Collège de France in June 2019. The fifth chapter was not presented then.

I must thank Prof. Nicolas Grimal for his kind invitation to allow me to discuss these matters of generalship and leadership in pharaonic Egypt. I am also thankful for Prof. Grimal in providing all the facilities for this period of time. I am, as well, in his debt for allowing me to have the lectures published. Much more could have been said and written. I have, however, preferred to let the concentration of three warrior pharaohs remain.

Additional thanks can be given to Olivier Cabon who has persevered in setting up this study, a not simple or easy task. The result of his excellent assistance can be now seen and read.
Leadership under fire: the pressures of warfare in Ancient Egypt

Anthony Spalinger
The abbreviations in this study follow those of the Egyptologists’ Electronic Forum (EEF):

http://www.egyptologyforum.org/eerefs.html
preface
The investigation of the personal aspects of ancient Egyptian pharaohs is a hazardous undertaking owing to the purposeful orientation of our textual records. Most studies on their reigns concentrate upon the series of monuments and written accounts which have been left to us as well as the numerous high ranking private individuals who worked and performed their duties under the aegis of various rulers. Yet, as is known to every Egyptologist, all of the royal material is particularly difficult to analyze owing to their purposeful orientations. Specifically, what the monarchs wanted to publicize was not their innermost feelings at any specific time and place as we would wish but instead indicate certain reactions to specific events, usually for them very important ones, and most certainly not a psychological summary of their identities. Researchers therefore have to sift through a quantity of disparate sources in order to limn the monarch’s persona. On the other hand, so long as the royal accounts are detailed enough some distinct characteristics of a pharaoh can be discerned. Fortunately, when it came to war, the New Kingdom pharaohs, and Pianchy of Kush as well, were determined to provide extensive records of their major campaigns, both pictorially and textually.

The following chapters attempt to do just that. This volume expressly avoids extensive linguistic coverage of the key narratives, partly because of the theme but equally due to the already well-researched historiographic studies that appear. I can refer to Donald Redford’s volume on the “Annals” of Thutmose III, Thomas von der Way’s very helpful study of the Kadesh material — a study which appears to have been engendered by a remarkable analysis of Jan Assmann — and a plethora of small research investigations dealing with the Kushite ruler Pianchy.

By and large, these three leaders have provided us with the necessary information in order that an attempt can be made to categorize their actions and hence describe their military complexions. Thutmose’s Megiddo campaign stands side-by-side with Ramesses’s Kadesh Poem and Bulletin, not to mention his pictorial records: Pianchy commissioned on a very large granite stela, undoubtedly originally set up at Karnak, to record his great campaign in Egypt. Hence, there is enough documentation at hand to enable one to pursue this task of reconstruction. How else could we investigate these warrior-pharaohs and attempt any evaluation of their abilities? It is one thing to critique the major inscriptions with regard to their literary aspects but a far different approach is needed to delineate their features of leadership, and in particular their abilities in war.
The first chapter, “Generalship and Leadership,” is an attempt to circum-scribe our theme, and therefore presents somewhat of a methodological approach based to no small degree on the key seminal works related to warfare that concentrate upon the “captains of the host” as well as their armies in battle. Qualities of command must come to the fore before the exercise of individual behaviour, and this implies that a reasonable background of non-Egyptological research is necessary in order to prepare our discussion of these three important pharaoh-generals. None of those men was a novice in the art of war. They were all trained in their early life to fight, and it was expected of them to perform admirably. How commendable were their abilities and how their own dynamism affected the outcomes of battle is my aim. True, each of them, and any other Egyptian monarch as well, provided for the future a concatenation of differing personal temperaments that they desired to promulgate. But within those royal accounts one can find many details that allow the scholar to re-arrange the depiction in order to evoke a different interpretation of the leader that he originally preferred and broadcasted. This does not mean that what was said in our cases, written or visually shown, was false. The military record of a Thutmose III, for example, effectively reflects his psyche. Charisma enters in addition to logistical superiority.

I have placed in the headings to Chapters 2-4 my evaluation of the individual pharaohs as generals. Thus one will find Thutmose a “strategic commander,” Ramesses a “hero,” and Pianchy a “multi-tasked general.” I am sure that the second wanted it that way. Does not the account of his famous war record at Kadesh, the Poem, provide a side of his generalship that is not merely a reflection of his single-minded victory? Of course, all of these men won — Thutmose III at Megiddo, Ramesses II at Kadesh, and Pianchy within Egypt. And we all know that such was not necessarily the case, or at least that serious difficulties were encountered by each of them in the field, events which curtailed some of their ambitions. In the heat of battle as well as in the preceding fog of war the original objectives altered, perhaps somewhat but even more so to a large degree. But it is within the historical record that we discover these pharaohs coping with the unexpected, and from their immediate decisions and ensuing actions a relatively judicious study of their characters can be made. Of course, we are not blessed with the far larger amount of source material that is available to the Classical scholar. And political issues relating to warfare and strategy, such as Pericles’ funeral oration or the Melian debate, cannot be found in the Egyptian texts.
The final chapter covers the historiographic and structural background to the key historical narratives of all three generals. Previously I had covered, but now do so in more detail, their striking personalities, at least in combat. But more important was to link those evaluations of mine with the various literary nature of the discourses preferred by the authors and their pharaohs. I can do no better than to highlight my judgements by quoting Hans Delbrück, “Legend and poetry do not paint falsely when they paint with other colors than does history. They simply speak another language, and it is a question of translating correctly from this language into that of history.”

To some degree this work has relied upon the numerous and significant works of John Keegan. His *The Face of Battle* cannot but be referred to here. I can add his further work on military intelligence (spies and scouts) and the terrain of war. He is to be cited at first owing to the impact that his studies have had on the field of military history. As an antidote, if that is the correct word, there is always Harry Holbert Turney-High's *The Military. The Theory of Land Warfare as Behavioral Science*, a work that is especially intriguing due to the author’s lack of mincing words. Additional fundamental investigations are not overlooked. Yes, Clausewitz is a necessity, but in order to grasp his theoretical niceties, including the difficulties in interpreting an incompletely written work, Raymond Aron's *Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz* is also compulsory to examine.

Hence, the opening chapter provides a more theoretical background to the subsequent ones that can be obtained by a pure study of Egyptology. But I have been able to incorporate many scholarly publications that either I had omitted in my 2005 publication or have appeared since then. Thus one very beneficial side to these studies for me has been my return to New Kingdom and later warfare, but with a totally new direction than I had given earlier. In addition, restricting myself to one campaign per one pharaoh has further allowed me to analyze the topographical, geographical, and logistic details of the three major campaign under consideration to a great degree — the Battle of Megiddo, the Kadesh Battle, and the Great Campaign of Pianchy. But there was an even more personally valuable consequence of having studied these commanders — namely, that I could retrace the logistical details earlier discussed in 2005, but now with a different, perhaps more mature outlook. This result, in conjunction with a now greater emphasis upon the “operational art” of warfare, a relatively modern interpretation that
is able to avoid the sharp dichotomy often urged upon us, one that can result in confusion, allows one to evaluate more carefully the two core aspects of strategy and tactics.

The reader will find that I have altered somewhat my earlier concepts as well as my interpretations. On the other hand, by subjecting three commanders and pharaohs to a minute examination different facets in the enormous field of ancient Egyptian military history were obtained. But this does not mean that these presentations lead to simplistic hero-loving or incompetent-hating evaluations. I have further not provided the generalist with a superficial canvas on which these warriors’ images loom ever so large and two dimensional. Yet my focus is not biographical, notwithstanding the involvement of the characters’ thoughts and actions. This volume also mainly stays away from the connection of religion and kingship, just as it avoids the intricate reconstruction of foreign affairs, diplomacy, and the like. But by choosing one of each pharaoh’s major campaign, which he emphasized *par excellence*, and the one that he seems to have been most fond of, and most known of — even in antiquity, I can apply my microscope more firmly and effectively.

I have provided a major scholarly apparatus including recently published minor studies. This work is not intended for a general reading public even if it offers quite an amount of basic historical foundations. I am not writing as John Keegan did. That is to say, the scholar will be able to see and to examine the primary and secondary source material, often critiqued, which lie behind my assertions. For example, when covering Alexander The Great — perhaps the archetypical commander of the Graeco-Roman world — Keegan’s orientation meant that he was not interested in primary source criticism with regard to the “Alexander historians.”

Hence, in his scintillating depiction of Alexander as an actor (to his troops in particular), Arrian, Justin, and Diodorus Siculus are mentioned, but the interested researcher additionally would have fancied some evaluations of those ancient authors who wrote about the king. This is not to say that a regurgitation of the incredibly extensive scholarly literature concentrated solely upon the original sources of our accounts of Alexander, no matter how imaginative and envisaging, is always necessary. Indeed, it would have moved Keegan away from his focus, especially because he gives a perceptive analysis of Alexander’s oratorical skills and his evident role as an actor. On the other hand, the tremendous and voluminous scholarly efforts devoted to the task of primary source analysis of Alexander appear now to have reached a standstill or, to put it
another way, the deposit seems nearly mined out. How much more remarkable, then, was Donald Engels’s Alexander study, significantly one that came about through archaeology and mathematics and not primarily oriented to the Alexander sources.23

By and large I have not been keenly interested to any extent in the social structure of the Egyptian or Kushite society except when it allows us to ascertain and make clearer many of the pharaohs’s decisions. We have ready-at-hand Andrea Gnir’s published thesis24 as well as a roster of important articles and chapters by Christine Raedler.25 I have thus explored the background of the New Kingdom military to some degree, and not only indicating war material and technology, in order to point out the social hierarchy and importance of the military to the country of Egypt. The same may be expressly stated with regard to Pianchy of Kush. After all, he was not Egyptian.26 But, as in 2005, I have preferred to evaluate the material of a pharaoh’s military decision or decisions from the angle of what, most probably, occurred. He was born into a matrix from which he could not leave, or even escape. His actions presuppose his command role in these Nile River-based cultures. Still commanding at the head of his army, our three generals fought not with iron or heavy chariots propelled by strong modern horses, but instead operated within the context of an earlier technological base.

But they provide, as well, visual evidence of their military power. The might of pharaoh in chariot is a typical Leitmotif of the New Kingdom, and the Egyptologist is at a good advantage in historical research by being able to turn to these non-written sources. Narrative was present in the written accounts as well as in the pictorial representations on walls.27 For us, the numerous Kadesh reliefs are, of course, of primary importance as they add much to what Ramesses had commissioned in his Poem and Bulletin. Thutmose III has left us nothing pictorial concerning his Megiddo campaign, and Pianchy’s battle scenes from his Great Temple at Gebel Barkal are not connected with his breathtaking campaign into Egypt, even if they help to no small degree in allowing us insights on the Kushite military system of the eight century BC.

I have wholeheartedly engaged with these three major participants in combat. I hope to have come to know their biases, orientations, and desires for immortality reasonably well, if only be they remembered as great men in battle. Their official records reveal much about their self-created images, ones that often can be found in the more publicly-oriented literature on papyri of the day.28 Their strong feelings
towards the enemy and their attitudes fixated upon a series of goals can likewise be discussed. With the twin poles of strategy and tactics, we can do that, provided that the limitations of the primary source material are made relatively coherent. This is partly achieved in the last chapter. Yet we have to work with what we possess. All of the key inscriptive and pictorial material under discussion was for a temple milieu. Independently of whether the reliefs were predominately on exterior temple walls or in locations more open to the public is not my concern. Likewise, Pianchy’s granite stela of victory was placed within the temple precinct of Amun at Karnak. Thus we cannot separate the background of the three major participants in our volume from the religious centers in which they devoted their accounts. The pharaohs went out to battle with the blessing of Amun and subsequently they returned home and presented their victories to their father-god. Then too, such accounts were not written down by private individuals for a wide audience such as Ptolemy Son of Lagos, one of Alexander’s generals, did. Let us keep in mind that all of our historical war records under consideration had their basis or *Sitz im Leben* the king’s approval of the final product. The final chapter covers these issues with a survey of the literary and linguistic aspects of the three major narratives (the “Annals” of Thutmose III, the Poem of Ramesses II, and the Great Stela of Pianchy).

How, then, can we reconstruct any of these commander’s abilities? Sift through the material knowing full well the historiographical background of the drama is the oft-cited response. By now, in this day and age, we know very well the limitations of the extant material and, which is more important to me, we also are very cognizant of their purport. The message delivered is not what we would desire a sober narrative would do, but this impinges on us and not on the ancients. We have to work with the message enunciated, even if, as in the case of Ramesses II, his heroic “stand” at the west of Kadesh jells reasonably well with what I believe his actions there were. Pianchy is another matter, but his stela continues with a brief narration of his relations with Tefnacht after he had received submission by his key opponents at Athribis. Yet Pianchy could not seize the domain of Sais, or anything of it. Tefnacht may have submitted, but this was as tentative in outlook as it was ineffective in action. Thutmose III left Megiddo under siege, a result which he most certainly wished to have avoided. All of his careful and clear-sighted manoeuvres to reach Megiddo, and his battle victory outside its walls, did not result in a definitive and immediate capitulation to him by his foes.
These studies have been drawn up from a series of four lectures presented at the Collège de France in June 2019 and I must deeply thank Prof. Nicolas Grimal for inviting me to Paris in order to deliver them. His exceedingly kind offer was a surprise to me and I hope that I have provided the then listeners and the present reader with a tantalizing insight into ancient Egyptian generalship.

notes

1 Would that we had even a fragmentary portion of an Egyptian military handbook. In this context, see the instructive article of Brian Campbell, “Teach Yourself How to Be a General,” *JRS* 77 (1987): 13-29.

2 The approach taken here is different from that of Giacomo Cavillier, *Il faraone guerriero. I Sovrani del nuovo regno all conquista dell’Asia tra mito, strategia bellica e realtà archeologia* (Turin: Tirrenia Stampatori; 2001).


6 My forays are “Pianchy/Piye. Between Two Worlds,” in: Christina Karlshaussen and Claude Obsomer (eds.), *De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte*
ancienne/War in Ancient Egypt (Brussels: Safran; 2016), 235-274, and The Persistence of Memory in Kush: Pianchy and His Temple (in preparation).

I take into consideration that Pianchy was a Kushite and not an Egyptian. His character is thus different from the “expected” pharaonic royal personalities. But his stela of victory is very long and hence excellent to employ in this study. At the minimum it was composed by an Egyptian (or Egyptians), was written in Egyptian, reflects Egyptian models, refers indirectly to past Egyptian literature, and was set up in Karnak, thus in Egypt. He was also a general, a leader of troops. The characteristics of military leadership are not circumscribed to single cultures or nations.

7 Thutmose III — Chapter 2, Ramesses II — Chapter 3, and Pianchy — Chapter 4.
9 I would like to thank Matthew Trundle and Jeremy Armstrong, my colleagues in Greek and Roman warfare, for helpful comments on how to proceed with this study.
16 For the proper English translation one must refer to the Michael Howard and Peter Paret translation — Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (trs.) (London: Everyman Publishers; 1993).


19 Here, I am indebted to my former student, Brett Heagren, whose thesis I have used in this work more than a few times: *The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt. An Analysis of the Tactical, Logistic, and Operational Capabilities of the Egyptian Army. Dynasties XVII-XX* (Auckland: Auckland University PhD Thesis; 2010).


21 And even Ptolemy (son of Lagos), a contemporary source, is referred to. He was used later by Arrian, though this is not indicated. No specific references are given here.

22 The closest parallel that I can present is that of Ramesses at Kadesh when he speaks to Amun, his soldiers, and Menna, his charioteer. See Chapter 3.


I am mindful that some Nubiologists have deplored, or criticized strongly, Egyptologists for treating Kush as Egypt, and not merely in a few ways such as language (mainly of the royal inscriptions) and art. Their judgments on this important matter of cultural understanding can be read in László Török, “Iconography and Mentality. Three Remarks on the Kushite Way of Thinking,” in: William Davies (ed.), Egypt and Africa. Nubia from Prehistory to Islam (London: British Museum Press; 1991), 195-204, “Nubians Move from the Margins to the Center of Their History,” in: Pal Steiner et al. (eds.), From the Fjords to the Nile. Essays in Honour of Richard Holten Pierce on His 80th Birthday (Oxford: Archaeopress; 2018), 1-18, but more significantly Adoption and Adaption. The Sense of Culture Transfer between Ancient Nubia and Egypt (Budapest: Ízisz Foundation; 2011), 44: “The lessons presented here are addressed rather to students to Nubian history who are reluctant to break with prejudices inherited from early twentieth-century Egyptology.”

In general, see Gaballa Gaballa, Narrative in Egyptian Art (Mainz am Rhein: von Zabern; 1976); and Spalinger, Icons of Power. A Strategy of Reinterpretation (Prague: Charles University of Prague, Faculty of Arts; 2011).


The monumental work of Nicolas Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pi(ankh)y au Musée du Caire. Je 48862 et 47086-47089 (Cairo: Institut français d’Archéologie orientale; 1981), remains standard.


See Chapter 1 note 34.
Generalship and Leadership: an Introduction
The issue of generalship is as complex in historical source material as it is psychologically entrancing.¹ What makes a leader is surely the key question. The answer is rooted in the relationship with the troops, for the winning of battles is not enough. And even before the commander-in-chief sets out, the basis for his campaign is what matters. Regardless of military preparedness, the societal aspects of war constitute the underlying raison-d'être for the conflict. Hence, martial skill, though one of the fundamental elements of warfare, is affected by the state’s self-conceptions of what it would take to win, be the conflict a major one among large powers or a minor struggle. But action follows upon the leaders’ ability to rouse antagonism to such a degree that an ensuing conflict becomes inevitable, preceded by a social mobilization at home in which war, directed against a truly hated enemy, is preferred to any form of negotiation. The military commander-in-chief sets out the basis for his campaign, and that is what matters.²

Generalship, nonetheless, provides the foundation for a strong and lasting victory. Equally, it conditions the troops to such a degree that either they can effectively achieve the aims of their commander, or else it reveals various levels of weaknesses ranging from unexpected conditions (the “friction” of Clausewitz)³ to sheer incompetence.⁴ The preparation for war, including the frequent inspiration of the troops, should lie within the capabilities of any combat leader. Not surprisingly, it has been argued, successfully in my opinion, “that generalship was probably the most important single factor in determining which army prevailed.”⁵ As a corollary it is implied that leadership is the ne plus ultra of generalship. But what does leadership mean? Clearly, power and authority are implied, but so are foresight and initiative. The ability to manage tactical situations is a requisite skill. The directional vectors of an army’s movement are even more crucial, if only because general whose visual acuity is slim will lose loyalty.⁶

With the development of complex military organizations one can pass over the simpler tasks of army preparations. But then we are dealing with only the rudimentary aspects of warfare. Troops march on their stomachs to be sure, but no general should be overly concerned with rations and provisions. (Plate I covers the estimated daily rations per per soldier.) Hopefully, the subalterns can take care of these things without direct involvement from a general. The “rational” subdivisions and behavior patterns of any corporation apply here.⁷ A general must prepare his troops through his personal exhortations, maintain

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II Seti I Campaigning against the Shasu at Gaza (Karnak, Exterior East Northern Wall of the Hypostyle Hall, Photograph Courtesy Peter Brand).
a battlefield stoicism, and ensure that a willingness for combat is always present. Leaders must be looked up to and not down at. Yet great failures need not be deprecated by soldiers. McClennan is a prime example of a third rate general ably supported, and indeed strongly approved, by his soldiers. In antiquity did the leaders always go into battle or did the commanders sometimes set their troops in action but remain distant from combat, like the master chess player of Omar Khayyam proceeds (lxix in Fitzgerald’s poem)?

John Keegan divides leadership into two styles: heroic and directional. He nominates Wellington at the extreme of the second whereas Alexander the Great provides an excellent example of the second (U. S. Grant is for him a representative of “unheroic leadership”), which might be best described as “talismanic leadership.” Here, the general is usually the ruler of his country and has many years of experience in warfare. No New Kingdom pharaoh was unversed in the art of war. Besides being a god (cf. some of Homer’s heroes as descendants of gods), the pharaoh was a macho individual upon whom all responsibility was placed and from whom all — success — was expected. Talismanic generalship is closely related to kingship, and the warrior “King in Battle” was part and parcel of a commander’s expected — indeed demanded — attributes. But Egyptian society of the New Kingdom was not as limited in royal military aspects as, for example, the ill-fated Aztec kingdom was under Montezuma, even though in both cases the concept of talismanic leadership was implied.

Religious leadership shares that attribute. There, the commander must be personally associated with the religious basis of his culture. Indeed, Egyptian pharaohs and Aztec kings operated within a similar structure of royal control. Religious leaders may not be generals, but the sacrifices and divine favours associated with the war leader and ruler were necessary, and the intimate relationship between pharaoh and Amun was one of the building blocks of the Egyptian state. But the intimate association of piety, faith, and prayer somewhat permeated New Kingdom royal accounts of warfare. The well-known illustration of Ramesses II at Kadesh comes to mind; but even there I believe that the event was singular, mainly owing to the trap into which the pharaoh had fallen. Yet absent from the war records of Egyptian history was the concept of a motivation in which the nation participated to some degree. The cultic religion of the New Kingdom was not a populist faith serving as a rationale for fighting against heathens.
Meritocratic leadership has its limits. Harry Holbert Turney-High has explicated this situation in his study of primitive warfare. But the stages of human development which he considered were less complex than the imperial state of Egypt during the heyday of the New Kingdom, or later. If there is lacking a deeply-held system of generalship emanating from the ruler, then we must deal with military leadership of a more spontaneous nature, one that arises in need and is not ever-present behind the scenes. In this situation, a commander does not automatically take charge by virtue of kingship or through a martial *cursus honorum*. In such “embedded societies,” to use Karl Polanyi’s term, warfare is immersed in social relations; i.e., it cannot be a separate, autonomous sphere vis-à-vis society as a whole. Yet he does allow for birth right, social status, or the like to be the decisive aspects of a society; and in Egypt this must indicate that the one man in military control was the pharaoh.

A recent discussion of “Sudanic Statecraft” attempts to argue for a model of a segmentary state with respect to the kingdom of Kush in Dynasty XXV. This interpretation is at odds with many previous historical reconstructions in which Pianchy’s Kush was similar in government to Egypt. This interpretation will be covered in more detail in Chapter 4. For the moment, let me state the “Sudanic Statecraft” *argumentum*: Kush was organized politically as a “segmentary state system,” one in which religious and political suzerainty did not coincide. However, this model could not define Pianchy’s system of warfare. In fact, Pianchy was the solitary generalissimo, as, typically, were New Kingdom pharaohs. At the point when he had to direct his army in person, his generalship was in no way dependent upon leadership of the meritocratic, talismanic, or religious kind (all three of these aspects treated in the sense of Max Weber).

Pianchy of Kush, and likewise the kings of Egypt of Dynasties XVIII-XX, ruled over a mature archaic state. In pharaoh was contained the ability to lead troops and to become, by necessity, or by force of personality, a war hero. The political, economic, religious, and military aspects of their societies were closely intertwined with the concept of monarchy. But Pianchy had inherited a kingdom that had expanded greatly from its original base at Napata/Gebel Barkal. His situation was not too dissimilar to that of the outgoing XVIIth Egyptian Dynasty. He and Ahmose inherited the throne along with an established military corporation that had practiced expansionistic warfare. The two kings likewise. And both rulers had, as well, a metropolis-capital which had as its religious head, Amun. The concept of embedded leadership can be a reasonable rubric under which to place these general-kings.
Of course, economics affects all commanders. The control and redistribution of expropriated goods devolve upon kingship and military leadership. Thus the loyalty of soldiers is bought by payments in kind from the king to them. Victory and the ensuing economic benefits—plunder is only the immediate example—retain a wider sphere of allegiance. Because the Egyptian king could provide such rewards, his authority and pre-eminence in the army—his army—can be taken for granted. The supremacy of the war leader created an expansive outlet for his role as a harbinger of success, and thereby formed one of the bases for his right to command. Tactical control may be forfeited by the military general, but the overall governorship of the ancient Egyptian army had to reside with pharaoh.

We know little about the logistics of Egyptian war preparation, nor about the routes of advance taken by the army on the march, or the expectations of conflict at certain localities. Tactical control might be ceded by the general, but the regulation of the army was the king’s duty, and compliance with his orders always created a real sense of loyalty on the part of the soldiers. Whether any of the famous warrior-pharaohs of the New Kingdom wore a “Mask of Command,” to use Keegan’s term, is a question that we cannot answer except in the broad sense. Some if not all of the generals chosen for this study may have elected to lead by hiding many of their feelings, yet all of them had to be prepared psychologically to order their men to die. How were commands given? Did military reverses cause alterations of original plans? How would a change in strategy affect the soldiers’ ability to fight or even their willingness? If war was the reflection of heroism, it was also an extension of policy.

No monarch of antiquity, serving as the army’s immediate leader, could exhibit fear or even indecision. There are episodes in the account of Thutmose III en route to Megiddo that might suggest disgruntlement, or at least compelling wish from his troops to follow different strategies and tactics. The minions of Ramesses II were not permitted to vent opinion concerning the trap into which their pharaoh had led them. But he does offer us (if not them) his feelings. At first Pianchy appeared aloof from battle and allowed his armies, which preceded him, to do the work. He laughed when his Middle Egyptian enemies made gains. At the moment of his choosing, he finally set forth downstream. His version, like that of the two Egyptian rulers, refused to acknowledge any type of slip by his own side unless it had been committed by his troops without him.
It is well known that during the Old Kingdom kings never led their armies. In fact, properly speaking, there was no Egyptian state army. The size of any organized group of soldiers was unimpressive, except for possible Nubian mercenaries.\textsuperscript{26} The role of a state military in Dynasties III-VI appears tiny.\textsuperscript{27} Leaders of soldiers, commanders though they may have been, seem unknowable in the historical and visual record of that bygone era. Most certainly, there must have been some trained officers and practised troops. How else could a courtier like Wuni lead a host of men into Southern Palestine? Considering the lack of land transport, it is not surprising that no permanent Egyptian military base was established south of the First Cataract, even though a royal military flotilla could have been developed. Moreover, what wars we know or took place mainly in Libya, close to Egyptian territory, with only the rare foray northeast. As with the Middle Kingdom’s boreal orientation, at ports could be controlled in the Levant under the best circumstances,\textsuperscript{28} but during the Old Kingdom the hinterland remained independent.

By the Middle Kingdom a of royal army had come into existence, and from the laconic Dynasty XII accounts it appears to have been rather well-organized.\textsuperscript{29} It was marine based, of course. The Nile was the umbilical cord of the armada. The presence of fortifications at the Second Cataract and the extant prosopographical data indicate that an effective Egyptian army was there at that time. It was composed of locals and of nomarchal levees, just as in the Old Kingdom, no standing military existed. These troops did not form a separate society from the general population, in contrast to the New Kingdom military system.

Even by early Dynasty XVIII, when the land based army of professional footsoldiers and charioteers, Egypt did not have a standing army. The military was not “24/7” and “365/365.” Troops left the country to fight in Asia only part of the year and returned for the harvest season. But more permanent fortresses were erected, supplied, and organized in the south — along the Nile of course — to control the populations and lands of Nubia. Then too, the number of soldiers had increased significantly and therefore a a far more sophisticated “rational” means of corporate administration had evolved.\textsuperscript{30} It is noteworthy that during the New Kingdom a series of anti-military tractates were produced. Dating from Dynasty XIX, these scribal vituperations indicate the awareness on the part of the pre-existing establishment of administrators and priests of a separate, independent, entity. A truly professional class of warriors had come into being, significant enough to encounter societal antagonism.
Just how important such a career might be to a son of a rentier is another matter. Barry Kemp calls the New Kingdom army “professional” and feels that it may have been the case that the military possessed political power. Based on P. Wilbour, he provides a very useful three dimensional social profile of agricultural renters at the beginning of Dynasty XX. Acknowledging the document’s geographic bias to the north, he found that soldiers composed ca 17% of the eight given categories, with priests 12.4% and Sherden mercenaries 7 1/2%. As three tenths of the given social categories of agricultural workers on rented land, soldiers formed a rather large unit. However, the data are limited in that charioteers, the New Kingdom army elite, are not documented.

Army people had an impact within Empire society, notwithstanding the lowliness of the footsoldiers (the ḫw). The kings’ sons received “training” in warfare at a very early age. The pharaohs’ generals and other members of the officer class were prominent. Recent studies on the interlocking nature of Egyptian managers show the importance of high ranking army men within the Egyptian administrative set up. Furthermore, the prevalence of New Kingdom historical fiction with a military focus indicates that the military had penetrated the literary imagination. Thus the role of the pharaoh in combat, in ferocious opposition to presumed foes, was articulated on the playing field of papyri as well as on the physical terrain abroad.

These written narratives also introduced non royal individuals, whose virtual absence from royal visual depictions and historical accounts is balanced, to at least a small degree, here.

To further our understanding of this native instrument of violence, and more importantly, its direct association with generalship, Ramsay MacMullen investigated the “Soul of the Soldier.” He noted the camaraderie within the Roman legions, marked by specific lexical terms, accents of the soldiers, their “savage” appearance, and so forth. On active duty the called each other contubernales, “tentmates.” If the Roman military society was “rather sealed off from the ordinary, that is, from the civilian,” one cannot make a strong comparison with New Kingdom Egyptian soldiers. Nevertheless, the behaviour of veterans brought into discussion by him allows up to reconstruct, albeit partly, the Egyptian soldiers’ sense of fraternity. On active service the called each other contubernales, “tentmates.”

The divisions of the New Kingdom army are reflected in the military standard. The Egyptian word for it was sḫrt, which was separate from the flabellum. Both regimental and divisional standards are known.
Raymond Faulkner opined that “whether the military standards of Egypt were considered to be the embodiment of the honour of the regiment or ship to the same extent as, say, the eagle of a Roman legion, may perhaps be doubted, but that some attachment was felt for them is suggested by the fact that the bearer of the standard was an officer of some rank, about whom it doubtless shed an aura of additional authority.”

The social cohesion of the Roman legion was not unique, of course. The larger operating force in the New Kingdom army was manifested in various independent reactions, few of which we can pinpoint. Surely the names of the gods associated with the kings’ massive soldier groups reveal their relative importance. Amun, being the name of the first, was most definitely paramount. Pre, the second national god, fits equally into our presuppositions of prestige. Then came Ptah and finally Seth, in reference to his role in the night bark of Re when he defeats enemies. The first three were chosen not merely to honor the all-encompassing “state gods,” but also to reflect their powers.

Awards for personal military success in combat were granted during official ceremonies and were displayed by the recipients. The best known of these was the “gold of valour.” It was said, by the ancients and now by Egyptologists, “The name of a brave is in that which he had done. It will not perish in this land forever.” Parades at home created opportunities for bonding among the high military figures and increased their loyalty to the monarch. Another affirmation of a military career was the Middle Kingdom title “Ꜣṯw of the king’s table.” There, elite soldiers were presented to pharaoh. For another example, being chosen for a dangerous task forged an intimate bond, at least from the point of view of the soldier or soldiers; I have in mind Thutmose III’s entire army when he determined the Aruna Pass route. In a camp far away from the homeland at a moment of decision (and of dissent, as MacMullen notes), we can better see class relations in operation within the army. Let me emphasize the speeches of the pharaohs to their troops, as related in the narratives, albeit that the men who were addressed were high in rank. Although we are ignorant of the average soldier’s reaction to surprise attacks, it is significant that the last two divisions of Ramesses II’s army, still marching north to Kadesh, did not run away or even stop in their tracks. Division solidarity was absolute.

Earlier, I have noted, following MacMullen, that we can see the specific terms of a soldier’s lexicon. Many years Paul Horn ago had already written a small work on that subject, but a recent study of Thomas Schneider is worthwhile to illuminate our topic. He separates “military language”
(as opposed to soldiers’ or military slang), and points out the necessity of such *termini technici* in the Egyptian army of the New Kingdom. After defining the numerous foreign words which had entered into the Egyptian language in the New Kingdom (and earlier), his final remarks concern the “Bravourtück of Elite Soldiers” in P. Anastasi I. Schneider emphasizes its importance within groups of officers (*mahers*) who have found themselves in difficult circumstances in Asia. The large number of foreign (northern) expressions that had entered the Egyptian military vocabulary at this time can be counted in Carsten Peust’s list. The words were still spoken in the Coptic Period. It may be useful to note the names of the kings’ horses or teams at this moment, if only because their designations are triumphal in nature.

We can now return to our main thesis. Leadership in war must have depended upon complete obedience and subordination. Superordination, a product of sovereignty, existed from the elemental base of two people to a huge military-industrial complex. Discipline was the first requirement of a soldier. The group efforts of all armies depend upon leadership and yet some armies succeed anyway, regardless of good or bad commanders. Incompetent commanders are as frequent as ants at a picnic, and the great generals stand out as exceptional. But even for so-called “primitive war,” discipline and command go hand in hand.

Turney-High’s significant volume, *Primitive War. Its Practice and Concepts*, may have focused on the military aspects of a society; but it nonetheless addressed the requirements of any organized group of men embarking upon a fight. He cautioned the reader that the warlike behaviour of such troops was private and personal in nature. Of course, we can easily see Egyptian attitudes in the one-on-one combat depictions wherein pharaoh strikes at a single antagonist, usually the commander on a battlefield or the prince of a city-state. Not surprisingly, the Other is personified in one man who is made into a violent disturber of the peace. Yet in primitive warfare leadership consisted mainly of organization and not command. Its tripartite structure is as follows:

1. Commanders without power. This role may be placed under our talismanic leadership wherein no discipline occurs.
2. Leaders with only sacerdotal power. As adumbrated earlier, Montezuma fits the bill. He remained behind the actual combat, and perhaps not outside of any immediate political decision making. In fact, the word “commander” does not even apply.
3. Advisory commanders. One against one conflicts were fought, somewhat in the manner of Homer’s warriors.

4. Active “commissioned” commanders determined by council or heads of soldier societies.

5. Commanders whose powers are conferred, with all authority ceasing once peace is restored.

It is useful to summarize these definitions, because the role of the Old Kingdom pharaoh in war differed greatly from that of the New Kingdom counterpart. Turney-High’s second definition seems to apply here very well. For the Egyptian army of the Middle Kingdom, some overlap between numbers 4 and 5 above may hold. At that time not infrequently the king’s son travelled at the head of the army, either westward by foot or southwards on ships. It was not the case that pharaoh always led his troops. Yet here we must differentiate between warfare that was considered minor and that which entailed the personal leadership of the king.

“The existence of some military cast which is permanently on a war footing was one of the avenues out of primitivity.” But of greater use for commanders was the ability to recruit soldiers. How did the ancient Egyptian army levy troops? This is a key issue for Egyptologists because, except for the mercenaries (Libyans, Nubians, and later Sea Peoples), we are in the dark regarding the social levels of the average soldiers. Kemp has summarized an important piece of information about the high-ranking members of the officer class. In certain cases of Dynasty XVIII — Ahmose Son of Ebana, Ahmose Pen-Nechebet, and Amenemheb come to mind (there are others) — we are able to discern the social backgrounds of some of them; but keep in mind that these were not mere grunts. It is a reasonable conclusion that some type of agricultural sustenance was required, whether the soldier was a landowner or a renter.

How loyal was such a man to the pharaonic commander? How did that loyalty come about and by what means was it maintained? The rise of the chariot elite created a middle rank of men whose relations to their leader in the field were vastly more personal than that of a foot-soldier. After the re-unification of Egypt ca 1575 BC, warfare required chariots and their operators. The visual and written sources, and not merely from the XVIIIth Dynasty, confirm the charioteer role of the Egyptian kings. Their military training included horsemanship, among the many artes belli. As adolescents, kings’ sons learned how to drive a chariot and how to shoot with a bow and arrows. At the minimum,
a prince was expected to accompany his father on a campaign and see for himself the disposition of troops, the vagaries of the march, the outlandish peoples and their customs — all in addition to analysing combat and the nature of conflict.

The “King in Battle” is an excellent “simple form” — to follow André Jolles here\(^{51}\) — in which to limn royal requirements for a general, the persona in which he performed manly deeds of violence. Norwithstanding his divine aspect, the “king” (\(n\text{jsw}\)), “his majesty” (\(h\text{m}=f\)),\(^{52}\) cannot be regarded as a god by his soldiers after he has led them in all sorts of material activities. For example, Ramesses II is absolutely clear on his filial role vis-à-vis Amun. At Kadesh, where he has been caught within his encampment, he implores his “father” to help him. The pious deeds which the pharaoh later iterates are standard accomplishments of any Egyptian monarch. Ramesses plays the do ut des role by imploring Amun to “do good for the one who counts on you.” Set within a clearly defined section of the account (Poem, 109), the antithesis is presented by the king in simplistic yet stark terms. Ramesses II’s infantry deserted him while his chariots supported him. But Ramesses fought at Kadesh at Amun’s command (\(w\text{d}\)),\(^{53}\) therefore it was the deity who was invoked for aid.

It is significant that with one major exception, Ramesses II at Kadesh, very rarely in the royal war narratives do the gods intervene to aid the pharaoh.\(^{54}\) Some, nevertheless, need to be mentioned for we must not forget the commonplace sun disk above the king in battle as well as Nechbet. Yet the Egyptian worldview attributed everything to the king in battle. If Nechbet or even Re parallel the role of the “Sun Goddess of Arinna” propelling the Hittite monarch to battle, these two Egyptian deities never participate in the combat. Even though pharaoh was a god in his own right, and the son of Egypt’s chief deity, the ideology of New Kingdom military inscriptions purposely avoided any revelation of his divinity. In the inscriptions sources as well as in the pictorial, the king functioned as protagonist in the absence of any transcendent partner or director. Pharaoh, having the promise of success at Karnak from Amun through an oracle, went out on campaign. After that season of carnage was over, he returned to Thebes and entered immediately into the sanctuary of his father Amun. Ramesses II conducted himself as an earthly ruler performing religious ceremonies. None of the war records which we shall discuss in the subsequent chapters imply that the king acted as a defender of the faith.
Civilized martial behaviour required discipline. By the New Kingdom there was a ladder of command within the ranks. Social pressure and desire for prestige created ambition among the soldiers, but the pharaoh maintained control through moral obligation and the power of coercion. In times of civil war, violent disputes over the right to rule occurred, yet no such challenges happened to a monarch while he was out on campaign. There, authority was automatically obeyed. But how was this commitment achieved and to what degree did various pharaohs demonstrate their leadership abilities?

For Bertrand de Jouvenel it is the role of a dux to provide the catalyst for organizational control and to quash resistance. Later, the rex extends Max Weber's classic dichotomy between charismatic leadership and the rational aspect of power. In the ancient Egyptian sphere one can interpret the XVIIth Dynasty's attempt to defeat the Hyksos in the north as a crusade. The rhetoric of Kamose, for example, in the early Rameside story of Apophis and Seqenenre, indicates such a mindset. The sanction of Amun was overtly indicated when the two pharaohs ultimately embarked on war. Kamose inherited a divided Egypt with a native state centered in the south at Thebes. The importance of the capital as a bastion of Amun and independence had already been established many years earlier. Data from his official archive at Karnak explicitly declare his cause for war. “Egypt” is to be rescued.

Behind his short speech to his magistrates, his very high officials, was the well-prepared army. It was still marine in deployment but had already engaged the northern foe at least once, and moreover had moved upstream into Lower Nubia. In addition, it had become more dependent upon horses, with the development of a chariot division as the leading edge. Good leadership was key to the success of the Theban state. With foreign elements in control of parts of Egypt, not only the Delta but also the Nile Valley, a further emotional appeal was involved, one that we can label nationalistic. Hence, generalship came into being as a permanent and not merely episodic characteristics of kingship.

And when Kamose sailed north, he ensured that his Medjay mercenaries received due praise in his official account along with his Egyptian archers. He made it clear that he was never lax concerning his army. To quote the text, “the concerned man has not diverted attention” from his soldiers. We can infer the type of war leader that he wanted to be for his troops. An additional brief remark towards the end of the fragmentary papyrus of Apophis and Seqenenre points to the types of advisors
with whom the king wishes to discuss his plans. He included — for the first time in the historical literature — the “ranking soldiers,” thereby acknowledging the value of the very high officers in his army, and their expertise as consultants.

Hence, by the end of the XVIIth Dynasty, Thebes had a military establishment in which non-royal but high ranking members were directly involved in decision making. This structure implies a separate body of likeminded men who had pharaoh’s ear although they were not regular administrators of the state. With them Seqenenre and his successors lived and worked. The regularity of the ensuing campaigns can be explained by this close relationship, which extended to the troops. Such was not the case earlier, even during the heyday of the Middle Kingdom.

Expert professionalism must have strongly taken hold sometime during the murky days of the early XVIIth Dynasty. Once the army became bureaucratic, its system was easy to maintain because it followed the norms of the state. It was not difficult to develop a relatively sophisticated and articulated command structure, one that included non-combatants such as royal scribes, provisioners, medical people, artist-recorders, animal handlers, repairmen, and of course the entire baggage train. The basic principles of warfare did not change much but the means of applying them altered as the technological support developed and the political system became organized for a war of liberation. Ideology certainly had a major influence on the soldiers’ life, as is reflected in the use of the first person plural “we,” as in “our army.” (See the account of Ahmose son of Ebana.) Such is a commonplace psychological occurrence when men, working together, attune themselves to thinking as a small entity, a mini-corporation, so to speak. If the individual was a replaceable unit, there were enough higher level officers to interface between the ordinary footsoldier and the king.

This newly expanded and, quite possibly to the ancients, perfected army required a more differentiated officer class who, like magistrates in civilian life, established the most efficient means of leadership, preferably through persuasion instead of coercion. Thus at the very top the monarch had to enact a moral example. To quote David Rapoport, “in the field he must be willing to accept the same privations as the men, and he must have the self-discipline to undertake unpleasant tasks.” But authority, surely, is what matters. Without it internal antagonisms will not be resolved and commands will not be followed. Increasing specialization demands stronger authority. No longer could the pharaoh
remain at home and send small bodies of troops outside his country. The XVIIth Dynasty, engaged in a lengthy attempt to control the entire Nile polity, began by building a firm military system raised upon the organizational framework of pharaonic Egypt, where central control extended to the economic, political, and social aspects of the new institution and where the ancient “state cult” ensured loyalty to the sanctified king. While force and authority are the two building blocks of a successfully established army, there was little need for the New Kingdom to incorporate an elaborate coercive apparatus because of the inherent authoritarian nature of the war commander, the pharaoh.

In the military, clarity of organization is important. From the albeit now dated study by Alan Schulman, the internal administrative structure of the New Kingdom army appears mature. The soldiers no longer had to obtain basic supplies, such as food and equipment, for themselves. The government provided rations and materiel, set a clear organizational structure, required some degree of training (although we know almost nothing of this), and brought in officers from well-established families of the administrative class.

The army became increasingly diverse. Archers had already been separated from the footsoldiers, who fought hand-to-hand. But then came elite attack troops, skirmishers, scouts, and, finally the chariots. Among the last appeared the king as the showman for all his men, but especially his fellow charioteers, who emerged naturally as the elite sector. There were also Nubian and Libyan mercenaries.

But “specialization and co-ordination, morale and supplies” were necessary. Evidently, no king could do all of this. He was never schooled in army provisioning or chariot repair. He probably never even noticed how his army was being supplied. These matters, logically, would have been left for administrative officers, A pharaoh was responsible for tactics, which he would have learned on the battlefield before he became king. There were generals with whom he could plan overall strategy.

Surely the ruler knew certain military fundamentals, such as learning the terrain, even if poorly. Likewise, it was necessary for the Egyptian soldiers and their commander to know their enemy in order to annul his capabilities and prevent him from taking the initiative. These aspects of warfare could not be ignored. “Natural leadership” must have been a compelling attribute of any warrior-king, independent of training. Personality, a much abused term, is notable. If it may be true that the military demands an extrovert to lead the troops, it also requires the clear thinking
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of a general staff. We learn little of that in the war records of Ramesses III. But with Thutmose III, Ramesses II, and Pianchy, the sources are detailed enough to allow us a degree of interpretation. Furthermore, personalities are apt to change under stress situations. Did not Ramesses indulge in uncharacteristic behaviour across from the city of Kadesh? But solving an unexpected crisis or even making a choice between alternatives demands a careful introspective leader, like Thutmose III on the way to Megiddo. Such was Pianchy, albeit he had the advantage of being at home plotting his actions from a series of reports.

If the commander could know and control all strategic complexities before setting out on a campaign, then he would be in a remarkably superior position vis-à-vis his opponents. Such planning, with a war council of course, requires knowledge of the roads, highways, urban centers, oases, rivers, mountains, and all forms of terrain. It is assumed that Thutmose III had a good understanding of the paths to Megiddo just as he relied upon a fully-developed coastal road between the northeast Delta and Gaza, thereby sidestepping potential trouble through the shoreline of Sinai. Any attempt to obviate the uncertainties (“fog of war”) must take place at the very start. By the XVIIIth Dynasty the major routes into Palestine, both along the coast and inland via the King’s Highway, were familiar to the Egyptians, as were the major city-states, But this does not imply that a pharaoh had any deep awareness of dangerous possibilities even though his sources of information (travellers, merchants, spies, scouts) would have garnered enough background data for him. Surely Thutmose III had in mind the Aruna Pass as a breathtaking opportunity to overwhelm his opponents tactically. But did he know this before he arrived at Yehem, or how much logistical details did his scouts provide?

From modern Egyptological reconstruction it appears that almost every major campaign was planned in advance. Upon perusing the maps and topographic figures in the works of Yohanan Aharoni, Wolfgang Helck, and Kenneth Kitchen, one gets the feeling that all of Egypt’s wars in the Levant followed logical patterns by which the king went to X, stayed at Y, advanced laterally to Z, and then returned home. Given the regularity of the routes and the locations of certain nexi — Gaza, Megiddo, and Kadesh come to mind, but add Yenoam, Kumidi, and the Lebanese harbours — it seems to scholars that all of the New Kingdom campaigns were simplistic in their strategic planning. However, recent analyses have revealed more complex scenarios, or at least ones that differ from the “accepted” scholarly reconstructions.
Such may be a chimera. The Egyptian writers of war records edited Ramesses II’s Moabite and Edomite campaigns from the “logical” progression reconstructed by Kitchen.\textsuperscript{70} The campaigns of Seti I, especially those of his first regnal year, are more difficult to interpret. (See Plate II, page 23) for the king at Gaza fighting the Shasu.) From local royal inscriptions at Beth Shan we learn what the pictorial record at Karnak does not allow us to see: that the king was not everywhere in person. He sent his divisions out while he remained at a strategic city. Hence we can always ask whether he was where it is claimed and whether he was actually commanding his battles. We possess some murky data about the high ranking warrior Mehi, who was a key figure in Seti I’s Karnak reliefs, as well as information on the role of a son of Merenptah during his Canaanite war.\textsuperscript{71} Additionally, the six-fold register division of the campaign of Seti I has led to many interpretations. Some scholars date all to the same year; others separate them. Yet others combine the Sinai and Yenoam campaigns even though they are carved on two separate registers. Without specific dates for all registers, we ought to see the monument as a single pictorial victory memorial and not solely as a historically-arranged war account which it was as well. To the viewer, it was only Seti who achieved success.

In the official accounts of the campaigns, certain matters are understood. The king is in charge, he leads his troops along well marked highways, and he makes the right decisions even under adverse circumstances. Always the victor, he hits his enemies at the right time. As is to be expected within the context of the royal ideology (and not merely by prerogative), non-royals play almost no role in the historical or visual tableaux. The extant data on any of the New Kingdom wars purposely avoid any hint of significant assistance. Therefore, I remain suspicious of “master plans” set into motion by the kings’ commands. They seem too pat, just as the always successful battles are never explained in detail; i.e., one never knows how tightly-fought the combat was. \textit{Pharao siegt immer} is a title to a well-presented catalogue that aptly expresses my scepticism, even if the presentations therein adumbrated what successful generalship was.\textsuperscript{72}

Yet it is clear that massive preparations had already been set into motion before the army moved north. Consider the following requirements:\textsuperscript{73}

1. The security of the Sinai and the early system of fortresses and garrisons.
2. The relative ease of marching through Palestine so long as Megiddo was under firm control.
3. The ease of marching through central Syria, provided that Kadesh was not in opposition.
4. The later supply depots along the Lebanese coast by means of which pharaohs’ inland army would be supplied and augmented.
5. The assurance of no opposition from many of the cities in Palestine and Syria.
6. The obvious need for supplies during the treks from one city to another as well as the necessity of securing fodder for the animals.
7. The generally unacknowledged presence of baggage trains. (A few details are present in Thutmose’s Megiddo narrative and the Kadesh reliefs supply additional information, but only from the depiction of the king’s bivouac.)
8. The expectation of the enemies’ knowledge of the campaign.

These eight stipulations only begin to convey the degree of preparation necessary for any pharaoh’s attack on the north.

Turney-High adheres to Wendell Coats’s characterization of the officer class as a profession demanding expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.74 These are the criteria of individuals who rise above mediocrity. Turney-High also refers to the old work of Theodore Dodge discussing the great generals of antiquity. And I believe that not only those two, but also later interpreters of military leadership would agree that popularity is not the essential hallmark of a captain of troops. In its place must be discipline.

The pharaoh marched at the head of his army. Thutmose III opened his army to danger when he demanded that the Aruna Pass be taken. Similarly, Ramesses II was personally courageous at Kadesh. Other examples can be given here as well. The sharp eyes of Amunhotep II during his first victorious campaign ought to be mentioned, as well as Thutmose IV’s correct preparation of his army when he was attacking Nubia.75 His brief narrative adds written testimony regarding how the various sectors of the army were stationed on the road, thereby supplementing the useful pictorial representations of marching soldiers (with their chariot support) in Seti I’s war record at Abydos and Ramesses II’s at Kadesh. Of course, it would be remarkable if any of the logistical arrangements for the army
were included in the official accounts. On the other hand, in his Great Stela Pianchy is very informative of the methods of contemporary combat. His involvement with his troops may be seen in the assault on the walls of Memphis. Such information depends upon the focus of attention of the ancient writer or artist. Cases in contemporary New Kingdom literature are not hard to find. The episode of “The Capture of Joppa,” for example, is explicit in describing a ruse that reads like a folktale.

Turney-High lists seventeen principles of effective warfare. All are connected to generalship and thus all can be applied to any Egyptian warrior monarch. Turney-High commences with the “principle of the offensive,” which seems to relate solely to the great campaigns that the pharaohs undertook in person. It was incumbent upon the king to attack, and with surprise. With this second criterion Turney-High considers field tactics. Military intelligence was necessary as well. We lack any evidence of an Egyptian spy agency, but this does not indicate that some type of intelligence service existed, presumably dependent upon the local Egyptian administrators in Asia. Nonetheless, as the Amarna Letters indicate, the Egyptians were well informed of local difficulties and political rivalry in their Asiatic territories.

Turney-High had three related requirements of excellent generalship: use of terrain, mobility, and manoeuvrability. How, to take a case in point, were the chariot sectors of the Egyptian army commanded and to what extent did the pharaoh lead? In the contemporary reliefs he is the front charioteer, and his written accounts stress that role. Yet in order to keep a rapid pace traveling northward, the chariot division needed information concerning the local ecology and terrain, which must have been gathered in advance at home. Here, the word “intelligence” applies again. It has been my contention that no campaign of a pharaoh operated in an information vacuum. For example, how could Thutmose III have prepared for war during his twenty-second regnal year without having set up his Sinai fortress system to receive his army? Consider how quickly he reached and then departed from Gaza. Enemies and neutrals must also have been well aware of any expected major assault on the part of a pharaoh.

Now we arrive at the objective, Turney-High’s sixth necessity. One cannot but refer to Clausewitz on this matter, especially the interconnection of politics and war. What did Thutmose III want from his first campaign as sole pharaoh? Certainly, it was to capture the city of Megiddo. All modern commentators have regarded Thutmose’s campaign
as aimed at crushing a major Palestinian rebellion centered in that city. Not surprisingly, then, when the siege of Megiddo began and the peripheral regions had been brought back under Egyptian control, the pharaoh left Palestine and went home.

But even before he embarked northward, what had already been prepared? Earlier, there must have been:

1. An effective fortress system in place along the “Ways of Horus.” The completion of the work would have occurred under the joint reign of Hatshepsut and Thutmose.
2. But safe and easy access to Gaza, and thus to southern Palestine, surely was desired at an earlier time.
3. Thutmose I, the first pharaoh to reach the Euphrates, would have realized the need to control the route. (Note that it was during the reign of Thutmose II that we hear of the transhumant Shasu, tribes who could impede Egyptian advances.)
4. It was known that Palestine was not ruled by one king, but rather was fragmented into small urban centers, some of which were powerful owing to trade and logistic positions, but others of which were small.
5. Hence, it was not necessary for an Egyptian army to stock up on food supplies for the soldiers and the animals accompanying them. The general political and ecological situation of Palestine was understood by the Egyptians.
6. Since no great empire stood next to the boundaries of Palestine, the Egyptian military could advance.
7. The major routes were familiar. The Levantine seaports had already been recognized as staging zones for additional troops.
8. Thus the lemma was the acquisition of peaceful control over the city-states, which could be subdued in whatever way possible: by acquiescence, the crushing of opposition, the policy of “resident ‘royal’ captives, and the like.
9. Eventually, some type of indirect political and military control was established.

Proceeding farther created security risks; hence the need for the effective subjugation of Kadesh, the crucial metropolis dominating the border lands immediately north of Palestine. Even with the Lebanese ports under
Egyptian control, progress was difficult. Thutmose I’s and Thutmose III’s campaigns against Mitanni did not produce results. Thutmose III moved into western Mitanni with little resistance but was stopped when he reached the dividing line of the Euphrates River. In hindsight it is easy to see that the Egyptian monarch lacked strategic purpose. Easy it was to build ships and sail south on the Euphrates, but for what ultimate purpose it is hard to determine. Thutmose III failed to develop a clear, realistic picture of what his campaigns were to accomplish. The so-called “Trans-Euphratean” offensive was lacked strategic focus. The planning was good, as can be read from his Gebel Barkal Stela; but his ultimate aims were dim. Tactically, if we agree with the royal narrative, all was successful even if the Egyptians subsequently had to withdraw from much of the recently-acquired northern territories. The same may be said for Thutmose III’s conquests — if they were such — beyond the Fourth Cataract. In both cases, Syria and Upper Nubia, Egyptian kings had to face serious impediments, the most important of which involved distance. Thutmose III was fond of emulating the deeds of his grandfather, Thutmose I, in Nubia and in Western Asia. By his twenty-ninth regnal year Thutmose I had easy passage through northern and eastern Syria, and therefore was able to face the king of Mitanni. In the heartland of Nubia, the Nile River provided fast and unopposed access to remote lands. Yet the results of these over-extended campaigns were meaningless because establishing permanent control was impossible. It is not improbable that Thutmose III came to realize that establishing military control so far away was simply not feasible. When evaluating pharaonic Egypt, we rarely attempt to estimate the costs of empire. By these criteria the problematic nature of the Kingdom of Mitanni as a powerful, effective opponent of Egypt can be rethought. Additionally, the logistic difficulties involving distance, transportation, and the fear of local rebellion can be strengthened.

On a previous occasion I attempted to calculate a tentative price for the grain needed by Thutmose III to reach Megiddo. Much of the data was solid, but I had to follow assumptions regarding the size of armies and the amount of grain production, neither of which can be easily determined. At Kadesh, Ramesses is assumed to have taken four divisions with him, each numbering 5,000 men, and I am not including the Na’arn cohort. (Plate III, page 42, covers two reconstructions of the army formation.) When combat occurred at the city walls of Megiddo, the Egyptian army may have numbered 7,500 soldiers if not a few more. The Egyptians would have contributed a great quantity of home-grown grain, but it would have
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been used up during the Sinai trip. More food and water would have been readily available at fortresses or could have been acquired \textit{en route} at local cities or by foraging. In Palestine the political leadership was weak. The Egyptians could live off the cities, which were used as storage depots and waystations for the army. Thus generalship in Western Asia need not be concerned with any serious deficiency in supplies. On the other hand, uncertainties about the size of the army must have been significant when a king was preparing to march since conscription depended upon the pool of male labour at a certain time of the year — let us say one Egyptian season at the maximum (ninety days) — and their combat abilities. Therefore it is important to consider the population limitations of New Kingdom Egypt. And here, even if we arrive at an estimate of about three million people, we lack specific data concerning the available number of officers, common soldiers, and non-combatants, all of whom went to war. (Note that I am not considering the garrison troops who were stationed in Nubia, but not in Asia.) If at least twenty thousand Egyptian fighters were in Ramesses II’s army at Kadesh, around 6.7% of the total Egyptian population was active in the field at one time. The pharaoh was advantaged by his country’s regular seasonal agricultural system.

For me, this task is connected to a great one — the cost of empire. The Egyptians would have had a great quantity of grains at home, even though the security of the Sinai trip was insured through expenditure of food, personnel, and water, most of which was readily available by means of the fortresses built and operable. On-the-spot requisition then came into play. The roads were the arteries of advance and control. They supplied the means of getting to desired localities owing to a local city’s food supply (within its walls and in granaries) or by foraging off the fields.

But what other requirements, outside of the global ones of economy and troop numbers, did a pharaoh have? Turney-High then adds security as his seventh desideratum, one that we have sketched repeatedly in this discussion. His next few, however, are equally crucial although they refer to the actual principles of combat and are therefore tactical matters: fire and movement, combined employment of all resources, concerted effort, and concentration of force at one point. We shall see later how well our selected pharaohs operated as generals by adhering to these rules later. For the moment let me observe that notwithstanding the Egyptian army’s overt relaxation after combat outside of Megiddo, a point that needs fuller explication, Thutmose III and his successors seem not to have been inept.
in these matters. And to be sure, his war records include this major objection against his men. Pianchy complained that his troops in Egypt had not disposed of Namlot. Indeed, they had let him return to his home base of Hermopolis. Still, Pianchy did not then lead the army.

It is interesting, indeed suggestive of an organizational mind, that Turney-High soon raises intellectual concerns regarding generalship. Integrity of tactical unity — apparently always followed by the Egyptian kings — the entailed simplicity of plans, correct formations, economy of force, and the necessity of sufficient numbers come into play. The second and the fourth factors appear to have been pursued effectively, or at least campaigns. Thutmose III employed effective numbers at Megiddo, and I do not feel that Ramesses II erred in any way by bringing his massive four-division host to the heartland of Syria. If his army’s size was double that of Thutmose III’s, the enemy was all the greater. Finally, we may analyse the exploitation of victory. Sadly, Ramesses II was unable to achieve his goal. Pianchy most certainly did, but only after realizing that he had to lead a large number of newly-trained men into battle personally. As we shall see, in this case it can be argued that he failed to estimate correctly the strength of opposition in the far north. Amunhotep II’s second campaign of victory in his ninth regnal year was limited in nature, and principally concerned with maintaining dominance in eastern Palestine. His purpose at the borders was one of containment. The same may be said with respect to Seti I’s warfare in the same region. From the records at Beth Shan a more exact understanding of the indirect activity of the pharaoh can be discerned. The dispatch of his army without him was undoubtedly the most significant aspect relating to generalship, but the policy was to attack only major foes in person.

I have remarked previously that any major campaign undertaken by the pharaoh could not have been done secretly. At the minimum, during the heyday of the Egyptian empire, the local princes of the Asiatic cities were well informed when their overlord had decided to intervene personally. Spies were necessary. The local chiefs would have been aware of a pharaonic advance. Secrecy, therefore, played a negligible role with respect to campaigns, although by no means were stratagems of opposition ignored.

A related issue is native opposition. Did the governors of these localities expect help? Did they believe that they could stop the pharaoh? Often the local prince would appeal to an outside power. Amunhotep II’s reactive campaign in his seventh regnal year comes to mind,
as do Thutmose III’s later Syrian wars. Under the circumstances the pharaoh would have to field a large army, like that at Kadesh in regnal year five of Ramesses II. Moreover, if the city was considerably distant from Egypt, the regional prince was more likely to resist. This, I suspect, any good Egyptian commander-in-chief would have realized from the very start. When Thutmose III transferred his military activities to central and northeast Syria, he wisely established a provisioning depot at the harbour. Ramesses II followed the same pattern when he attacked the Hittite-held territories in Syria. Of course, all of these preparations were recognized by the Asiatics.

It is very possible that a sort of “chivalric” attitude existed, akin to the concept of ludic war, to which the local powers played along. Battles against urban centers in Asia took place near the citadel. Egyptian pictorial records feature the topos of a chariot duel in the field outside of that fortress. The written accounts usually describe struggles at key localities. Hence, combat seems to have been regarded as a set piece in a game wherein the two antagonists — pharaoh and enemy chief — fought until the Egyptian won. In reality, the Egyptian army outnumbered that of any local prince. At best, effective resistance would have slowed the Egyptian campaign so that a larger, more distant foe might become better prepared to halt the invading army. Either that, or “head for the hills,” as Ellen Morris writes. Surely, such tactics, seemingly useless to us moderns, were understood by the pharaohs. I do believe that the elite chariot-based culture of the Late Bronze Age fostered the homo ludens aspect. Therefore, we should not be surprised at the relatively small number of chariots and horses that were captured, not to mention the war materiel that a pharaoh acquired after a broken siege. The war records of Amunhotep II are useful to reread on this matter.

One wonders whether at home in the chancellery there were two departments. The Amarna Letters, our mine of social, political, and military information during the reigns of Amunhotep III and IV, are useful only for Asia. (These letters were written in Akkadian.) But was there a division of responsibility similar to that of imperial Russia, which bifurcated its diplomacy into European and Asiatic sectors? The administration of Nubia was split into north and south (Kush), and with a well-equipped governmental structure in place and overseen by a viceroy. Keep in mind that I am referring only to the diplomatic and military aspects. Pharaoh rarely went south to war after the middle of the XVIIIth Dynasty if only because his military difficulties were far greater in Asia.
The social aspect of Egypt’s general-in-charge, the pharaoh, demanded that he undertake campaigns of a major sort and in person from time to time. He could thus ascertain who were his friends, rewards his servants, and ensure that everything operated smoothly. Witness Seti I in Lebanon, for example. Campaigns were not necessarily solely oriented to combat. For instance, a pharaoh would pick up valuable political awareness from a campaign. But I believe that the best testing-time for a rebellion was the liminal period between the death of a pharaoh and the ascension of another. Aggressive actions could be begun, and then the new pharaoh would set out northward. Remember that the Kadesh march in regnal year five of Ramesses II was preceded by at least one northern conflict a year previously. Small undertakings may very well have been ventured as preliminaries to a major offensive. The Egyptian monarch had to act when events became serious. It was a demonstration of his worth.

We thus arrive at one of the major criteria that Keegan studied in a final section of his important *The Mask of Command* — namely, the commander’s address to his troops. It is singular that Keegan refers explicitly to Raimondo Montecuccoli, the famous seventeenth century general of imperial Austria, but oddly avoids any references to the wealth of examples, and contemporary historical analyses that are contained therein, which are to be found employed over and over by the ancient Greek and Roman historians.

Keegan, relying mainly upon Arrian, singles out Alexander the Great’s inspiring, but reactive, address to his soldiers. Equally, a brief acquaintance with Herodotus and Thucydides is enough to show the reader just how important, and how literary rather than historical, these speeches were, even if they may have been composed with the actual pronouncements in mind. Notwithstanding the sizeable amount of inspired scholarship on this matter, for us the important fact is the event itself and not what later historians construed the general’s words to imply.

Keegan indicates that one of the arts of generalship was speaking before a battle and performing well. The latter assessment is all-important. Any commander should be able to persuade his troops to wipe out the enemy. There were other occasions when a *Feldherrenrede* — Keegan in fact uses the German classical term — was orated for a different purpose; in the examples of Tacitus, Drusus and Germanicus spoke to quell their legions’ revolts. Here, the same actions of leadership came into play.
The general, pharaoh or not, must be an actor. The indispensable accomplishments for personal military supremacy must therefore include public speaking, incorporating these skills\textsuperscript{95}

2. Loud voice.
3. Visual contact with the audience.
4. Use of a platform or rostrum.
5. Presence in front of the troops.
6. A theme that speaks to the point.
7. Rousing vocabulary and phraseology.
8. Application of humour, which can be spiced with irony.
9. Increase of voice strength at the end of sentences, especially at the conclusion of the address.
10. Adroit body movements, including sharp turns of the face, but not too many physical displacements.
11. Timing of the oration.

Let me stop and analyse the final desirable attribute as it moves us to the core of the matter. This one is directly connected to all of the others: the general must be attuned to the precise moment of exhortation. The words and the method of delivery hinge upon the optimum occasion. The preceding ten characteristics are necessary rules of recital, but all of these together are the understood requirements for acting. The consummate general is well versed in stagecraft.

Keegan outlines three imperatives, which he labels military \textit{virtù}, following the concepts of the Italian Renaissance. Machiavelli’s \textit{Art of War} is assumed here.\textsuperscript{96} The Florentine soldier, statesman, and author frames his treatise within a conversation between Lord Fabrizio Colonna and his Florentine nobles. There is no real dialogue, but rather a list of prescriptions and recommendations, preaching in written form, by a Renaissance prince encouraging his underlings to understand what authoritative primacy requires.

Keegan then makes four more basic stipulations with respect to a general’s address to his troops, and all apply nicely to Thutmose III. They are: the argument of use, fear of infamy, the desire for riches and prestige,
and the inculcation of confidence. Let us survey these points, but also observe that they need not be associated only with the purely military context of battle. The first stresses that there is no choice but to fight and win. Patriotism and love of “the captain” are assumed. One can also instil disdain for the enemy, treating him as a coward unprepared for combat. Fear of infamy refers to the choice of fighting or dying. *Tertium non datur*; that is to say, flight leads to ostracism. Here especially, the soldier is addressed individually by the leader’s public speech. We have already mentioned Keegan’s third persuasion, wherein the average soldier is led to expect some type of reward, be it monetary or prestigious. Finally, the last — confidence — undoubtedly overarches all the other three. With it, the pharaoh has secured a cohesive, patriotic army that will fight for him — the example of Shakespeare’s Henry V at Agincourt cannot but be remembered — having been roused for the ensuing struggle. Did not Thutmose III do the same on the evening preceding the fight outside of Megiddo? Set pieces for the world’s literature these battlefield pitches may be, they nevertheless reveal the writer’s concept of leadership in war.

Keegan further argued that battlefield command depends upon the society in which soldiers live. The different generals reflect the time, place, and occasion of war. Seemingly hesitantly, the war records of the New Kingdom tend not to stress patriotic feelings. We encounter a few at the interface of the outgoing Second Intermediate Period and early Dynasty XVIII. Subsequently, Thutmose III’s “Annals,” as befits a royal narrative, provide more information. The two accounts of Amunhotep II read differently, eschewing such personal motives and actions. With Seti I a vast screen opens to us as in a cinema. Ramesses II at Kadesh purposely addresses different issues, ones of betrayal and self-sacrifice. But the communality of New Kingdom society pervades these diverse accounts. Keegan’s volume considered the various models of generalship taken from different societies and epochs. We, however, remain fixed upon one era and one culture.

The stark division that Keegan chose for his remarkable study was that of charismatic and administrative, or as one might say, heroic and directional. But as Lord Moran states, “once men are satisfied with their leader has it in him to build for victory they no more question his will but gladly commit their lives to his keeping.” To this he then justly adds will power above all. Moltke collapsed in 1914 owing to the lack of a quick and definite victory. Falkenhayn eventually resorted to half
measures, and Ludendorff lost nerve when things went wrong. Keegan was following the recognized groundwork of Weber’s sociological analyses with more than a teaspoon of Turney-High’s “Clausewitzian” commentary. Even so, it is readily apparent that the pharaoh in war was not “rational” according to Weber’s concept of the “bureaucratic mind.” To the contrary, New Kingdom monarchs had to perform successfully in combat. They presented themselves as perfect exemplars of heroic command wrapped in what Keegan pronounces “the imperative of kingship;” yet the vestiges of their abilities rarely provide direct evidence of the lonely task of command. But Keegan’s “mystery of leadership” can be examined with our realization that the pharaoh’s actions were observed by all of the soldiers. How much the army was suffused with his personality is, I suspect, one of the hallmarks of a successful Egyptian warrior-king.

The penetrability of decision making through subalterns, the pharaoh’s generals and lower ranking officers, did not obviate any soldier’s knowledge that his lord and pharaoh was personally and fully in charge. How much was the army suffused with his personality was one of the bases for a Egyptian successful warrior-king. One can perhaps see him as Ivan the Terrible was perceived outside of his tent on a knoll at Kazan by the young Fyodor, in a vivid medium shot of Eisenstein saturated with patriotism and awe.

Sanctions, as well, are among the tasks of command. Thutmose III exerted control by repudiating his troops in a tenuous moment after the battle of Megiddo. Seti I may have relaxed his martial manner upon reaching Lebanon, the result of which no doubt more than pleased his army. Pursuing an enemy which flees after defeat was always a troublesome matter. No doubt Ramesses III did not feel it necessary to continue to forge ahead after his Libyan opponents were smashed. He would have been forced to go farther westward and spend more time than his aims could justify; he never intended the destruction (if that were possible) of the Libyan tribes. Consider, rather, Thutmose III’s well organized march eastward in Syria, his arrival at the Euphrates, and his attempted destruction of Mitannian cities. His war reports did not reveal any opposition at all on the part of his soldiers, as in contrast did Alexander’s, whose supply connections were extended and his goals never well defined.

Keegan put it succinctly by writing that command, control, communication, and intelligence form the desideratum of military strategy. Yet equally the pharaoh was the ruler of his country, and so his aims in war went beyond the annihilation of the enemy to “peace,”
a vague term indicating the agreed-upon result of a military conflict. In his remarkable study on Thucydides, Ramon Aron contemplates the sense of historical destiny. Thutmose III shouldered the same burden. War, which is competition between or among different powers, is also a focus for cooperation. Thus the diametrically opposed social aspects of “we” and “they” are immediately emphasized. Invading armies carry with them the feeling of pride; they seek domination. What did Ramesses II desire when he set out for Kadesh? Was the subjugation of a major revolt qualitatively different from the re-establishment of pharaonic control? On a campaign, the effective leader must manufacture passion for combat but at the same time maintain discipline. The pharaoh had to internalize the same feelings, so as to be ready to release his forces at the advantageous time and place.

The chief warrior should not act precipitously but by reflection. Charles Francis Adams Jr. writes that “the work of a general in command demands head — a cool, calculating head, fertile in expedients.” Amunhotep II is frequently considered to have been a violent man with a warrior’s temperament for humiliating his opponents and devastating their territories, but his two major records indicate well thought out strategies, and his tactics cannot be criticised without knowing what happened on the other side. Battles may or may not confirm the calculations of the commanders, and the resultant victory may not turn out as planned. Royal narratives from Egypt inscrutably present all events as if inevitable. As for the working goal, this can often be discerned; e.g., Thutmose III at Megiddo, Ramesses II at Kadesh, or the defensive attacks of Ramesses III in the west. With respect to any of Seti I’s campaigns, was the scenario depicted at Karnak logically a set piece? As for the Asiatic thrusts, one normally assumed a logical development across the Sinai, re-establishment of full security in Palestine, and a military visit to the coast of Lebanon. Then we see the Hittite war, which appears to be a logical precursor to the recapture of Kadesh. With an “interrupting” Libyan conflict between the last two, the question arises whether pharaoh fought in person or not. Furthermore, it could be argued that the two Asiatic registers on the west side of the northern hypostyle hall might represent temporal order and refer to one single march of Seti northward. The Libyan encounter could then be disregarded if we prefer to accept a “grand strategy.”

The intelligibility of historical reconstruction depends upon the interpreter. Certainly, Thutmose III’s preparations for his north Syrian attack seem very logical indeed. His concerns were similar to those
of Ramesses II preceding the march to Kadesh. The dramatic character of both pharaohs rests upon their presumed combative foreign policy. Ramesses may have emulated his father just as Thutmose III self-consciously followed in the footsteps of his grandfather. But the contingent nature of events does not allow us to conclude that these four men expected the same outcome. The political geography of Syria-Palestine allowed only a few choices of attack. The weapons did not differ, nor did the war materiel. The army’s progress was easily worked out in advance at home, and the expected arrivals and departures from specific localities did not change much.

But understanding and emotionalism must be combined in the personality of a general because the talent of the commander directs the entire army. Intellect and temperament are what Clausewitz highlights at the commencement of Chapter Three of his first book, “On Military Genius.” An informed understanding occurs when war is the activity, especially under pressuring circumstances, demanding a strong sense of calculation. Inflammable emotions are dangerous to the commander, and we well remember Ramesses II’s singlemindedness in proceeding north to Kadesh. But daring is also a necessity, although not to be used frequently. It is best applied on singular occasions when a totally new horizon of possibilities opens up. Thutmose III’s risk in departing from Yehem proves the stricture. In contrast, Pianchy’s initial reaction was to let his local contingents in Egypt deal with the unexpected checks to his suzerainty. When that failed, he had to go to war in person. But his character appears to have been fairly well level. Maintaining himself on an equilibrium, we shall see subsequently that he was able to wax hot in combat but become subtly cool after the storm has passed.

In the third chapter Clausewitz proceeds by connecting warfare and terrain. A regular army — and that is what pharaohs led — operates in three dimensional space. It is on the move or bivouacked. Armies dominate the areas through which they travel. The “sense of locality,” as Clausewitz states, is perfectly recognized by great commanders. U. S. Grant was one of the best-known generals who possessed this ability, but he was also a very odd case, one truly deserving a psychological-historical study. This trait is inborn. Clausewitz calls it imagination. Thutmose III sensed it as he came close to the Aruna Pass. Ramesses II did not feel it when his divisions had to cut through the Forest of Lebawi and then tread through a ford. It is extremely disheartening that such an innate psychological characteristic is not revealed by the extant Egyptological sources.
Consider, then, the requirements for moving armies. On land the situation was considerably different than on water, the Nile in our case. The unification of forces was achieved by Ramesses — the Hittites had not desired to impede, if they could, his Na‘arn contingent on its way east. With regard to affairs of a less threatening flavour, consider Seti I in east Palestine, where he effectively used his forces, directing them from behind the scenes. But he also had the superiority in numbers and materiel. Furthermore, the engagements were of a minor nature, and ones for which he could approximate how much expenditure was needed. But, as Clausewitz warns us, “surplus strength in a tactical situation must be considered in strategy as a means of exploiting success if the opportunity arises.” Was this perhaps the reason for Ramesses II’s battlefield victory at Kadesh?

How, then, did the pharaohs regard themselves in war? Their chariot image was the icon of their martial activity, although no sculpture of a king in a chariot was ever produced. (One would have to wait for Marcus Aurelius for an equestrian statue.) Royal self-representations followed the norms of pharaonic society and ideology. In the reliefs, soldiers also appeared: archers, regulars, charioteers, and leaders, scaling walls and entering cities, fighting one-on-one and hacking their enemies. All of these men are the pharaohs’ pieces; he is the master chess player. Only he faces an enemy general or chief. The king alone engages with the foreign city, which may sometimes be personified.

These aspects also appear in the written material where, owing to the length and necessary detail, non-royal information may be preserved. Such visual depictions do not provide any solid means of investigating generalship. We are forced to reconstruct the decision-making abilities of the royal commanders from scenes of warfare. Even from the case of Seti I, whose six registers at Karnak provide a wealth of information, it is extremely difficult to hypothesize the innate character of the pharaohs in the field, much less how they behaved on the outbound march and return home.

To summarize our concerns in this introductory chapter, everything can be placed under the rubric of “the skill of the commander” (Clausewitz, Book Three, Chapter Four). I have attempted to provide a methodological basis for the ensuing discussion of three war leader-pharaohs. Specific details have been provided in order to freshen the arguments, but I have stayed close to the overriding theme of this chapter. The moral character of the kings’ campaigns deserves far more discussion then has been covered.
so far; yet this lacuna is due to the intractability of the source material, especially the chauvinistic attitudes prevalent in war records at the beginning of the XVIIIth Dynasty. The accounts of martial Nubian activities are more limited, although the visual records amplify the contemporary Egyptian outlook by presenting them as the lowest of antagonists. Pictorial evidence notwithstanding, the weaker the foe is assumed to be, the easier pharaoh’s victory appears. To heighten the strength and determination of the enemy is a clever tactic as it elevates the Egyptian leaders’ successes. We must be careful when evaluating the overwhelming pictorial data of Ramesses II, for example. He reaps success against one Asiatic city after another, but were the engagements that successful? What is made to appear as a major series of revolts may, in fact, be something less. Thus we must treat the numerous images of triumph with some degree of caution.

Certain snapshots of warfare may still be insightful as a reflection of the designers’ intention to emphasize drama. I have in mind the departure from Tjaru across the beautifully rendered “water channel division,” the deserted city, and the crumbling destroyed metropolis. The remarkable illustration of the pro-Hittite center at Dapur is another case in point, but others may be adduced. There, the enemies strength of resistance is sumptuously and impressively rendered, if only to make Ramesses’s success even the more significant. At Medinet Habu the unique scene of the Egyptian garrisons attacking the Libyans may at first be interpreted as featuring the king’s troops, but to their right Ramesses III appears in his chariot. As an aside, it is noteworthy that two reliefs on the west depict Egyptian fortresses, the first carved for Ramesses III’s year 5 campaign, albeit representing the post combat reception.

Turning to scenes of the same pharaoh when he fought against the Sea Peoples, the representation of the land battle is a standard one. It presents the topos of king in chariot fighting against a very large mass of opponents, carved as a thick, leaderless mass. Attention may be directed to the large number of Egyptian footsoldiers fighting within that melee, a not uncommon means of historical portrayal but one that is nonetheless singular owing to the attention that the artist gives to ordinary people. “On the field of fire it is the touch of human nature which gives men courage and enables them to make proper use of their weapons,” asserts Samuel Marshall.

The second of Ramesses III’s snapshots is definitely more significant for our study. Within this depiction pharaoh stands on the ground — the shore — and aims his arrows at the fleet of the enemy. There is nothing
extraordinary about the design, but the topos causes us to reinterpret the spectacle and realize that the king may not have been present at all. His poised figure to the left of the chariot and horses, all of which face away from his motion, isolates him at this battle. Except for four diminutive archers in front of him to the left, likewise flexing their bows, he is separate from other humans and their combat activities. His troops are in ships, engaging with the enemy flotilla. History requires of the artists a new rendering without fortresses and citadels.

We may conclude this introduction by referring to the classic antithesis of theme and formula.\textsuperscript{122} (The latter may be divided into a small version or a large-scale one, the “type-scene.”) These terms and their application were developed from Milman Parry’s epoch-making work on the Homeric poems, the study of which was advanced by Albert Lord, and explained solely within oral poetry.\textsuperscript{123} The figure of Ramesses III, as I have just described him, is stock and could be inserted into any depiction of Egyptian royal warfare. Moreover, as the sea battle illustrates, standard representations could be adapted to new scenes. Themes, for Parry and Lord, reflect larger concepts and possess an inherent narrative orientation. The image not only records events but also influences how they are to be viewed and understood.

Peter Burke, in his book dealing with images in historical narrative, allocates pride of place to the “battle-piece,”\textsuperscript{124} just as we do here. He remarks that, beginning in the sixteenth century there has been an increasing shift towards representing any fight scene as unique. “Battles,” he maintains, “were becoming less like an agglomeration of single combats and more like collective actions in which groups of soldiers marched, charged, or fired as one man.”\textsuperscript{125} Figures were no longer arranged to produce a series of stop action images, as in an Egyptian narrative. Burke argues that the heroic aspect of “battle pieces” was less emphasized.

It is worthwhile to think about modern interpretations such as Burke’s in order to focus more clearly upon our theme. The Egyptians, as all scholar learn very early, organized their representational reliefs by means of those twin antitheses of theme and formula. If the pharaoh in his chariot represented the small-scale version, the bigger picture was a battle scene. They cannot be separated, at least in Egyptian art of this nature. Granted that images of rulers are often triumphalist in style,\textsuperscript{126} the pharaoh is made real by the metaphor of winning as a charioteer. Art is theatre, Burke adds. It is a public representation of an idealization, in this case of a triumphant general. We have returned to the role of the military leader as thespian.
For Keegan, the general wore, and still wears, the “mask of command.” But a mask is a persona, a reflection of certain martial qualities. As I have stressed, the essence of good generalship is acting, playing upon the military virtues of his troops. Thus the military spirit of the army was as necessary for Egyptian success in combat as was the moral superiority of their leader, the pharaoh. In Chapter Five of Book Three, Clausewitz makes the point that an army’s martial temperament has only two sources: a series of wars, or, at least, the collaborative exertion of frequent campaigns. “The more a general is accustomed to place heavy demands on his soldiers, the more he can depend upon their response.” This proposition is supported by historical phenomena. The beginning of Dynasty XVIII witnessed a series of military actions, all expansionistic, that had earlier antecedents and continued to the reign of Thutmose I.

To be specific, the repeated campaigns of Seqenenre, Kamose, Ahmose, and Amunhotep I all culminated in the reign of Thutmose I. By the time he had established firm control over Kush — albeit this would be challenged later — he was also capable of marching at the head of his army far north into Mitannian-held territory. Note the continual use of the army and the pharaohs’ presence as commander-in-chief. Then came a hiatus which I recognize as aptly reflecting the famous French phrase, “retirer pour mieux sauter.” By the joint reign of Thutmose III and Hatshepsut, there was a pause in Egypt’s northern military strategy because it was necessary for the Egyptians to develop an effective, secure Sinai Corridor. Then Thutmose III could take Megiddo. But the continual wars did not cease. More than fifteen years of constant military engagements in the north improved the already effective Egyptian army. The same cycle came to fruition at the time of Ramesses II. Under his father, a nearly identical degree of army morale must have been engendered by the same constant warfare.

Yet we possess the startling commentary of the British writer Eric Ambler who became a gunnery officer in World War II and was assigned to read the censored extracts from soldiers’ letters. From the correspondence he discovered that most striking thing to him “was the way units became battle-wise. A perfectly good unit of brave men would become useless as it grew more experienced. The men preferred serving under officers of indifferent courage; they became most depressed when led by winners of the VC.” We must add this psychological factors of groups to the commonly-held position that the best soldiers are led by the best officers.
As Clausewitz opines, the martial spirit of an army “can be created only in war and by great generals.” The Egyptian army most certainly endured through several generations of peace after the reign of Amunhotep II “even under generals [pharaohs in this case] of average ability.” The morale must have been rekindled successfully by the bellicose exertions of the early Dynasty XIX rulers. But without a successful pro-active and forward-looking king, the spirit of Egypt’s army would have faltered. Great leadership must have great times in which to work.

notes


Roel Koninjendik, Classical Greek Tactics. A Cultural History (Leiden and Boston: Brill; 2018), 29-37, observes that “Military history of the last few decades might be less concerned with the achievements of great men, but has its own peculiarities” (page 36). But on the following page he continues by properly stressing revolution in strategy and tactics that “require a military genius.” There is also a useful overview by Philip Sabin, Lost
Christopher Kolenda (ed.), *Leadership: The Warrior’s Art* (Carlisle PA: Army War College Foundation Press; 2001), presents a general overview by the editors in Chapter One (“What is Leadership? Some Classical Ideas” as well as a considerably more important analysis in Chapter Five (“Discipline: Creating the Foundation for an Initiative-Based Organization”). Needless to say, he also covers the eternal figure of Alexander the Great in Chapter Six, just as Keegan did. On page 83 He argues that the “the true test of discipline is, therefore, functionality.” With that assertion I cannot agree.

For background information, there is the excellent and lengthy work of Heidi Köpp-Junk, *Reisen im Alten Ägypten. Reisekultur, Fortbewegungs- und Transportmittel in pharaonischen Zeit* (Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden; 2015).


The controversial book of Samuel Marshall, *Men against Fire. The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (New York: William Morrow; 1947), Chapter 8 “(The Riddle of Command”) has some interesting comments on the problems associated with leadership in battle. This study on fire power is argued


8 “It is axiomatic in battle that a bad officer will do more harm to a unit than a good one will help it,” according to Bergerud, *Touched With Fire*, 242.

9 Keegan, *The Mask of Command*. There is a useful overarching chapter by chapter by Paul Beston, “Hellenistic Military Leadership,” in Hans von Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales; 2009), 315-336, that can be consulted with profit vis-à-vis the ancient Egyptian evidence. By and large I shall not refer to the voluminous Classical research except when it seriously impinges on my arguments.

10 For evaluations of Grant’s leadership on future generations I refer to two well-known and extremely able writers: Gertrude Stein, *Four in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press; 1947), *passim*, especially 48-51; and Owen Wister, *Ulysses S. Grant* (Boston: Small, Maynard & Company; 1907). Like Caesar, Grant could write a masterpiece of historical reflections.

We can supplement these remarks by those of Georg Simmel concerning the elder Moltke. Undoubtedly known to few, they are also worth reading in this context: Georg Simmel, *Aufsätze 1887 bis 1890. Über sociale Differenzierung. Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*, Heinz-Jürgen Dahme (ed.) (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; 1989), 103-107 (“Moltke als Stilist”).


William Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* (Berkeley: University of California Press; 1974-1991), a compendium of five volumes, cannot be disregarded. For us, it is extremely useful with respect to comparative material.


16 At this point William James, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” in *Memories and Studies* (London, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, and Co.; 1917), 267-296, is important to consult. The discussion is on historical reconstruction of battles.


See Chapter II. Konijnendijk, *Classical Greek Tactics*, Chapter 5 (“‘Utterly Outmatched in Skill’: Battle Tactics”), is important to read in the context of our study on tactics and strategy. The “Conclusion” on pages 216-227, is also pertinent to Egyptological research.

See Chapter 3.

See Chapter 4.


I have adumbrated these factors, and others concerning the still murky issue of the Old Kingdom Egyptian army in “The Trope Issue of Old Kingdom War Reliefs,” in: Miroslav Bártá, Filip Coppens, and Jaromír Krejčí (eds.), *Abusir and Saqqara in the Year 2015* (Prague: Faculty of Arts, Charles University; 2017), 401-417.


Spalinger, *War in Ancient Egypt*, Chapters 1 and 2.


“The Egyptian Chariotry: A Reexamination,” *JARCE* 1 (1962): 75-98 and page 75 in particular, sets the size of chariot divisions as fifty.


moves: see Latin *signa tellere*, *signa movere*, and *signa constitutere* (*ibid.*, 287 note 101).


40 Classically included in the tomb biography of Ahmose Son of Ebana: *Urk*. IV 2.5-6. See Christopher Eyre, “The Accessibility of Ramesside Narrative,” in: Sabine Kubisch and Ute Rummel (eds.), *The Ramesside Period in Egypt. Studies into Cultural and Historical Processes of the 19th and 20th Dynasties. Proceedings of the International Symposium Held in Heidelberg, 5th to 7th June 2015* (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter; 2018), 92. He argues on page 98 that by the Ramesside Period there was a “wider use of prose” than earlier. Does this assertion equally apply for the lengthy royal narrative military compositions of the same epoch?

41 Significant in this context as well is Manassa, “The Chariot that Plunders Foreign Lands: ‘The Hymn to the King in his Chariot’,” in: André Veldmeijer and Salima Ikram (eds.), *Chasing Chariots. Proceedings of the First International Chariot Conference (Cairo 2012)*, 143-156.

42 Paul Horn, *Die deutsche Soldatensprache* (Gießen: Alfred Töpelmann; 1905).


44 Carsten Peust, *Egyptian Phonology. An Introduction to the Phonology of a Dead Language* (Göttingen: Peust & Gutschmidt; 1999), 307-310, where the number of military terms is high. There are additional New Kingdom words, carried down to Coptic, that had a pure military locus or ones with an Asiatic connection that Peust discussed earlier. It is interesting that the New Kingdom word for “team of horses,” “span of horses,” *ḥtr*, became the word for “horse,” well-known from Coptic. The word was derived from

His conclusion that the famous series of horses’ names on the royal New Kingdom monuments of the pharaohs refer to one horse, and not to the team, is correct. Ramesses had “Mut-Is-Content” as well as “Victory-In-Thebes” at Kadesh. (The latter was the more important one.) Both reflect military success, and both “supported him” at Kadesh. (Identically, see *Krt* I 7.14 where the two horses’ names are given for the king’s chariot.) Almost all of the horses’ names refer to success or valour in battle. The steed *Hrw-nfr* in *Krt* II 182.8 appears to form an exception to the overt victorious nature of the other designations. Yet one may have a “holiday” in war.

Designations such as these are useful for cultural analysis. One would never meet a pharaonic royal team or an individual horse whose name would be akin to Lee’s Traveller. I remind the reader of a singular fact: hardly any of the American Civil War horses had warlike names. See Keegan, *The American Civil War: A Military History* (New York: A. A. Knopf; 2009), 266. Faugh-a-Ballagh and Fire-Eater may be considered exceptions; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_horses_of_the_American_Civil_War. It was the lacklustre General John A. Logan who called his horse Slasher.

As an aside, Wellington’s horse (in Europe), Copenhagen, was named after the Second Battle of Copenhagen whilst Napoleon’s Marengo was obviously taken from his famous victory. The two equids were participants at Waterloo.

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45 Spalinger, *Icons of Power*, 39-40 with full references to previous studies on *htr* and *ssmt*. Add, however, the commentary of Henry Fischer, “More Ancient Egyptian Names of Dogs and Other Animals,” *MMJ* 12 (1978): 177-178, which I had overlooked.


47 Ibid., Chapter 4.

48 Ibid., 87.

The publication of Veldmeijer and Ikram (eds.), *Chasing Chariots*, must be consulted on these war vehicles; to which we can now add André Veldmeijer, Salima Ikram, and Lucy Skinner, *Chariots in Ancient Egypt. The Tano Chariot. A Case Study* (Leiden: Sidestone Press; 2018). There is the older and useful analysis of the Florence chariot in Maria Guidotti (ed.), *Il carro e le armi del Museo Egizio di Firenze* (Florence: Giunti; 2002). But the important studies of Anja Herold must be added: *Streitwagentechnologie in der Ramses-Stadt.* (Mainz am Rhein: von Zabern; 2006), and “Funde und Funktion — Knäufe, Knöpfe und Scheiben aus Stein” (Mainz am Rhein: Von Zabern; 2006), and Streitwagentechnologie im Alten Ägypten,” in: Mamoun Fansa and Stefan Burmeiser (eds.), *Rad und Wagen. Der Ursprung einer Innovation. Wagen im Vorderen Orient und Europa* (Mainz am Rhein: von Zabern; 2004), 123-143.

Deborah Cantrell, *The Horsemen of Israel. Horses and Chariots in Monarchic Israel (Ninth-Seventh Centuries B.C.E.)* (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns; 2011), Chapter 2 (“The Nature of the War-Horse”) and 63-64. See her comment in note 2 page 11: “Based on personal experience, I believe these estimates are conservative at that horses, if required, could easily pull chariots at full speed over short distances on the battlefield. The main problem was loading the chariots with enough weight to keep them grounded.” Her definition of “full speed” is 45 mph or 74.5 kph. This, however, is based on modern equids, and she disregards the number of men in the cab. Light weight chariots “often bounded out of control,” as Cantrell observes (63 note 8). I cite her work here as it supplements recent studies, including mine. However, the depth of scholarship on the issue of chariots and horses in this work is limited.

But see now Bryan Lawton, *Various and Ingenious Machines. Power Generation and Transport. Volume One* (Leiden and Boston: Brill; 2004), 466-467, for the ideal location where the warrior and his driver must stand in the chariot.

The issue of kingship in Egyptological scholarship is a voluminous one, and often subject to major scholarly disagreements. See, for example, the contrasting viewpoints of Hans Goedicke, *Die Stellung des Königs im Alten Reich* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz; 1960); and Georges Posener, *De la divinité du pharaon* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale; 1960). These are two seminal cases that present contrastive viewpoints. The more recent compendium edited by David O’Connor and David Silverman, *Ancient Egyptian Kingship* (Leiden and New York: Brill; 1994), continues to follow the same patterns of the previous two Egyptologists, without, however, becoming confused with regard to the multiform nature of the Egyptian monarch. NB: Some now prefer to translate “his person” instead of “his majesty” for ḥm=f.


A related issue is the flag-ship of the pharaohs. Kamose in his second stela specifically attributes it to gold, thereby probably signally Re. But it was also a falcon-ship, and Horus is thus clearly indicated.

Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Sovereignty. An Inquiry into the Political Good*, J. Huntington (trs.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund; 1997), 25,
41, and 361-362. Van Creveld, *Command in War*, 17, states that “a commander who wielded a spear in the front ranks of his army cannot have exercised much more than the — admirably very important — moral functions of his job.”


Rapoport, “Military and Civil Societies: The Contemporary Significance of a Traditional Subject in Political Theory,” 186.

Schulman, *Military Rank, Title, and Organization in the Egyptian New Kingdom*.

Rapoport, “Military and Civil Societies: The Contemporary Significance of a Traditional Subject in Political Theory,” 200.

James Hittle, *The Military Staff. Its History and Development* (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company; 1961), Chapter 1 (“From the Nile to Lutzen”). Unfortunately, this historical section is overly general. The remaining chapters, however, are excellent. Add van Creveld, *Command in War*, 27-40 (“The Nonevolution of Staffs”).


66 Spalinger, War in Ancient Egypt, Chapters 2 and 3.


Yet see Kitchen’s considerate remarks on some war scenes at Karnak (Great Hypostyle Hall, West Side, bottom, middle and top registers) in KRI II 152-156): Ramesside Inscriptions. Historical and Biographical. Translated and Annotated. Notes and Comments II (Oxford and Malden MA: Blackwell; 1999), 63: “whose geographical range is not self-apparent.” I can also note his remarks on pages 94-97 with respect to the “Moabite and Edomite Wars.” See note 69 below.

To these studies see now Dan’el Kahn, “Ramesses III and the Northern Levant. A Reassessment of the Sources,” in Sabine Kubisch and Ute Rummel (eds.), The Ramesside Period in Egypt. Studies into Cultural and Historical Processes of the 19th and 20th Dynasties, 183-184
(“A Possible Reconstruction of the Route of the Campaign”); and Roberto Gozzoli, The Writing of History in Ancient Egypt during the First Millennium BC (ca.1070-180 BC): Trends and Perspectives (London: Golden House; 2009), 34 note 39 — discussing the extreme difficulty in working with topographic data connected to Sheshonk I’s campaign in Palestine.


Robert Rittner’s translation in his *The Libyan Anarchy. Inscriptions from Egypt’s Third Intermediate Period* (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature; 2009), 465-492, can be used as a backdrop.


Turney-High, *The Military*, 63-64.

“Goal” in this case = both German “Zweck” (in French: “la fin,” l’objectif,” “le but”) and “Ziel,” but the latter remains more concrete. See Aron, *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz I*, 405-406 note xvi. The German theorist opposes “Ziel” to the political “Zweck,” although “Ziel” designates the ultimate military objective of the campaign or war. In this case Ramesses II’s “Ziel” was to regain lost control over Kadesh. See note 112 below.


86 See Morris, Ancient Egyptian Imperialism, Chapters 5 and 7.

Van Creveld, Command in War, 24, remarks that owing to slow and insecure communications “commanders were always reluctant to send out detachments.” And “once detached they would become all impossible to control.”

87 A detailed overview of ludic behaviour in war was presented in my “Pianchy/Piye. Between Two Worlds,” within which the reader will find a lengthy discussion of the seminal work of André Jolles, Adriaan de Buck and Johan Huizinga. Cf. Spalinger, “Ramesses Ludens et Alii,” in: Kousoulis Pangiotis (ed.), Studies on the Ancient Egyptian Culture and Foreign Relations (Rhodes, University of the Aegean; 2007), 71-86.


89 Morris’s work, supra, provides the latest discussion that is connected directly with our theme.

90 Keegan, The Mask of Command, 311-351.

91 Ibid., 320-321 and 337. The quote used by Keegan is taken directly from Thomas Barker, The Military Intellectual and Battle.
Raimondo Montecuccoli and the Thirty Years War (Albany: State University of New York Press; 1975), 130-132. This is a translation from the original, but it is not to be found in the standard editions written by Raimondo Montecuccoli, Ausgewählte Schriften des Raimund Fürsten Montecuccoli, General-Lieutenant und Feldmarschall II (“Militärische Schriften”) (Vienna and Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller; 1899); and Aforismi dell’ arte bellica (Milan: Fratelli Fabbri; 1973).

For the Classical data, there are three following studies amply cover the subject: Mogens Hansen, “The Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography. Fact or Fiction,” Historia 42 (1993): 161-180; Edward Anson, “The General’s Pre-Battle Exhortation in Graeco-Roman Warfare,” Greece and Rome 57 (2010): 304-318; and Jon Lendon, “Battle Description in the Ancient Historians, Part II: Speeches, Results and Sea Battles (Continued from Greece and Rome 64.1),” Greece and Rome 64 (2017): 145-167. The last study is very inclusive and up-to-date.


94 See Tacitus, Annales I, 31-54. The account, though overtly partisan (pro-Germanicus), provides the historian with excellent addresses by both generals in which all the hallmarks of leadership are indicated. Cf. Mary Williams, “Four Mutinies: Tacitus ‘Annals’ 1.16-30; 1.31-49 and Ammianus Marcellinus ‘Res Gestae’ 20.4.9-20.5.7; 24.3.1-8,” Phoenix 51 (1997): 44-74.

95 Craig, “The Art of War,” 16, where he stresses the theatrically of Alexander (battlefield dress, magnificent cloak with jewels, quilted body armor, and Bucephalus).


See our commentary in Chapter 3.


This interesting point Lord Moran makes with respect to Friedrich the Great, *ibid.*., 199: “Friedrich the Great would not allow his generals to hold Councils of War because they fostered and bred timid courses.”


I shall not comment upon General Haig in the context of failures. Neither did Turney-High, probably because he was oriented to the United States. Hence, he discussed McClennan instead.

Sergei Eisenstein, *Ivan the Terrible. Part I*. I am referring to the totally overawed reaction of the young soldier, Fyodor, son of Aleksei Basmanov, when seeing Ivan on the small hill — an excellent *Feldherrnhügel*, equipped with royal tent — and uttering “Tsar! …..” (shot 379; reel 5). The pronunciation
of the word is remarkable. See No Author, *Ivan the Terrible. A Film by Sergei Eisenstein* (New York: Simon and Schuster; 1970), 66, for the script.


105 Charles Francis Adams, *Lee at Appomattox and Other Papers* (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company; 1902), 364 (from “A Plea for Military History”). This study is extremely important for any historian’s reconstruction of battles. He inspected the site for his work on the Battle of the Plains of Abraham.

Other examples may be chosen to refute the accounts of contemporary or participatory witnesses of battles, but an excellent case is the modern archaeological reconstruction of the Battle at the Little Big Horn. Eyewitness accounts, hitherto employed for a historical analysis, have been proven to be false. See Richard Fox, Jr., *Archaeology, History, and Custer’s Last Battle: The Little Big Horn Reexamined* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press; 1993). Cf. the review of this work by Al Wesolowsky, *Journal of Field Archaeology* 21 (1994): 253-256.


107 Aron, *Clausewitz. Philosopher of War*, 120.


Aron, *Clausewitz. Philosopher of War*, 185: “Genius (or good sense) is exercised less in the calculation of that which does not lend itself to calculation than in the discernment of the essential.” This can be argued for Pianchy. Add pages 132-138 in this study.

Clasewitz, *On War*, 127-128 in the Howard-Paret translation (Book One, Chapter Three).

Keegan, *The Mask of Command*, 202-229; and Turney-High, *The Military*, 62, who precisely hits the nail on the head. The “Ziel”/“Zweck” dichotomy of Clausewitz is brilliantly reflected in this curt remark, as it applies to General U. S. Grant. “Grant knew that his objective was Lee, not Richmond.” See note 82 above.

Edmund Wilson, *Patriotic Gore. Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press; 1962), 131-173 and 133 in particular (Chapter IV: “Northern Soldiers: Ulysses S. Grant”): “Owen Wister said truly, in his little book on Grant, that Grant’s was an even odder case than Lincoln’s.” Like Caesar, Grant wrote succinctly, clearly, and impartially (though he was not neutral). Both produced magnificent works. See note 10 above.

Clausewitz, *On War*, 245 in the Howard-Paret translation (Book Three, Chapter Twelve).

From an art historical viewpoint, and one related to my *Icons of Power* study, let me refer to Peter Burke, *Eyewitnessing. The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 2001), 67-69, a volume which I had overlooked. For the other cultures in the Ancient Near East, see Davide Nadali and Jordi Vidal (eds.), *The Other Face of the Battle The Impact of War on Civilians in the Ancient Near East* (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag; 2014).


116 Clausewitz, On War, 218 in the Howard-Paret translation (Book Three, Chapter Four).


119 Heinz, ibid., 309 (I.22) = MH II, Plates 69-70.

120 Conveniently, ibid., 305-308, for the scenes (especially I.16 and I.18 = MH I, Plates 32-38; cf. Icons of Power, Chapter 16; and the study of Redford cited in note 64 above.

121 Marshall, Men against Fire. The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, 38.

122 Burke, Eyewitnessing, 143-144.

123 Ibid., 144, referring to the well-known work of Albert Lord, The Singer of Tales (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; 1960); add Gregory Nagy, Homeric Responses (Austin: University of Texas Press; 2003), 63-64.

124 Ibid., 146.

125 Ibid., 149.

126 Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Jonathan Cape; 1976), 36-46, covers the “battle piece” within a discussion of the “rhetoric of battle history.”

127 Clausewitz, On War, 221 in the Howard-Paret translation (Book Three, Chapter Five).

128 Ibid., 221-222.


130 Clausewitz, On War, 222.

131 Ibid.

132 When did exhaustion set in?
Thutmose III: Strategic commander
Military historians stress topography and its effect upon war, but often focusing upon two separate categories. Geography is concerned with the interconnections between or among places, especially in an A > B relationship such as distance, rate of travel, the use of routes (communication vectors), and the goals desired. In a nutshell, the parameters involved are strategic and logistic. The nature of terrain is the second, and this mainly refers to tactical dispositions and outcomes. Hence, the latter deals with defence situations as well as means and methods of attack. The oft-cited and almost universally applauded campaign of Thutmose III to Megiddo especially suits the first strategic consideration, at the very start of his march north into Canaan. (See Plate IV, page 81, and V, page 82) Thutmose III’s “Annals,” the best military account of the New Kingdom, opens the historical progression with the monarch’s Sinai trek. (See V for a further map of war.) To this we may turn first, as this analysis emphasizes the prerequisites which Thutmose III had at his disposal. Subsequently, his trajectory along the road from Gaza to Yehem, and then to Megiddo. His personality of command, as indicated by his official royal account set up at Karnak, show him to be less heroic than frequently assumed and more a superior logistical military director. By and large, I shall avoid the subsequent campaigns of Thutmose although the Syrian war, the eighth in the official numbering, bears some scrutiny.

Let us remember that the Egyptians had already set up a fairly well-organized system of communication and support before Thutmose went to Megiddo. This had to have been completed in the joint reign of Thutmose III and Hatshepsut, but surely the problems to be encountered had already been realized by Ahmose or Thutmose I. The desire of the early New Kingdom monarchs to take over southern Palestine and then to control territories further north was tempered by logistic demands. It was necessary to secure an effective means of reaching Gaza as quickly as possible, especially when a large army was in operation. This had been accomplished when Thutmose was faced by opposition centered at Megiddo.

It is first necessary to evaluate the logistic system of the king’s army, indeed of any New Kingdom military division. The soldiers needed supplies to traverse the Sinai, and parameters concerning army rations for this effort (and thereafter) can be tentatively established. Redford, who also discussed this matter, had arrived logistic approximations relating to foods supplied across the Sinai. He arrived at 80 small loaves for each man and 1,000 donkeys for beer. If we follow him, the soldiers did not pickup additionally needed supplies on the way north. I set the number
IV Trajectory of Thutmose’s Megiddo Campaign
(Schematic Plan Courtesy Brett Heagren).

Thutmose III: Strategic commander
VI The Aruna Pass (Photograph Courtesy Australian War Memorial, B 3202).
of Egyptian troops less than Redford posited — ca 5,000 men determined by Donald Engels’ useful arithmetical calculations and additionally based upon the situation in the narrow Aruna Pass — i.e., the time it took for the whole Egyptian army to go through the defile (Plate VI, page 83). I also avoided estimating the non-combatants in the Egyptian army such as cadets, porters and the like. Granted the effectiveness of foraging in southern and central Palestine — a bounty for the Egyptians to be sure — I now follow a limit of 7,500 men.

To be sure, additional foodstuffs plus water ought to have been provided to the soldiers marching north. Given the one day stop-over in Gaza, I feel that Thutmose III departed with his whole army and moved fast northwards. Advanced divisions may have been sent ahead of him so that the bivouac at Gaza would have been already set in place when Thutmose subsequently arrived. In this context note that the pictorial representations in Medinet Habu show that all of the departing army was prepared with weapons, etc. before it left. The reconstructed situation at Gaza, however, remains an assumption.

Still, a ten-day limit for carrying soldiers’ rations across the Sinai, as calculated by Redford, fits within the data from the Hellenistic Period. I assumed earlier that at Tjaru/Sile each soldier in the Egyptian army already possessed the 80 small loves, with the stipulation that the caloric value of each ration in breads, per individual, was ca 3,100 or less. That is why Barry Kemp’s analysis of the Middle Kingdom fortresses is important to cite in this context. He dealt with number of garrison soldiers in the Second Cataract fortresses during the Middle Kingdom and determined caloric intake and annual rations. The granaries within the fortresses also had to “maintain secure supplies of grain for the campaigning armies,” although not regularly. Similarly, the Egyptian fortresses in the Sinai had to provide some logistic support for the advancing army such as water, even if the soldiers brought supplies with them.

We can now turn to other fairly inflexible constraints that Thutmose III had to face before he ever left Egypt. These include food intake of men and animals plus the rate of progress.

I. Velocity of Army: “Assuming that the army marched between five and six hours each day, averaging between 3-4 kph, a speed that would have enabled both donkeys and oxen to keep pace with the foot soldiers and the chariotry, then the army would have been able to cover around 22 km in a single day’s march.” But in this case I feel that the time exhausted
by Thutmose III between his entry into the Aruna Pass, if not earlier, and the area outside of the city of Megiddo was over 5-6 hours. The expectation — not under extreme duress of course — was ca 2 jtru/day.

II. Fodder: The extensive land available in Asia, even partially agricultural, easily formed the backbone for food supplies. Donkeys, which subsist on little water and a poor quality of forage, require ca 1.5 kg hard fodder and 5 kg green fodder/day. If fodder was not ready-at-hand, or not needed as is assumed for the most part when the Egyptian army marched in Western Asia, then ca 10 kg pasturage is needed. Oxen require greater dietary sustenance than donkeys, and ca 7 kg dry fodder and 11 kg dry and green fodder are sufficient per day. (Of course, the data given here are taken from modern catalogues and studies, but are based on additional constraints given in up-to-date studies of antiquity.) Their water intake is higher as well (30 litres/day.) Keep in mind that pasturage could supply the Egyptian donkeys provided that a requirement of 22 kg was kept. For oxen the integer is higher: 45 kg.

It is crucial to keep in mind the crossing of the Sinai with these animals. Were at least some of them, especially the horses, already organized at Gaza before the king arrived? In view of the Medinet Habu scene referred to earlier, the automatic answer would appear to be negative. Nonetheless, this supposition can remain speculative.

Turning to the all-important horses we must remember that they demand high quality rations. The water supply (minimum 15 and more surely above 30 litres) forms a remarkable demands upon any army, and not only the New Kingdom Egyptian. In addition, one horse consumes ca 2.5 kg of hard fodder and 7 kg of green fodder each day. (I accept the criticism that these sums were lower in antiquity than today.) By forging (ca 14 kg/day) one significant essential was solved, but still hard or dry fodder was needed. During the Kadesh campaign of Ramesses II “the Egyptians also relied in part on hard or dry fodder to provision their horses while on campaign.” If the army operated away from supply centers this would have been necessary. Indeed, when the pharaoh came to a city which was hostile — such as Kadesh — both foraging and supplies would have been necessary.

III. Water. Per person, the daily requirements are ca 4 litres with consumed food making about one half of this amount. There are few references in the Ramesside Period to the attempts on the part of the monarch to secure water supplies. The effective fortress-reservoir system in the Sinai was thus a crucial necessity.
IV. Supply Trains. We may now turn to the question of how the “baggage” was carried. I did not discuss them in my _Art of War_ but now feel, especially in this context of the Megiddo campaign, that it is necessary to provide an overview. How those supplies were transported is an open question. Ramesses II’s reliefs indicate this in the depictions of the bivouac, but not during the march. They may have been attached to local units or else formed a separate entity. And donkeys naturally, but oxen too, supply power of locomotion. Conjectures of the weight carrying capacity for donkeys vary, with “100 kg considered to be an ideal estimate for a typical load.”

V. Rate of Progress for Animals. For a donkey the rate is ca 4 kph, and thus one animal was able to attain 24 km/day given six hours of marching. But rest is needed. Data for oxen are not so precise. 19-24 km/day seems to be an accepted interval. A two wheeled wagon, at least during the Roman empire could carry up to 500-550 kg. For a four wheeled vehicle the mass would be ca 650 kg. The progress of the supply train therefore would be slowed down a bit from the expected velocity of the donkeys. Yet Thutmose’s rate of advance seems not to have been slow. The top velocity of his supply train — granted that there was one — comes to around 4 kph, but with oxen 3.2 kph. (Horses had an average pace of ca 6.4 kph.)

VI. Rate of Progress of the Army. We now reach the crucial point in our discussion of “preliminaries.” Heagren argued for ca 5-6 hours/day with an average velocity of 3-4 kph. The day’s advance would thus be ca 22 km, given no imponderabilities. This fits our knowledge of Thutmose III’s northern trek. Both donkeys and oxen could have kept up such a pace, and it is almost certain that the Egyptians marched on the “best” routes, both from a strategic sense as well as from the fear of attack. They followed the major roads which had key points or nexi that controlled travel.

These considerations, and they are complex to be sure, would have been dealt with by Thutmose’s lower-ranking officers and superintendents. Lateral movements from Gaza, to the east of course, were not undertaken. Instead, as Thutmose already knew, it was best to advance up the Via Maris to around Ashkelon and Joppa and then move inland to enter the Jezreel Valley, a very rich zone. As an aside, Heagren observes that Beth Shan, close to the distant border in the east, “contained a silo that would have been sufficient to provide for an Egyptian army passing
through as long as they remained for a single night and returned … via different route.” 34 From Gaza 35 to Yehem it took the Egyptian army around 11-12 days to cover the distance. 36 No opposition was recorded in the official account. Raymond Faulkner significantly comments that “Here the army apparently halted for a few days to rest while scouting operations were in progress.” 37 I suspect that the interpretation is correct, especially because Yehem is approximately only ca 4.8 km from the eastern road to Tanaach. But from there to the Aruna Pass passage was an additional 8.5 km, and proceeding further north and then north east one had to cover 26 km in order to reach the end of the Djefti North Road. Yehem, therefore, was a preplanned resting point.

Let us retrace the king’s overland advance and return passages. All of this, I assume, was determined in at least weeks (if not longer) in advance. The entire travel had to have been evaluated and the timing ascertained. Thutmose already knew that a coalition of Palestinian and Syrian “rebels” had holed themselves up in the pivotal locality of Megiddo. These facts, concerning which I presented a brief description in the previous chapter, need further consideration. The pharaoh knew who his enemy was, approximately who were supporting him, and where the enemy troops lay. To be sure, his opponents were aware of the probability of a counter attack. Because Palestine was in turmoil and Megiddo was an excellent center for stopping the Egyptian advance, 38 they likewise were not lax in preparations. I presume these reasons are why Faulkner presented the case for Egyptian scouts (or spies, if you will) 39 sent away from Yehem — to the north would have been the best — when the king arrived there. Those men, who seem to have ridden horses, were used as information-gathering “eyes.” They were not heavily armed, and can be seen in the Kadesh reliefs of Ramesses II. 40

Megiddo possessed a strongly-based logistic and topographical position as well as being on the key arterial routes that led north and east. Furthermore, no other major metropolis lay nearby. (That is one reason why Thutmose reached Yehem without opposition.) 41 This was not fortuitous. Heagren additionally notes that the king’s progress after crossing the Sinai was slower thereafter, and he mentions the unfavorable impact of geography as well as a possible sign of resistance, an interpretation that remains moot. 42

At Yehem the compelling pre-battle decision had to be made, and I find the pharaoh’s abilities are worth analyzing at this juncture. All three routes (to Tanaach, the Aruna Pass, and to Djefti North) were under
consideration. Had Thutmose already ascertained that he could proceed, easily or not, along any one of those trajectories? I believe so. It would have been un-logistic for him to have ignored, or taken for granted, the risks of these three choices, and one thing we do know about this commander-general is that he was highly competent in planning and topographic visuality. The time it would take for him to reach all three of those arteries when he stopped at the crossroad of Yehem are as follows:\footnote{43}

\begin{align*}
\text{Yehem to Tanaach turn:} & \quad 4.8 \text{ km} = 1 \frac{1}{5} \text{ hours} \\
\text{Yehem to Aruna Pass turn:} & \quad 13.3 \text{ km} = 3 \frac{1}{3} \text{ hours} \\
\text{Yehem on Djefti North Road:} & \quad 39.3 \text{ km} = 9 \frac{4}{5} \text{ hours}.
\end{align*}

In the last case one reaches the highway north of Qina.

Considering that an army rises around sunrise if not a tad earlier, it is reasonable to explain Thutmose’s reason for not taking the last route, separate from what he states in his “Annals.” Given that he wanted to surprise his foe at Megiddo, the travel would be simply too long. One would reach the road leaving Megiddo and proceed in a northwest direction too late in the day. To send scouts out from Yehem would have been proper for a competent general to order. At the minimum, the 1.2 hour trek north plus an equivalent trip back on horseback would not be a problem. A scout on a horse covers distances at a far greater velocity than what the entire army of Thutmose could have accomplished. It is therefore reasonable to view the pharaoh dispatching his agents by horse to the north, quite probably beyond the Aruna Pass defile. He had time to do so, having arrived at the Aruna Pass two days after he reached Yehem at the latest.\footnote{44} Does not the corporate nature of generals and armies encompass such temporal evaluations?\footnote{45}

With the military, Thutmose always acted maturely and carefully, and that is the reason why I view him less a hero and more a master planner. Is it not significant of his logistical mind that when narrating the pharaoh’s march to Yehem the “Annals” immediately turn to Thutmose’s consultation with his high military officials there? No other event interrupts the daybook entry of time and place and the first of the king’s speeches. It is evident the perspective of the Egyptian writer is focussed upon Thutmose’s \textit{Felherrenrede}. On I śnw day 16 the “Annals” is completely devoted to the king’s address and the reactions. Indeed, only he speaks, irrespective of whether the actual words of the pharaoh were presented.
The issue at Yehem was an open-ended one, exactly parallel to the numerous speeches of generals in the Classical world. Just as the latter are presented with a decided literary bent, one concentrated on leadership, Thutmose’s “Annals” operates in the same manner at this point. In general, I adhere to the up-to-date translation and commentary of Redford, but the issue of translation remains. Miriam Lichtheim’s rendition, for example, is considerably more literary than Redford. The king’s speech concludes with the army’s departure from Yehem, and we can surmise that, given over three hours of travel and ignoring the bivouacking of the Egyptian troops, the address occurred early in the morning. Following that would have been the lengthy orders and commands as well as the preparations for departure. Hence, I suspect that the Egyptian army left Yehem close to midday.

Thutmose spoke to “his victorious army,” but in essence he conferred with his high-ranking military men. The style and linguistic register of this portion of the “Annals” reflects new or “innovative expressions,” to use Andrés Stauder’s term. He further reflected upon the cluster of such expressions in this military council of Thutmose which occur in the speeches as well as through dialogal exchanges. This entire portion is singular, as befits its great importance.

Here is part of Redford’s translation with some alterations:

His majesty ordered a consultation with his victorious army saying: “That [vile] enemy of Kadesh is come, having entered Megiddo. He is n(ow) [there] at this very moment; after having assembled for himself the princes of all the foreign lands who used to be loyal to him, and until Naharain in … Khorians, and Qodians, their horses/teams of horses, and their very numerous army troops.”

The commencement of Thutmose’s monologue provides a narrative backdrop in which the speech patterns are different from the expected layout of Dynasty XVIII (or Late Middle Egyptian) royal monumental hieroglyphic presentations. The involvement of Mitanni, ever so distant geographically if not likewise politically, is indicated. Note that the account specifically states “from” or “as far as” and not quite “up to” (nfrj-r). There is also a clear division presented between the Palestinian rebels and others outside of that geographical zone; i.e., those in Syria. Yet the enemy par excellence is the king of Kadesh.
“And he is now saying, to wit — “I shall stand in order to fight with his majesty in Megiddo." Tell me your opinion(s)!”

The opening words of Thutmose are short and to the point. He presents a military rundown of what has already occurred and limits himself to the situation at Megiddo. We may assume that all of the first six aspects of a general’s elocution to his soldiers listed in the first chapter were employed. Thutmose’s communication is very clear, and to the point. We may or may not assume that he used a platform to address them, but surely his voice was not soft or mumbling. Loud and direct must have been his opening remarks, and he must have maintained eye contact with his advisors. The all-important antagonist is identified, the prince of Kadesh. Thus future combat will be interpreted as a one-on-one confrontation between him and Thutmose, the Palestinian ruler of Megiddo performing a secondary stage role.

The reply of the army leaders is:

"Then they spoke before his majesty — "How will it be, walking on this path which has now become narrow, when it is reported that the enemy are there, standing on ..., and they have become numerous?"

This is the first of two replies to pharaoh and I presume that the soldiers are fully aware that he intended to take the Aruna Pass route. Why else would the king have halted his army at this very point? In fact the soldiers explicitly remark that the road has “now become narrow.” What else can be added? This is the first query of Thutmose’s military entourage and it is presented in such a manner so that the reader can ascertain that the troops did not prefer to advance in this direction. This reveals a classic use of an elaborate narrative device. The outsider is dramatically pulled in and personally involved in the story. The narrative is written to who that the underling are not as wise and logistically-oriented as their military commander. From purely a linguistic point of view, the unauxiliated NP hr sdm, signalled by Stauder, is used to express progressive aspect. The army leaders are afraid that they may be ambushed from above when they progress, ever so slowly, through the defile. Their fear is compounded by a second remark, also interrogative:

“Will horse after horse not go forth, and the host of men likewise?”
Then we encounter a complex rhetorical statement which contains a circumstantial *jw*:

“The Shall our vanguard be fighting while the rearguard is waiting here in Aruna, unable to fight?”

This is the second, and again very explicit, argument against the king’s plan. And it is resumed, anaphorically one might add, at the time that the Egyptian army had begun to exit from the Aruna Pass. The king’s brief address and the two major criticisms, relate in a stylized manner, indeed with a cataphoric construction, the crucial decision of the king that must be obeyed. At this point the narrative is most definitely an artificial reconstruction, carefully written in a very high manner. As Stauder indicated, “the evoked ‘dialogal register’ is itself a construct,” and it provides a spontaneous interweaving of the words of king-troops-king.

The following addition, the response of the men, provides the king and reader with the other choice that Thutmose could adopt:

“And two roads are here. One road — it is good for us, and at Tanaach it debouches. The other — it is at the north of Djefeti and at the north of Megiddo we shall come out. Let our victorious lord set forth through which his heart desires.”

One road led south of the pass and a second lay to the north of it. Either is fine, so it is said, but the army chiefs knew that this was not the king’s wish. Hence, their further beseeching: “Do not let us go on that difficult road!” Suddenly, as befits the dramatic aspect of the entire war conference, messengers arrived. (The hieroglyphs refer to “messages,” *wpwt-jwt.*) One assumes that they were Egyptians, and that they were the scouts sent ahead earlier to examine the Aruna Pass if not the Djefeti North Road. The account then switches to an oath of the king, which Faulkner regarded as “heated.” The decision to take the dangerous route can be argued to have occurred just then. I.e., the pharaoh had not previously made any final decision but had canvassed his military leaders to see what they felt.

To summarize this extremely significant portion of the “Annals” is not difficult from a narrative orientation. Taking a literary tack, but noting the strongly expressed emotional categories utilized, the relatively
"modern" or idiomatic aspects of the linguistic registers employed, and the import of the conversations, it is necessary to examine them from a historically-oriented complexion. To me, the significant aspect of this war council is its stark orientation. The crucial decision-making aspects of the pharaoh are set in the “Annals” on a single day. The common Egyptological term Königs novelle is now regularly employed by scholars to rubricize such events wherein king and advisors, or the king alone, present important decisions. Such is the case here. Notwithstanding the still vague application of the term, it is sufficient to remark upon the artificiality of the conference within the narrative context, but also to scrutinize its use. The author of this inscription desired to present a fulsome backdrop to the pharaoh’s ultimate, and unilaterally-voiced decision to take the Aruna Pass Road. All hung upon the choice of Thutmose. The focus of the narrative is now completely oriented on the pharaoh’s correct judgment, his determination to act after other choices were proposed. The “Annals” do not as of yet portray Thutmose in bellicose garb. Instead, his logistically-minded figura is stressed at Yehem. He is shown to be a royal and divine executive whose understanding is second to none. This is the first time in the “Annals” where the monarch emerges as a personality. Given, to be sure, the purposeful limited nature of royal thoughts and emotions in ancient Egyptian texts, is it not redolent of great wisdom that before the battle is portrayed, Thutmose’s innate character is demonstrated to be more than virile or perpetually bellicose.

The timing of the conference at Yehem fits well within the desired requirements of military speeches. They occur at specific occasions when there is a heightened fear or threat present, or a crucial decision to be made. Yehem was the place. But the account is concerned with the ruler’s policy and those of his high ranking soldiers. There is no speech to all of his troops. Hence, no rabble-rounding evocative, highly-strung and emotional peroration of Thutmose is recorded. To the contrary, only a dialogue is allowed space for that day’s event. But we have arrived at the springboard for the later narration of combat. In the “Annals” there are a few momentous occasions when the account ceases its temporal and geographical progress and light is thrown, for a considerable amount of time, on the king. Thus I believe it is accurate to conclude that Thutmose, automatically represented as a warrior, is also portrayed as a far-sighted decision-maker. Granted that all pharaohs are right according to official dogma and convention; all can see into the future and know what is best. But here a logistic-topographic feeling is strongly conveyed that indicates
Thutmose to be very perceptive in analyzing terrain, distance, and potential opposition. He is depicted as a general who perfectly ascertains time and space as two logistic modes in war.

This reflection upon his personality is what the writer of the account wished and what Thutmose desired. It is not enough to argue that he won at Megiddo owing to this decision. Furthermore, at this point his aspects of personal strength are not important. This facet reveals him to be an architect of success before battle, acting as a model strategist.\footnote{Surely he was not the first ruler of Egypt, or other administrators at home, who had a reasonable understanding of the routier system in Western Asia.} Thutmose, as well as his officers, does not appear to be fully ignorant of the local topography. Heagren, who has set up a tripartite system of levels of military control felt that the interplay among strategic, operational, and tactical levels can be perfectly exemplified by the generalship of Thutmose III.\footnote{I shall summarize his conclusions and provide further clarification, but I restrict myself to this point in the narrative.}

1. **Strategic**: a defined goal — to defeat the enemy coalition at Megiddo. Enemy and their location were given. We can assume without any hesitation that Thutmose’s opponents knew of his undertaking. Successful results would fall into place automatically. There was no compulsion to have other Egyptian divisions operating in Palestine at the same time. An “all or nothing” outcome has to be assumed by the modern interpreter.\footnote{Without a keen knowledge of up-to-date “affairs” of the north any pharaoh on a campaign would have been at an enormous disadvantage.}

2. **Operationally**: the Yehem conference reveals much about Thutmose’s mind in media res. A certain degree of operational flexibility was present, and the fact that three choices could be considered indicates, independently of the pharaoh’s overriding voice, that at least on this campaign no final decision was made at first, before the troops were on the march. The decision was made in the heartland of central Palestine. The risky nature of the Aruna Pass is brought up by the army officers to Thutmose, and later remarks in the “Annals,” supplement their fears.

3. **Tactically**: the critic must hold fire until reading in the “Annals” the combat result.
All hinged upon the king’s ability to foresee the chances of success when he opted for the unexpected. The rate of progress, for example, would have to be slowed, and not by an inconsiderable degree. Hence, it was necessary to “rise and shine” at Aruna as soon as possible. Consider, as well, the required preliminaries of movement. The chariots would be dismantled, parts of which could be carried or taken on the donkeys, etc. The path was also very narrow — hence the given statement “horse after horse … and the host of men likewise.” This was the turning point of the operational art of Thutmose. The Zugzwang, to use a chess term, was put into action. But the entire operational theater was already in place. The decision at Yehem, the paramount event in Thutmose’s Megiddo campaign, was one decided upon in foreign territory and not earlier at home. The other preconditions that the army had to adhere to, follow, and obey were fundamental requirements for any operational system to be set in motion. Thutmose certainly brought these factors into work before setting out to Asia. Given the goal and the purpose — defeat of the rebellion at Megiddo and the reconstitution of Egyptian hegemony — the following underlying operational demands had to be fulfilled:

1. Assemble a large enough army. How large it was to be? Whether or not we set the number of troops at 5,000, 7,500, or 10,000 men what was originally desired by Thutmose and his highest military advisors? Had they worked out a reasonable estimation of their foe’s strength?

2. Travel along certain well-defined roads.

3. Insure the safety of the Egyptian army, first across the Sinai (not a serious problem at this time) and then northwards, ending up at the small mountains located westward of Megiddo.

4. Insure the provisioning of men and animals.

5. Attempt to verify any unexpected enemy encampment or opposition, large or small. Surely, this must have involved the use of scouts.

6. Travel at a good speed and avoid getting bogged down in details.
From this schematic list one can see how precise are operational requirements for battle and, in contrast, how vaguer are the strategic considerations. Yet the latter are by no means rarefied philosophical stipulations. Quite to the contrary, they connect with — automatically entail — the former. “From an idea to a result.” Yet strategy, in contrast to tactics, “is the bridge between civil government and actual war.”\textsuperscript{75} Strategy belongs to war and not to combat. It is a civil function whereas tactics refers to warfare. But strategic success always relies upon actual or potential tactical strength.

From the “Annals” it appears, although we cannot be totally sure, that Thutmose expected no enemy opposition at the exit of the Aruna Pass. In fact, he assumed that the coalition of opponents would not even suspect that he would take that narrow route. In the hieroglyphic narrative we are given the news of the enemy that “[Their] southern wing was at Tanaach, and [their] northern wing on the south[ern] bend [of the Qina Valley].”\textsuperscript{76} How was this revealed? Redford’s interpretative translation indicates that the enemy were “isolated,” but this reconstruction is speculative.\textsuperscript{77}

My query has to do with the presumed knowledge that the Egyptian army had possessed. It did not know much at this time unless columns 65-67, in light of the new interpretation of Redford, indicate that the pharaoh ascertained the crucial logistic setting of his enemy immediately in front of the entrance to the Aruna Pass, and by the means of capturing some enemies. But I still feel that the remark of the enemy’s locations is a post bellum commentary by the author of the composition. The setting at which this comment is interpolated concerns the arrival of the head of the Egyptian army coming out of the pass. There were still many soldiers proceeding eastward and “caught,” so to speak, in the gulch. Provided is a topographically-oriented statement concerning the logistic nature of the protagonists of Thutmose. Only later could those facts have been discovered, and then added into the historical narrative. Thutmose did not know this then. His argument pro proelio is extremely short, and may indeed reflect the archetypical characterization of a pharaoh-god. He knows. But he never earlier mentions the locations of the two wings of his antagonists when speaking to his officers.

The opening sentence of Thutmose’s follow-up address is short and simple: “My majesty shall proceed on this Aruna Road!”\textsuperscript{78} The initial jw serves as proof of the truth of the powerful assertion, the oath, and these few words all that matters. Then the pharaoh immediately
turns to his troops. What do they wish? He had already listened to their positions and did not agree with the two choices then presented. But Thutmose does not rebuke those military leaders; nor does he even indicate that their options were poor or worthless. Instead, perhaps craftily given as another choice, the monarch states in an unambiguous manner the somewhat ironic, perhaps even trivial resolution that any of his soldiers can to go “the other way.”

Let him of you that wishes to go on those roads you spoke of. Let him of you who wishes come in my majesty’s following.

One might even interpret Thutmose’s mood to be more than ironic and rather sarcastic. Be that as it may, he follows up these words with:

See! They will say, those enemies, the abomination of Re — “Has his majesty proceeded on another road while he has become fearful of us?” So they will say.

This is simply put. If Thutmose takes either of the two, now rejected courses, his enemies at Megiddo will recognize his cowardice. As expected the soldiers agree with their lord.

But then, no doubt owing to the previous disagreement, Thutmose shows additional capabilities in generalship. Hesitating not, the pharaoh declares that he shall not let his army proceed in front of him. True first-class generalship is revealed once more, but with the added factor that the king remains in the thick of things, just as are his men. This final declaration of Thutmose is then transmitted, from his tent I presume, to the entire army.

There is an interesting formal grammatical alteration at this point. Excluding the direct speeches of all the participants, the narrative changes from the third person to the first. Later on this switch will end, but the timing of the alteration is significant. We have reached the instant where the passage from Aruna to Megiddo is to be attempted and then carried through. When Thutmose ends the dangerous trek the third person narrative is resumed. I understand the switch not as a simple slip, but rather as a staying with the first person speeches of the king, yet now with the added sense of divine assistance. Thutmose invokes Amun-Ra, Wepwawet, Harachty, Montu, and possibly Khonsu, those deities providing the supernatural religious components that effectively are to support Thutmose.
When we return to the more prosaic account we resume the more impersonal narrative description. The alteration is not due to an inadvertent error on the part of the scribe. Rather, it reflects the rhetorical aspect of royal narrative, one suited to a third person address by the king. This small segment of the narrative can in fact be regarded as a personal interpolation stressing the gods’ support to general Thutmose. In sum, The use of the first person is quite limited, but it provides an extension of the experiential aspects of the conference in which there are distinctive logistic proposals.

By column 61 the daybook account relocates the reader at the mouth of the pass: “Proceeding [by his majesty at the head of] his [army].” Thutmose had arranged his troops into “squadrons” or “battalions.” The terminus technicus “divisions” is not employed; $skw$ is used here and not $mš$. Evidently, the splitting up of the king’s host logically meant that sectors of his army were rearranged. After all, the defile was very narrow. At this point in the account there are some columns that are very poorly preserved. Redford has given a new interpretation of the ensuing events, and even if some of the restored hieroglyphs are open to dispute this improved rendition, plus the addition of a missed column (57a) allows us to posit a very interesting encounter, one that easily refutes the old analysis of James Breasted although it essentially follows Faulkner’s reconstruction.

1. The king had not debouched the pass at the head of his army. These events preceded the trip within the pass.
2. Thutmose’s army was, to use Lichtheim’s translation “grouped in many battalions.” Surely, this was the preliminary to the move into the Aruna Pass.
3. The king “calls to them” ($njs + n$: $n=s$) on [this] [road]” (and not “issues a challenge.”) We do not know to whom this refers, but the following mention of “that vile enemy”, $hrw pf$ appears to indicate that some of his enemies were there as well.
4. The extant traces of the hieroglyphs as well as the tentative translation of Redford might permit us to conclude that a small battle took place, but there is no mention of combat.
5. In order to save Redford’s interpretation I would argue that a few of the king’s foes were present close to the entrance of the pass, just as Faulkner surmised.
6. Redford emphasizes his restoration of “to boast” (swḥj, spelled swḥꜣ), by using the words “cheering,”\(^8\) In order to support his contention that armed conflict was intended. He does not, however, present the case that an armed clash occurred.

7. Faulkner, on the other hand, argued for a “brief skirmish” at the mouth of the pass.\(^9\)

8. Because we have no evidence that Thutmose’s “vile enemy” was present — the ruler of Kadesh Surely is that individual — we must assume that hrw pf refers to enemy troops of some sort, and a minor contingent at best.

To me it is logical that some type of local guard was placed in the vicinity of the entrance route to the Aruna Pass in order to espy the Egyptians. But why did they not run into the pass and scamper away? Surely the size of the Egyptian army would have convinced a relatively small number of soldiers to scamper away. But granted their presence, we might assume that if Thutmose had already sent out scouts, these foes would have been seen. It unfortunate that these events in the “Annals” are contained in a very fragmentary passage Redford’s conjectures, nonetheless, seem to imply that some foes “were discomforted” and then fled.\(^9\)

Hence, the immediate “cheering,” recorded in the new interpretation of Redford, makes perfect sense. Did Thutmose call out to some opponents, almost as a taunt? And, to add a bit to this interpretation, what was “this road”? I presume the path to the mouth of the Aruna Pass, but this might be queried.

The troops of the pharaoh then laid upon their ruler one significant demand. This time his soldiers demanded that the king “watch over” the rearguard of “his army and its people.”\(^9\) These remarks, not meant as a rebuke, were effectively pertinent to the military situation. From a literary viewpoint they serve to make even more effective and overwhelming the pharaoh’s role in advancing as a champion, as the quintessential strategic-general. The comment is anaphoric in intent because it assumes the previous statement by the king that he would go forth into the pass at the head of his army. One faces an interesting, albeit simple, crisscross pattern:

King speakshead of army
Troops speakrear of army.
There have been raised intriguing chronological reconstructions with the army’s disposition positioned at the exit of the Aruna Pass. I still find it highly unlikely that Thutmose was there on the 20th day of I šm\textsubscript{w}.

The time it would take to accomplish a series of military arrangements were great. I include the following:

1. Dismantling the chariots, taking care of the horses, setting the now extended army in order at the mouth of the Aruna Pass.
2. The travel through the pass.
3. The time it would take to reassemble the army at the exit.
4. The move to a locality outside of Megiddo and the bivouacking there.

Thutmose specifically insured that soldiers’ remarks to him were contained in the account. Quite correctly they were afraid of an enemy success if the Egyptian army was not reassembled in good order. But the pharaoh seems not to have been worried about any attack. He halted and sat down, surely under a protective canopy or in a tent. And the “shadow turned” on the portable clock when the last group of men had defiled outwards, thereby indicating a time past the sun’s zenith.

The subsequent portion of the account concerns the circumstances south of Megiddo when the entire army reached the vicinity on the shore of the Qina Brook. Note that the daybook account avoids any specific timing. Assuredly after the entire force was settled, all paraphernalia were re-adjusted to camp environment — i.e., the horses were un-tethered, the chariots were stacked up, food supplies put in order, people and animals fed, guards were provided at the perimeter, especially at the entranceways of the camp. Then came another royal speech. I suspect it did not take place in twilight. Instead, his words, though encouraging, are restrained, terse, and limited in nature in comparison to those at the Yehem conference. In contrast to a solemn and/or uplifting speech the few words given are almost banal: “Prepare yourselves! Make your weapons ready! For one will engage in combat with that wretched enemy in the morning, inasmuch as one is…” Here, at least for the third time, the narrative provides a jump: “to the effect that one will engage in fighting.” We have seen backward glances as well as temporally proleptic remarks earlier, and I suspect that these simple mirror-like combinations reflect the author’s literary style more than one would expect by a narrow historically-oriented writer.
I set the time frame for the final encampment on day 20 of Išmw. This was argued on the basis of the homo ludens aspect so prevalent in military society. But in view of Redford’s interpretation it is necessary for me to expand upon this issue as it directly concerns the pharaoh’s reactions and expectations.

The Battle of Kadesh, which shall be covered in the following chapter, provides a clear example of this attitude. Why did a second battle encounter take place on the day after combat? Notwithstanding the lack of royal success previously, both armies — the Egyptian and the Hittite one — stood not too distant from each other and separated by a small body of water, the river Orontes. Ramesses had to fight again. Not only was it required of him as a warrior, but it was also necessary within the established corporate conduct of the military. I have argued that “day two at Kadesh” was a set battle piece, a combat wherein both sides knew pretty well their relative strengths and positions in the field. Pharaoh must fight to preserve his honor; the conflict was not yet over. Muwatallis likewise engaged his soldiers in the melee, but there was no compelling reason for him to do so. As I shall discuss this circumstance later, let me mention briefly this parallel to Thutmose and leave additional commentary to the following chapter. Nonetheless, I feel that on day twenty the pharaoh waited at least until dawn on the following day to engage the foes in a “proper, upright” manner.

The battle at Megiddo took place in the following morning. There were three segments or sectors of the Egyptian army. A southern wing at a hill south of the Qina Brook and a northern one to the north-west of the city. The king remained in the center. A useful evaluation of chariots in combat is necessary, and I admit that I had not considered this previously. They raise dust. One ought never to line them up in columns, one after the other, when marching. Divide the chariots into rows, abreast so to speak, and then advance leisurely. On the march the chariots would be protected by footsoldiers on the sides. But just at the outset of combat, when the action is still regular, move the chariots in columns at the enemy. The vehicles thus act as a screen to protect the advancing footsoldiers while aiming at the enemies’ troops. Following the evidence from the Ramesside visual records of warfare during the New Kingdom, we should expect that the charioteers, the elite land-based troops, led the way. The “Annals,” however, place no emphasis on the melee, even if we assume that this “perfect” arrangement of chariot dispositions were followed.
Nonetheless, we can see the major differences between chariotry and cavalry in battle. The latter are to be sent to the flanks of the enemy (left and right). They have force, mass so to speak, and this is the crux of the matter. Chariotry also provide useful propulsive force but move slower than horse riders. Therefore, one can suspect that the chariot groups — cohorts if you wish — would proceeded forward in the center and not at the sides although remaining at the front of the army. The Egyptian pictorial evidence can only assist us in somewhat reconstructing Late Bronze Age chariot warfare, and a more detailed analysis will have to wait for a later time. As for the written material of the “Annals,” it is not useful at all.

The real power provided by Thutmose’s chariot cohorts was to establish a “center of gravity.” They provided some force to be sure, but also supplied battlefield manoeuvrability, firepower, speed, and ability to chase broken formations. I assume that Thutmose III expected the last from his charioteers, and his infantry as well, but he was not completely successful. The soldiers in the war vehicles should have pursued the fugitives and thus prevented them from reaching the wall of Megiddo. Perhaps many of the survivors sped quickly home on their chariots. Most certainly the Kadesh and Megiddo princes fled, quite possibly in their war vehicles. Requirements for chariots included training, specialized weaponry, and material as well as sufficient ammunition, and we can understand what a great loss occurred to the enemy when Thutmose’s army won the day. Finally, chariots need to be protected from enemy infantry and chariots. They were particularly vulnerable if they were caught between enemy infantry combined with chariotry that could prevent further advances. (I do not subscribe to the new metaphor of “helicopter gunships” used for them that Morris has made.) Heagren’s discussion of “tactical centers of gravity” additionally covers their impact at the operational level due to their ability to operate separately from the main army (infantry and archers). The chariots also had “stand-off” firepower which allowed the user to engage in operations over an extended area. We may summarize their advantages:

1. They provided the means for success at the operational level owing to their manoeuvrability, surprise, and firepower.
2. They required intelligence and training as well as leadership qualities. Hence, the elite nature of this army formation was a logical outcome of their use in combat.
3. They were vulnerable when there was poor or no infantry support, had a limited application, and were logistic dependencies.

Thutmose III, as all New Kingdom warrior-pharaohs, depended upon his charioteers. His success at Megiddo was only hindered by a later event, which shall be covered below.

How was the chariot utilized? During battle, the Egyptian evidence allows us to conclude that chariots could fight enemy chariots without troop support, and Schulman’s contention that they were used as mobile platforms is still a valid interpretation. The presence of a “free man,” not the driver, allowed these vehicles to serve as moving platforms for archers, keeping in mind that the velocity of arrows, javelins or any weapons would be increased owing to the chariot’s velocity. As Heagren stresses, “Even a small number of chariots had the capability of delivering a high volume of fire onto” an opposing formation.

At least two dispositions of reconstructed attack can be found in the Egyptological scholarship. According to Schulman, the chariots moved in a parallel direction down the line of the enemy troop formation (Plate VII, page 103). Then they would move off when they had reached an effective range for shooting volleys of arrows. Note that the attack was against men and not aimed at killing the foe’s horses. It is just possible that the chariot sector attempted to locate the less protected flanks, and thus acted similarly to the later employ of cavalry, but keep in mind that chariots moved forward and did not sharply veer off greatly to the left and right as in the classic tactical arrangements of cavalry attack. Actually, horses are far easier to manoeuvre owing to their single rider, lighter weight, and simpler yet more effective means of directional control.

A second possibility envisages the chariots seeking out the enemy flanks and rear, but this must imply a split in the force and assumes a high degree of manoeuvrability (Plate VIII, page 104). And as it appears evident, such a tactic works well with infantry not possessing high mobility and when the enemy’s supporting chariots were removed from the field. Schulman, although not adhering to this reconstruction, nonetheless argued that the line-up of the war vehicles were in squadrons of ten, a highly manageable size; each were named. Finally, only after the enemy infantry formations had been broken could the chariots close in on their foes. This is surely what occurred outside Megiddo. The success of Thutmose’s army forced his opponents to retreat. Indeed, they must have fled. The infantry thus became easy
Leadership under fire

VIII Second Hypothetical Reconstruction of Egyptian Chariot Attacks
targets for the faster chariots and it is quite possible that at this point the bow was replaced by a spear or a javelin.\textsuperscript{110} It was at this point that Egyptian artists illustrated the battlefield melee in their reliefs. Clausewitz refers to a “principle of continuity” during which the defeated enemy, now pursued relentlessly, was denied any chance of re-establishing composure and hence were crushed totally. This must have taken place at Megiddo if the pursuit by chariots could be maintained and the danger of any retaliation minimal.\textsuperscript{111}

In order to contrast the chariot method of engagement with that of cavalry, let me chose the Battle of Gettysburg as it provides historical evidence that can enlighten the situation at Megiddo, both positively and negatively.\textsuperscript{112} There was no overriding strategy on the part of Lee. He wished to compel the north to opt for negotiation but without a clear physical objective indicated. (Of course, he desired an eventual attack on Washington.) By the second day he divided his army into three portions, sending two of them to the left and right flanks of the Union positions. Except for Longstreet, Lee’s commanders were not of superb quality. He then attempted a frontal assault in the middle, and almost succeeded. Pickett’s charge, approved by him, was foolhardy and a major error, as Lee realized \textit{in media res}. He lost the battle. For our purposes at this point it is sufficient to note the direct center advance of the Confederates and their inability to dislodge the enemy who were on a higher terrain. Direct center attacks by infantry need a very large number of troops plus help from the flanks. Unfortunately, nowhere in the extant historical data on the part of the Egyptians are such details provided save for the Battle of Kadesh, and that was a singular case.

Let us resume the Egyptian narrative of the “Annals” and turn to the report from the king’s scouts or specially-trained investigators at the very start of the day of battle. The account of these men stated that “The plain is fine,\textsuperscript{113} the southern and northern troops likewise.”\textsuperscript{114} As previously noted, combats outside of Asiatic cities regularly took place, and almost expectedly, a \textit{homo ludens} engagement had to occur.\textsuperscript{115} Ideally, the timing was in the early morning. All must be sunny. Both sides would have been able to size up their opponents’ preparations, abilities, and size, including what percentages of the enemy troops were in chariots or on foot, not to mention the presence of archers. The noise of battle — horse neighing, trumpets, screams, “clattering chariots,” if not bells, would have pervaded the intense personally-driven charge on both sides.\textsuperscript{116} Let us add the cacophony of the horrible noise coming from wounded men and horses in addition to spears meeting with shields and the like.
Deborah Cantrell estimates that the effective abilities of the horses to endure warfare were not as long as one might assume.\textsuperscript{117} The duration of the Megiddo battle must have depended upon the stamina of the equids, and especially limited by the fact that no replacement in animals occurred. As she puts it, “If the battle in fact ‘raged all day long’” — a typical literary topos — “numerous trips from the camp to the battlefield for fresh horses were necessary.”\textsuperscript{118} We have no evidence of this in the war records of the Bronze Age. But the endurance of any active horse in combat lasts for around one hour, or two at the most. Furthermore, is necessary to supplement this gory data of violence\textsuperscript{119} with the caveat that it was very difficult to annihilate a horse; arrow wounds are usually not fatal. In contrast, such wounds, be they made by arrows, lances/javelins, and other body piercings actually stimulate the animal, and it takes hours before a horse dies when its artery is pierced.\textsuperscript{120} One can be assured that all charioteer warriors knew these empirically-based fundamental facts. Last, but not least, we know how much the pharaohs sought to capture, not injure, their enemy’s steeds.\textsuperscript{121}

Up to recently, the all too brief account of Thutmose is all that we possess regarding the actual combat having occurred at Megiddo, although there are additional extant sources that deal with this campaign.\textsuperscript{122} But we can now rely upon a fragmentary Dynasty XIX story, labelled by Manassa “Thutmose III in Asia,”\textsuperscript{123} and enable us to analyse historical military fiction with respect to eh royal hieroglyphic accounts. There, the narrative unfolds historically and possesses a military setting. Chariots and their horses are mentioned. The account is not oriented to the lowly footsoldier or archer. According to Manassa, a lengthy portion of the opening fragments of battle deals with “darkness,” and she perceptibly argues that the time must be the night just before the combat on I śmuw 21.\textsuperscript{124} There is a dialogue of sorts between a non-royal, Paser and his lord, Thutmose. We should expect this literary dialogue if only because Ramesses II and his charioteer Menna do the same during the battle of Kadesh.\textsuperscript{125} The method of fighting is highlighted in the story, and as to be expected the chariots held the place of honor. The presence of transhumant (seasonal pastoral-agricultural) Apiru associated with chariot teams also is noteworthy, and the encounter with them is further parallel to a second Ramesside literary narrative, “The Capture of Joppa.” But one all-important fact is present in this hieratic account of Thutmose — namely, 1,900 Egyptian chariots (word restored but certain) are mentioned.\textsuperscript{126}
Literary war accounts such as this one offer personal aspects of events, far more than royal historical accounts written in hieroglyphs. Asides not directly relating to the combat fit within the tapestry of the story. Divine interventions also were placed in “Thutmose III in Asia,” as well as “hostile wind,” but the chariots still remain pre-eminent. In addition, a standard of Amun set at the north of the king is referred to. Donkeys turn up—a female one ridden by a “commander” — and perhaps here shame is involved. But the overriding importance of this narrative, written down centuries after the battle, is that a fictional tale may still contain hard core facts. The historical events were set within the major campaign of Thutmose III and highlight significant circumstances. In sum, the milestone of the defeat of Egyptian foes outside the wall of Megiddo by Thutmose III was not only remembered, it was subsequently related and described in a setting that was considerably more public than the temple walls of Karnak.

Manassa poses the question whether these fictions were an independent literary genre, and she sets her stories, four to be exact, within the “three main criteria of literariness set forth by Antonio Loprieno: fictionality, intertextuality, and publication beyond the monumental sphere.” But some questions remain concerning the purpose, audience, and contemporary inspiration for these tales. With regard to “Thutmose in Asia” the historical time in which the events unroll is defined; we are not situated within a mythic past. Some, if not all, of the individuals had to have been known to the reader or listener, and I am not referring merely to the pharaohs. Specific details that veer away from a mere narrative dealing with a campaign are replete. For example, the exploits of general Djehuty in “The Capture of Joppa” purposely ignore the continual successes of his ruler, Thutmose III. We might wish to use the literary term from antiquity, “High Style,” to reflect the monumental discourse in contradiction to a “Middle Style” wherein non-royalty is present to a significant degree and the account is written in soft copy, on papyrus. Then too, let us not forget the orientation of these literary narratives. “Thutmose III in Asia” covers the Megiddo success of Thutmose III and “The Capture of Joppa” relates a key event which took place during his northern wars. The events, true even if embellished or not, did not belong to a royal hieroglyphic narrative of war, the official monumental record set up in a religious institution.

But let us return to the Megiddo battle. As befits a wise general Thutmose insures that he will not be threatened by any enemy attack, sneaky or straightforward. After he awoke he received the news that all secure.
That was the most important thing to be ascertained. Without this pre-knowledge, it would have been hard to advance upon the enemy’s chariots and footsoldiers which were close by, and it was the redactor-author of the “Annals” purposely included a brief mention of the area being safe for attack. Combat was to take place very soon. As outsiders, we can applaud Thutmose’s wisdom. He is no precipitate leader of men into combat. But there is a second, considerably more detailed, reflection of his character and it deserves more attention. Egyptologists are no strangers to Thutmose’s complaint, placed in the third person account of the narrative and thus apparently “truthful.” I shall follow Lichtheim’s translation because it is the most mellifluous of recent attempts:

Now if his majesty’s troops had not set their hearts to plundering the possessions of the enemies, they would have [captured] Megiddo at this moment.

This remark was provided for a host of reasons. First, it simply describes what occurred. Second, the failure to arrange the immediate capture of Megiddo by surrender stemmed from the soldiers’ avaricious nature. Therefore, they are blamed, and thus the subsequent seven-month siege of Megiddo by the Egyptians, described later in the account, is provided an explanation. Hence a link is established in the narrative with this serious, albeit terse, remark acting as a prolepsis to what comes later. The melee appears to have been short if we follow the narrative, and the victory so overwhelming that no one expected such a great result. But Thutmose, as depicted in the “Annals,” definitely was furious over the failure on the part of his soldiers. How did that occur is not given to us to know. But combat and pursuit time would have expired when the Egyptian soldiers hurried to plunder the enemy. This was a major failure of leadership no matter how one may excuse the pharaoh. The tactical goal had been achieved — crushing defeat — but the strategic goal was not acquired. No one should let troops go wild. I find it significant that this blush upon Thutmose’s generalship, and it is a major one, does not center on strategy but on personal leadership, the control of one’s men.

Why did this unexpected result of combat victory occur? Great captains must insure that discipline is the rule. In the Egyptological scholarship it is assumed that the troops were greedy. I feel that this is a reasonable evaluation. Perhaps the rapid success of the Egyptian army was too swift, giving the opportunity to the king’s troops to plunder
unexpectedly. I feel that the battle was highly successful on the Egyptian side. How else could Thutmose’s soldiers (chariot men included) swoop upon the enemy camp right after their foes had fled? I posit the following reasons:

1. The simplest one involves the location of the enemy’s bivouac. It was not far away from Thutmose. Once his opponents were defeated and fled, the Egyptians had the time to reach rapidly the enemy’s encampment.

2. The enemy had divided its forces. This is well known. I do not imply that the foe’s army at Megiddo was reduced to a large degree, but that some troops were not present to oppose Thutmose. They were guarding the other “exits.” Yet surely the best men were ready at Megiddo, as the presence of the princes of Kadesh and Megiddo indicates.

3. The enemy was not united. This factor appears not to have been discussed. The opponents had formed a coalition to resist Thutmose.

4. Connected to 3 — once a defeat was certain, the individual city units of the coalition must have split from one another. One must recognize that unity is a preeminent requirement for an army as well as for a concerted alliance. But seeing defeat, I contend that the individual units of the Asiatic coalition broke up.

There are five simplistic rules of coalitions, military or otherwise, that apply here.

1. Keep unity at all costs during the conflict.
2. When defeated, especially severely, the alliance breaks up.
3. The alliance also becomes more tenuous when the end, the strategic goal, is within sight.
4. The more, or most, aggressive player in a coalition seeks to continue the war until the foe is totally annihilated in order to acquire more advantages at the cessation of the conflict.
5. Other not so aggressive members of an alliance tend not to consider the long-range results of peace.
In our case the enemy coalition opposing Thutmose suffered a lot. The follow-up reports in the “Annals” indicate the following:

1. The enemy camp was plundered.
2. There was thus a cessation in the conflict.
3. As to be expected, certain men ran headlong to the city walls of Megiddo and were hoisted up.
I do not feel that only the rulers of Kadesh and Megiddo escaped.
4. The horses and chariots, both in the camp (I presume a few were there) and on the field were quickly seized.
5. The survivors were placed stretched out on their backs. Their military or civilian status would have recorded, the number of men counted, and the remaining booty categorized.
6. So too did the king’s army seize the tent of the prince of Kadesh, reminding one of the Swiss victory over Charles the Bold at Grandson.\(^{137}\)

If we follow the “Annals” perspective, Thutmose would have expected Megiddo to surrender immediately after all of its allies had been overwhelming defeated, captured or killed. Megiddo was “shut up” as the narrative indicates. If Megiddo would have surrendered immediately,\(^ {138}\) no siege would have been necessary. This logical, indeed simple, conclusion is supported by the numerous visual and written New Kingdom tableaux of pharaohs fighting enemy city-fortresses in Asia just outside the metropolis or citadel. Once pharaoh wins in the field the city-dwellers surrender.\(^ {139}\) Unfortunately, the lack of detail with respect to the “clash and rout,”\(^ {140}\) at Megiddo is not recorded, even though the pursuit of the fleeing enemy by chariots “ensured that the chase was more than a clumsy and risky release of stress” for the embattled infantry.\(^ {141}\)

The booty list from the Battle of Megiddo helps us to reconstruct the military equipment, soldiers, and horses after the Egyptian counted up their success.\(^ {142}\) Specified are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living prisoners</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hands</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses(^ {143})</td>
<td>2041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foals 191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stallions(^ {144})</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Redford, this tally covers only the booty taken from the enemy camp outside Megiddo. This is very dubious, if only because the antagonist would have mustered all that he had — chariots, horses, men — to withstand Thutmose and to defeat him. I seriously question the supposition that the Kadesh prince, the “head” of the coalition, and others, had left their chariots in the camp. Then too, the numbers given are relatively high, thereby indicating that they should refer to actual material recovered by the Egyptians, and that must include people captured in battle, hands representing fallen enemies (definitely not from the camp), and the chariots of Thutmose’s foes (specially the two belonging to the princes of Kadesh and Megiddo). The list moves from the most important war vehicles to the least, and is organized neatly — Kadesh prince, Megiddo prince, additional leaders’ chariots, and finally army chariots. It is hard to see any of the first three categories of chariots remaining in the enemy camp and not being used.

It is useful to compare this data with the evidence of 1,900 Egyptian chariots proffered by Manassa. The grand total of chariots that Thutmose “acquired” at Megiddo was 924. Redford felt that the latter integer indicates vehicles never used in combat. Let us assume his argument. Why then were so many chariots not used? Was it the case that the separation of the enemy forces — one group north and one south of Megiddo — meant that some of the chariots remained at the home base, so to speak, and were thus not used? Or, as I feel it more reasonable, did the Egyptians list only the chariots that were captured but not those which were broken? Significant, nonetheless, is the percentage: 924/1900, or if we wish to round up, 1,000/2,000. I.e., the enemy possessed at Megiddo only one half of what the Egyptian chariots brought to that city.
This booty list then continues with the military paraphernalia dealing with personal armament. 502 bows are listed and 200 — a nice round number — of bronze suits of mail with two others belonging to the princes of Kadesh and Megiddo. We thus arrive at 702 men. Because the two leaders survived, fled to the walls of Megiddo, and were pulled up, at least they, but perhaps others, wheeled their chariots around and fled off to safety. They would have swiftly jumped out of their vehicle and discarded their personal protection in great haste. The narrative indicates that the foe had abandoned their horses as well as “their chariots of gold and silver,” and charged backward to home safety. Hence, some of the war material totalled up later definitely came from the melee.

Sieges are rare in the historical sources for the Late Bronze Age. They are messy affairs “and given the Egyptian pertinacity for low cost, low attrition (but high gain) warfare,” they do not figure greatly in the war records. To be sure, the Egyptians possessed siege technology as did others such as the Hittites. The oft-cited example of the Siege of Urišu reveals the following: siege towers, earthen siege ramps, and battering rams. Reconnaissance of the surrounding territory was de rigeur. Even more, the literary narrative, “The Capture of Joppa,” provides us with a similar occurrence.

To summarize this campaign is not difficult. It can be divided into four “operations” that were sequential rather than simultaneous without, however, taking into consideration the pharaoh’s desire to scout ahead and determine the “lay of the land.” When each of these four were accomplished, Thutmose could then begin the following stage of the campaign:

1. Arrival at Yehem
   a. Pause
2. Operational Plans Determined
   a. Penetrating the Aruna Pass
   b. Pause before battle
3. Open Battle
   a. Pause after battle
4. Siege
   a. Additional military actions
   b. King departs
By this means we can ascertain the success of the king step by step. But an argument can be made for reconstructing simultaneous operations once Thutmose had placed the city of Megiddo under siege. But failure to take advantage of the “principle of continuity” at the tactical level is self-evident.\footnote{157}

We have now arrived at the stage where an estimate of Thutmose III’s generalship can be encapsulated. From the very beginning there was a well-defined strategic goal, Megiddo. Naturally, the aim was to defeat the enemy at that city. That having been achieved, the ultimate desire of Thutmose would have been realized— namely, Egyptian hegemonic control over Palestine would be re-established. The use of intelligence to ferret out the situation in Western Asia must be assumed, especially because the pharaoh had some time in which to prepare his large army. Logistically, Thutmose III had at his fingertips an effective military machine and a well-designed routier system, one that now included an up-to-date system for fortifications across the Mediterranean region of the Sinai. He departed at a reasonable time — before the Egyptian harvest had to be reaped — and met no opposition at all until he reached the mouth of the Aruna Pass. Even there the resistance was minimal, if not trivial. Megiddo was the pivotal center for the enemies as well as for Thutmose. (Note that the stated objectives of his later campaigns do not provide us with such details. Hence, the plethora of modern reconstructions with regard to the Syrian wars of Thutmose.\footnote{158})

Thutmose III stands out in the “Annals” as an outstanding strategist, but also as a wise leader who understood the necessity of deciding military policy at specific (required?) occasions. Such “bottlenecks” were present on the way to Megiddo, but none proved to be treacherous. We can list Gaza, Yehem, mouth of the Aruna Pass, exit of the same defile, and the battlefield near Megiddo. At all of these locations the monarch was superior in generalship. Of course, not all cities, towns, or specific geographical features are inherent decisive points. But Thutmose’s activities at those five places bears scrutiny. He also knew the art of surprise and this, after all, sets him very high in our career estimation.

The pharaoh showed himself able to deal with the unknown. He lost control of his victorious troops around Megiddo, however, and this must be considered a mark against his tactical abilities. He encountered no severe opposition from his troops at the war council in Yehem. Later at Megiddo his soldiers must have come to order under his strongly-worded commands. No opposition is recorded in the narrative. Thutmose
then maneuvered around the city and set in motion a siege. His immediate military operations then must have followed the surrender of all living opponents after combat, the official numerical reckoning of plunder, and so forth, if not a victory speech and celebrations.

The apparent rapid, if not overwhelming, success of the Egyptians was something that he never took into consideration. This depends upon the speculation that the battle was over too quickly, but I think that the “Annals” indicates this. The apparent cowardly nature of the two major antagonists, who appear in the narrative as the only successful fugitives, indicate that they saw the disaster and fled as soon as possible. The impending defeat was unexpected and in my opinion swift.

We can add to this evaluation data concerned with the eighth campaign of Thutmose III as the “Annals” provide a reasonably detailed account of this warfare. It is unfortunate that little of the man’s personality can be sifted from the very short accounts of the king’s later wars. One campaign stands out nevertheless. This took place in regnal year thirty-three, the eighth in Thutmose’s numeration, and was directed against Mitanni. To Yosef Mizrachy the warfare has the trappings of a symbolic nature but possessed no demonstrative consequence. The major difficulty with his interpretation is that the initial strategic aspects of the lengthy war are not analysed and the military assumptions for this major show of force not considered. Great expenditure was needed, and Redford more than adequately discussed this. In addition, the length of time away from Egypt, the provisioning of the troops, the need to insure local civil support must have been taken into account by Thutmose. Let us also not forget the expenditure of time and cost. But the fundamental issue remains clear: why fight in distant Syria?

What were his aims during this later campaign? We know enough about the Egyptian logistic network in Western Asia to see how carefully the pharaoh planned this war, how much he was dependent upon supplies from the Lebanon, and how deep he understood the political geography of Syria. To quote Heagren, “the resulting political vacuum and the inability of surviving but now fragmentary city states to put up any unified resistance,” was still in operation, Mitanni notwithstanding. I concur with Redford’s evaluation that “the 8th campaign involved the surprise occasioned by strategic planning and secret equipment.” Why was such effort and detail organized and set in motion if the warfare was geared merely to a show of force? In his discussion Redford further remarks upon the Egyptians proceeding moving north and proceeding, with devastation,
through the kingdom of Aleppo on the way to Carchemish.\textsuperscript{163} To me it is worthwhile that he also admits the difficulty in historical reconstruction with respect to the eighth campaign season, but resolving that the warfare lasted at least five months, a rather long period of time. Yet we must keep in mind that simultaneous operations, not led by the pharaoh, could have taken place even if the official royal account presents the case otherwise. One way out of the temporal dilemma of a length season of campaigning (five months at the minimum) is to propose that the king left for Asia early. This is, in fact, Redford’s hypothesis.

Thutmose III as commander is the general whom we have faced here. His strategic objectives were clear and his operational command is sufficiently revealed in the “Annals” to conclude that his risky course of action was the hall-mark of this campaign. He appears to have considered the Aruna Pass decision to be the most important part of the campaign. The conference at Yehem dwarfs all other portions of the royal narrative. Compare the speeches there with the incredibly short account of the battle wherein no actual combat is reported. His brilliance as field commander is never presented outright, and we are right to conclude that Thutmose’s “real success had already been achieved at the operational level” in Yehem.\textsuperscript{164} That having been accomplished, his tactical victory at Megiddo reads almost as an expected coda to the entire war. Earlier, his strategic ability showed itself in his goal, which was not a scattered one nor even half-planned. If the capture of Megiddo was worth “the capture of one thousand cities” (column 90 in the account), Thutmose certainly knew his purpose. In battle he was in the center with his main chariot forces while the right and left wings protected the core, but at the same time could deal readily with the flanks of the enemy.\textsuperscript{165} All three levels of the art of war were followed: strategic, operational, and tactical.\textsuperscript{166}

By his time the military arm of Egypt had adapted for itself an operational art that took heed of geography and other logistic hurdles abroad, technology,\textsuperscript{167} and their insufficient combat power.\textsuperscript{168} The pharaohs could not depend upon wars of attrition. At the height of their success their military achievements were still limited, and no monarch could “project significant enough military force in this region,” that is into Asia.\textsuperscript{169} Yet these constraints do not in any way deflect from the achievements of Thutmose III in his great campaign of victory against Megiddo. Space, time, and force he had, but he was also a strategist of the first rank!
notes


2 Heagren’s *The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt*, specifically addresses what is now called “operational art,” one that is placed somewhere between tactics and strategy. Bergerud, *ibid.*., notes the bivalent nature of geographic considerations.

With regard to terrain, climate, etc. there are some perceptive comments of Mario Liverani, review of Marc van De Mieroop, *The Eastern Mediterranean in the Age of Ramesses II* (Oxford: Blackwell; 2007), Or 78 (2009): 214: “If we put on a distribution map the basic features of the complex cultures at that time — fully fledged states, urbanization, palatine complexes, writing and formal administration — we can see that they build up a continuous and rather narrow strip stretching from the Nile valley and the Aegean to Elam.”

Extremely helpful in providing a modern overarching viewpoint of this time is the recent volume of Ellen Morris, *Ancient Egyptian Imperialism*, a work that avoids the not infrequent modern cultural biases opposed to “imperialism.”


4 Pierre Grandet, *Les pharaons du Nouvel Empire: une pensée stratégique (1550-1069 avant J.-C.)* (Monaco: Éditions du Rocher; 2008), 85-94, deals with the Megiddo campaign of Thutmose. The introduction, and in particular pages 24-49, cover the Asiatic situations of terrain, weather and so forth. The volume is worthwhile consulting with respect to the methodological background argued here.

5 I am speaking from the viewpoint of a historian and not from any literary aspects. In addition to Redford’s commentary in his study referred to note 3 above (and especially Part Two), see Spalinger, *Aspects of the Military Documents of the Ancient Egyptians* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press; 1982).

6 The following discussion is based on my “The Upkeep of Empire: Costs and Rations.” The important study of Heagren concerning food supplies, time of travel and other logistical consideration has improved on Redford’s work, *The Wars of Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, Part 2 (Chapters 2 and 3), as well as my *War in Ancient Egypt*, Chapters 3 and 5 (especially the two Excurses).


See my comments in Chapter 1 and “The Rise of the Sinai Road System in Dynasty XVIII,” in press (with Eliezer Oren).


A summary is presented by Jürgen Kenning, *Der Feldzug nach Qadech: Das Ägypten des Neuen Reiches auf der Suche nach seiner Strategie* (Hildesheim: Olms; 2014), 48-54. In this work, which I shall discuss in detail in Chapter 3, an attempt is made to establish the norms of Egyptian strategy. I shall leave global perspectives aside and concentrate, as he does, with the Battle of Kadesh, on specific cases without entering into the vexed arena of dominating mental reconstructions. Strategy, as he understands the word, must include all aspects of foreign relations and not merely warfare. My orientation is more modest.


Morris, *Ancient Egyptian Imperialism*, 145, states that “Thutmose III was probably marching only 5,000-10,000 men northward each year.” I originally opted for 5,000 men at the Battle of Megiddo. For the number of soldiers in his army during the later campaigns of this pharaoh we are in the dark. Hans Goedicke, *The Battle of Megiddo* (Baltimore: Halgo; 2000), 98-99, also discusses the sizes of the opposing forces. Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, 195-198, differs with him. I follow Heagren, but see my commentary *War in Ancient Egypt*, Chapters 2 and 5 (notes and Excursus).

Spalinger, “The Upkeep of Empire: Costs and Rations.”


Kemp, “Large Middle Kingdom Granary Buildings (and the Archaeology of Administration),” 133.

I am turning to the later work of Heagren, *The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt*, 161-208 — Part II (“Logistics”), as it improves on my earlier parameters in *War in Ancient Egypt* as well as Redford’s in his *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*.

The most recent studies on Bronze Age donkeys may be found in Itzhaq Shai *et al.*, “The Importance of the Donkey as a Pack Animal in the Early Bronze Age Southern Levant: A View from Tell es-Safil/Gath,” *ZDPV* 132 (2016): 1-25; Guy Bar-Oz,

21 Heagren, *ibid.*, 206.

22 Hard fodder = barley and oats; green fodder = hay, straw, clover, broad beans, etc.; and pasturage = grasses and vegetation. Dry fodder is sometimes separated from green fodder. Horses need more of the latter than the former.

23 Heagren, *The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt*, 181. On page 201 note 186 he observed that a single ox could pull around 181 kg at 3.2-4.0 kph for ca 7-8 hours/day. Oxen had a weekly range of 96 km “with the remaining time resting and grazing.” Add Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War 100 BC-AD 200* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1996), 293. Goldsworthy has extremely useful logistical determinants on pages 287-296 (under “Logistics”), even though they reflect a far later period in time than the Egyptian New Kingdom. Cf. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (246 BC-AD 235)*, 211-212.

24 Morris states that horses “were still relatively rare in the Nile Valley” at the time when Thutmose III took over Megiddo (*Ancient Egyptian Imperialism*, 121). This may have been true, but the desire to acquire horses, especially for breeding purposes, need not imply their rarity. This scholarly position needs investigation.


29 To assume that there was none is not an acceptable conclusion.


31 Spalinger, *War in Ancient Egypt*, 34.


The stop-over there, which lasted but one day, was coincidentally — purposely in my eyes — set on the king’s accession day.

Faulkner’s old comments, “The Battle of Megiddo,” JEA 28 (1942): 3, are still correct despite later, more substantive, analyses.

Ibid., 2-3. Van Creveld’s remarks on the “directed telescope” use of spies and scouts may be read in this context — see notes 1 and 55 in Chapter 1. For auxiliaries in the New Kingdom army, see Darnell and Manassa, Tutankhamun’s Armies. Battle and Conquest during Ancient Egypt’s Late 18th Dynasty, 67-69.

In a somewhat different perspective, see Keegan, Warpaths. Travels of a Military Historian in North America (Hodder and Stoughton; 1995), where a good study of fortresses (first built by the French and later, the British and American ones) is given. His discussions provide some additional data with regard to the Egyptian and Western Asian urban centers of control. I should warn the reader that this work has been severely criticized by Gary Mitchell, Archivaria 42 (1996): 146-147, but with a partly chauvinistic perspective.

Darnell and Manassa, Tutankhamun’s Armies. Battle and Conquest during Ancient Egypt’s Late 18th Dynasty, 69-70; Heagren, The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt, 88-89. Well-known is Kamose’s small expeditionary force into the Libyan Desert, the one that captured the messenger from the King of Apophis. These men were soldiers as well as scouts/spies. Van Creveld, Command in War, employs the phrase “a kind of directed telescope” to explain the need for a commander to receive instant information from the battlefield vis scouts/spies:

40 Schulman, “Egyptian Representations of Horsemen and Riding in the New Kingdom.” *JNES* 16 (1957): 263-271. We should also keep in mind that scouts, to be very effective, easily could have been non-Egyptians.

41 And the more he found out that no enemies were hindering his progress, surely the more he was certain that the crucial fight would take place at Megiddo. But Thutmose had already planned for a confrontation at Megiddo. I find it significant that the Egyptians never recorded any threat to their army’s march north.

42 Heagren, *The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt*, 221.

43 I am basing the army’s advance at 4 km/hour.

44 The arrival at Yehem was on I ṣmw 16 and the departure from there (clearly at dawn) to the Aruna Pass was on I ṣmw 19.


46 In modern Classical scholarship, there is strong dichotomy between historians and “literary people.” When it comes to trusting what a leader says the latter generally are more perspicacious in their discussions. How, for example, can we trust the famous speech of Pericles in Thucydides? The consensus today is that it reflects the truth of the event as the ancient historian depicts Pericles’s character. But it is not an exact, or even closely-rendered copy of the actual words. In our case, as with many reports of Greek and Roman generals’ addresses to their troops in combat, the literary fancies of the writer soar. Therefore, I shall follow the approach of the writer or author and indicate what the king wished and how he presented his case.

From an Egyptological perspective of these hermeneutic issues, see Eyre, “Is Egyptian Historical Literature ‘Historical’ or ‘Literary’,” in: Antonio Loprieno (ed.), *Ancient Egyptian Literature. History and Forms* (Leiden, New York, and Cologne: Brill; 1996), 415-433; and Manassa, *Imagining the Past*, *passim*.
especially Chapter 1 (“Intimations of an Earlier Age: History and Fiction in New Kingdom Literature”).

47 Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, 14-15. For one questionable interpretation, see the analysis of the Egyptian verb *njs* on page 23 note 132. The older text version is to be found in *Urk*. IV 649.3-652.12. Note that photographs of all of the extant columns are not given in Redford’s volume.


49 Andréas Stauder, *Linguistic Dating of Middle Egyptian Literary Texts* (Hamburg: Widmaier Verlag; 2013), 51 with also note 210. Note his comments on the sequential *jw=f hr sdm*, showing up here first “in documentary registers.”

50 I have not noted where restorations occur.

51 A nice use of the contemporary First Present in Egyptian.

52 Stauder, *Linguistic Dating of Middle Egyptian Literary Texts*, 172, for *ḫr sḏm*. See his comments on page 168 as well. Redford’s “as far away as” is also reasonable.

53 The restoration of Redford here is conjectural and cannot be proven to have existed.

54 Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, 14, restores “and their troops,” without indicating a lacuna. He reads after “their horses” *ms* = *sn r ḫr wrt*.

55 Classically, and with much force, this underlying pressure from Mitanni was enunciated by James Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt* II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1906), 167.

56 This is a crucial reconstruction of Redford.

57 For the following passage, see Stauder, *Linguistic Dating of Middle Egyptian Literary Texts*, 46 and 392. I do not follow Redford at this point.


62 Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, 15 and note 85, is very helpful at this point. *Urk*. IV 650.9 (edition
of Kurt Sethe) is very dubious, as he must have realized because he “abbreviates” the spelling.

There are still problems with this section despite Redford’s newest attempt (*ibid.*, 15 with notes 85 and 86) to clarify the original text. Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature* II, 31, uses the phrase “whichever of [these] seems best to him,”

Correctly understood already by Faulkner, “The Battle of Megiddo,” 3 and 5 note g. He further comments that these “dispatches which have presumably just arrived must have contained further information” (his italics).

The restorations of Redford, *ibid.*, 15, are very conjectural, as he indicates. “Messengers” are discussed by Manassa in her *Imagining the Past*.

Faulkner, “The Battle of Megiddo,” 5 note g.


I am using this term in its core or original sense of “appearance,” or “outline.” See Eric Auerbach, *Scenes from the Drama of European Literature* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; 1984), 9-76 (“Figura”).

The title of Giacomo Cavillier’s work, *Thutmose III. Immagine e strategia di un condottiero* (Turin: Tirrenia Stampatori; 2003), shows the emphasis upon strategy.


This is indirectly discussed by Morris, *Ancient Egyptian Imperialism*.


Chapter 3 will cover Ramesses II at Kadesh, a useful example to place beside Thutmose’s Megiddo success.

The subtle difference between “Zweck” and “Ziel” thereby come into action once more.

Urk. IV 653.11-13. See Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, 22 with note 131, but he did not realize that Faulkner, “The Battle of Megiddo,” 3, already knew this. Faulkner also places an interrogation point at the very end of the passage.

Ibid., note 128: he argues for a restoration of $w’w$ in column 128.

To present the $jw \ wd: \ bm=j$ as a “Second Tense” is impossible (Redford, *ibid.*, 17). Cf. Jean-Marie Kruchten, “From Middle to Late Egyptian,” *LingAeg* 6 (1999): 1-97, and especially 56, 67, and 89. Add Loprieno, *Ancient Egyptian, A Linguistic Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1995), 166-168. Note the $jh \ wd: \ nb=n$ in *Urk. IV* (column 36). Deborah Sweeney remarks that $jw \ sdm=f$ ought to be an aorist and might give the sense of the king persisting in going forth. This personal communication adds a bit more significant data to the discussion.

Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature* II, 31, is excellent.

$jw=f \ wd:(w)$. A nice use of the colloquial.


Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature* II, 334 note 5. But her commentary is purely grammatical-historical.


Ibid., 22-23.

Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt* II, 182 (§ 426). He called this portion “Battle in the Mountains.” Faulkner’s comments will be found in his The Battle of Megiddo,” 9 where the presently-held newer, and far better, location for this event was first presented.


See note 47 above.


90 Not much of column 67 can be seen in Plate 2 of Redford's publication. Hence, I cannot verify his restorations. For the “discomforted” section, he has in his copy $jw=sn \ hr(w)\ st\ hrw\ pf\ hsj\ wth(w)$.....

91 Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Paléstine of Thutmosis III*, 24 note 144, following Faulkner and Goedicke. This is an important remark as the addition of $rmṯ$ to $mš\ García$ ought to refer to either non-combatant military men or “camp followers,” a second possibility that arises.

92 *Ibid.*, 23 and 25-29. Any day switch should indicate morning unless the integer continues on from a previous event having taken place on the same day. Redford’s careful analysis must imply that the Egyptian army traversed the Aruna pass in the night.

His restoration on page 23 is: “Regnal year 23, first month of shomu, day 20; (?)”

93 Some of these are covered in Chapter 5 of my *War in Ancient Egypt*. I now realize that more elapsed time needs to be considered.


96 *Urk.* IV 653.3: $r\-ntt\ jw.tw\ t\ thn\ ‘ḥz$ and *Urk.* IV 656.5: $hr\-ntt\ jw.tw\ [hr\ V…]$. The two passages are in contrast, as Stauder remarks.

97 Spalinger, “Ramesses Ludens et Alii.”

Cantrell, *The Horsemen of Israel*, is not very useful on this matter. See Chapter 1 note 50, with special reference to the volume *Chasing Chariots* wherein specific data are given.


The Kadesh depictions are the best to employ when attempting a solution to this vexed problem, but even there the forces of Ramesses that repelled Muwatallis’s charioteers were also predominantly charioteers. I have partly covered this situation in “Military Dispositions in New Kingdom Egyptian Battles,” which should appear in an edited volume by myself and Eliezer Oren (see note 9 above). NB: Both shooting arrows and throwing spears or javelins are definitely aided by the velocity or acceleration of chariots.

The chariots of both leaders were taken by the Egyptians and entered into the official list of booty. However, this does not mean they the chariots were abandoned in the field. I suspect that both princes sped back to Megiddo as quickly as possible in their vehicles.


See note 116 below on horses’ ability to survive being wounded by arrows, etc.


Heagren, *ibid.*, 84-86.


Keegan, *The American Civil War*, 190-203; see also Chapter 3 note 144.

The often rendered translation of “shore” is not quite appropriate. I use “plain” as if the territory were perceived to be on the edge of a “sea of grass.” But “coast is clear” does fit very nicely within the English idiom. See the next note.


Cantrell, *The Horsemen of Israel*, 32 and 74.

Ibid., 75.


Ibid., 32-33.

Morris, *Ancient Egyptian Imperialism*, 127-131, provides a very significant discussion plus charts of plunder, “benevolences” (her term), and trade: in gold, horses, people, silver, and cattle based on the “Annals” of Thutmose III. More categories are given.
Here are the percentages for horses: plunder = a bit above 60%. She rightfully notes that “The final numbers would have been significantly higher” than those with which she worked. Excluding the first campaign, horses = 70% in plunder.


124 There is a short discussion by her on the “new moon feast,” psḏntjw, that occurred on day 21 on page 108. I do not subscribe to Redford’s analysis in his *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, 25. Manassa is correct to argue that “a reference to the complete blackness of night with a new moon” may be indicated in the narrative. Krauss, “Lunar Dates,” in: Erik Hornung, Rolf Krauss, and David Warburton (eds.), *Ancient Egyptian Chronology* (Leiden and Boston: Brill; 2006), 420-422, provides the best analysis of the Egyptian new moon (psḏntjw) and the battle at Megiddo. See his extremely significant comment on page 422: “both armies watched for the moon’s invisibility to go to battle,” thereby supporting my contention that the combat was akin to a set piece.


126 *Ibid.*, 108, referring as well to my earlier estimate of 2,000 war vehicles in *War in Ancient Egypt*, 88-90. These factors are also discussed by me in “The Upkeep of Empire: Costs and Rations.”

127 *Ibid.*, 113-114. See Chapter 1 note 37. Manassa further indicates that in the First Libyan War of Ramesses III “a large standard of Amun-Re rides in its own chariot.”


130 Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature II*, 32.
Bergerud, *Touched with Fire*, 408, observes that surrendering is extremely dangerous. You may be killed by the energetic attackers. But if a surrender is planned, then it is best to surrender in a group. Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, 52-54 and 72-73, aptly discusses the concept of “small group dynamics” in order to elucidate the actual role of the soldier in battle, especially with respect to the sublimation of the fear of losing one’s life to the reputation among men. In the case under consideration this covers the Egyptian soldiers’ opportunity to plunder the enemy camp as well as the Asiatics’ flight.

Manassa, *Imagining the Pašl*, 242 note 26 is absolutely correct.


See Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, 34-36, where plunder, etc. is covered.

NB: the enemy’s camp, as Thutmose’s, was also outside Megiddo, and both must have been not too far from each other. Official communication between the two could easily have been established.

The evidence of the Allies’ back and forth approach to coalitions against Napoleon is a prime example. This is one of the major themes in Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored. Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; 1957). Add Clausewitz, *On War*, 596.

The great historian of warfare, Hans Delbrück, is useful to consult in this matter: *Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege. Zwei kombinierte Kriegsgeschichtliche Studien, nebst einem Anhang über die römische Manipular-Taktik* (Berlin: Walther & Apolant; 1887). Quite a number of parameters that parallel Thutmose III’s Megiddo victory are covered: literary (Bullinger) and sub-literary sources (letters), number of dead and wounded, dispositions of the troops, etc.

To provide a later probably similar circumstance, the most important plunder taken by the Swiss after their defeat of Charles were the tapestries: Anna Buri and Monica Stucky-Schürer, *Burgundische Tapiserien im Historischen Museum Bern* (Munich: Hirmer Verlag; 2001). One wonders what special items were acquired by Thutmose from the tents of the princes of Kadesh.
and Megiddo, at least after the initial plundering by the Egyptian troops. Yet the study of Walter Mayer, “Die Finanzierung einer Kampagne,” *UF* 11 (1979): 571-595, can be consulted for additionally useful economic parallels.

138 Let us assume that the simplistic nature of the adverbial phrase, “at this moment,” *m.t素质教育*, is a hyperbole.

139 And no siege would take place. See Heagren, *The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt*, 146-154. Granted the iconographic nature of these New Kingdom war depictions, it remains the case that the Asiatic battles occur just outside of a city’s walls. With respect to the Libyans or Sea Peoples, as well as the Nubians, the situation is different.

140 Konijnendijk, *Classical Greek Tactics*, 178-186.

141 Ibid., 201.


143 Only *ssmt* is written. See the next note because Redford reads “mares” here.

144 Redford, ibid., 34 note 203, maintains that, in contrast to the Ramesside Period, the war horses were mares. But Cantrell, *The Horsemen of Israel*, 24-26, is more informative regarding mares as chariot horses. The key analysis, which Redford follows, is that of James Hoch, *Semitic Words in Egyptian Texts of the New Kingdom and the Third Intermediate Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1994), 18 note 12. But Hoch does not discuss the Ramesside Period. Moreover, these were the *enemy’s equids* and not the Egyptians’. Therefore, modern scholarly assumptions on the part of the sex of the Egyptian horses must remain *sub judice*.

Add Schneider, “Fremdwörter in der ägyptischen Militärsprache des Neuen Reiches und ein Bravourstück des Elitesoldaten (Papyrus Anastasi I 23, 2-7),” 187, for *jbr*, “Hengst,” from North West Semitic, a fact that has been known for many years. The context is the Poem on the King’s Chariot for which see Manassa, “The Chariot that Plunders the Foreign Lands: ‘The Hymn to the King in his Chariot’,” in: Veldmeijer and Ikram (eds.), *Chasing Chariots*, 143-156.

145 Read *n’t* here. This passage is restored by Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, 35, yet no hieroglyphic restoration is present in his Fig. 4. “Undecorated” is not an exact
Leadership under fire


146 The coalition’s army is assumed to be that of the prince of Kadesh. But is this an expected comment that reflects the Egyptian concept of a battle between two leaders — and only two?

147 See note 126 above.


149 The “Annals” specify only two, but is this due to the orientation of the writer? I.e., only the key opponents of Thutmose are named. The omission of additional men need not automatically indicate that just the princes of Kadesh and Megiddo managed to get back into Megiddo.

150 If one wishes to take a cynical attitude, then following the text literally, only the two princes of Kadesh and Megiddo, were not captured but instead managed to get home.


152 Darnell and Manassa, *Tutankhamun’s Armies. Battle and Conquest during Ancient Egypt’s Late 18th Dynasty*, 85-90.


There are also the useful discussions of Trevor Bryce, *Life and Society in the Hittite World* (New York: Oxford University Press; 2002), Chapter 6 (“The Warrior”), with a discussion of siege warfare on pages 114-116. Add his *Hittite Warrior* (Oxford and New York: Osprey; 2007), a more general study. In both works Bryce asserts that there was a manpower shortage in Anatolia during the Hittite New Kingdom (*Life and Society in the Hittite World*, 101, and *Hittite Warrior*, 10). This needs further researching. For the moment let me state that the argument is not sufficiently proven. It is based upon insufficient labor in Hittite Anatolia. The supports for this contention are the usual practice of victorious Hittite rulers in carrying off civilian prisoners from regions in which they campaigned in Anatolia and assigning these people to institutions and persons in Hatti. There is also the requirement in treaties with vassals that the latter must return to Hatti any refugees, whether they be noblemen or simple craftsmen. There are of course no statistics available on population.


157 The “principal of continuity … stresses the need (somewhat paradoxically) to maintain the pursuit and not allow your opponent the opportunity to recover”: Heagren, *ibid.*, 438.

158 Three recent studies are referred to in note 8 above. To them there is Redford’s analysis in *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, Part Three.

159 Mizrachy, “The Eighth Campaign of Thutmose III Revisited.”

160 Spalinger, “The Upkeep of Empire: Costs and Rations.”


165 Remember that the chariots on both flanks of Thutmose’s army could not act as cavalry do.

166 I am avoiding any discussion of a “Great Game” of political confrontation being played out by the Egyptians during the New Kingdom. Cf. Grandet, *Les pharaons du Nouvel Empire: une pensée stratégique*, 49-51. This would move me to the entire foreign policy of the pharaohs, one that is well-covered by Morris, *Ancient Egyptian Imperialism*, but also can be read in Rudyard Kipling’s “Kim.” Luttwak attempted such an interpretation with respect to the Roman Empire; see Chapter 1 note 106.

167 In general, see Ian Shaw, “Egyptians, Hyksos and Military Technology: Causes, Effects or Catalysts,” in: Andrew Shortland


Ramesses II: Pharaoh as Warrior
The plans and execution of Ramesses II’s northern campaign to Kadesh in his fifth regnal year have seen much research even if the outline of his strategy is simple indeed and the tactics preceding the military encounter likewise.1 (Plate IX, page 139, provides a recent evaluation of the battle.) The plan of the Egyptian monarch was to arrive at the Syrian metropolis of Kadesh, then pro-Hittite. He knew that there would be no opposition in Palestine when advancing inland northwards, and furthermore he did not expect any serious resistance until he arrived at his defined goal. The march into Syria and the disposition of his army is well recorded in the major Egyptian historical account of the Poem (P).2 He launched his year five campaign in April, and after thirty days had reached Shabtuna, covering ca 600 km. From this literary record it appears obvious that the pharaoh had no idea that his opponent, Muwatallis, was already at the city. Ramesses set up his camp at the northwest of Kadesh and thus positioned himself across the Orontes River — not a wide waterway — and surely expected combat on the following day. (Or was his location a sort of Feldherrnhügel from which he could observe the plain lying to the south?) The time was in the mid afternoon at the latest with sunset about 613pm or 614pm, and the king’s departure fits perfectly the time of spring — the Egyptian date is II shemu day 9 — as does that of his enemy.3

Why did Ramesses choose this location? First, I feel that we have to assume his avoidance of approaching Kadesh directly must have been based upon his dispersal of troops into four divisions. Surely, enemy soldiers were around — and of course within — that city. This has to be conceded. If there were no Hittite soldiers located within sight of Kadesh — P 71 explicitly indicates that Muwatallis’s chariots were hidden behind Kadesh — I still have a question concerning the pharaoh’s decision to stay to its west. How great was the number of enemies cannot be ascertained, and the pictorial evidence, albeit highly detailed, tends to “combine” various phases such as the king’s audience with the scouts (see below) and the attack of the Hittites upon Ramesses’ camp.4 Second, even if we remember that Ramesses had not yet found out that Muwatallis was close by, this positioning was well suited owing to the southerly location of the ford and the distance between his camp and the city of Kadesh itself. I.e., if attacked, he had time to muster his troops and to prepare for combat. Third, he avoided crossing the Orontes in any case, thereby allowing his remaining three divisions to proceed in a fast manner to where he was without turning eastwards and traversing the Orontes. No constriction of the columns of his soldiers was necessary.
IX  Kadesh Campaign of Ramesses II: Final Stages

(Diagram Courtesy of Claude Obsomer).

X  Scene from the Kadesh Reliefs of Ramesses II, Abu Simbel

(Photograph Courtesy of Claude Obsomer).
Finally, as will be stressed further on in this chapter, he must have determined to have a set battle on the following day and therefore found a well-suited locality for his bivouac, one that was wide and broad as well as somewhat remote from his goal, Kadesh.

Undoubtedly, Ramesses II expected to meet his enemy in combat on the day immediately following his arrival to the west of Kadesh. The Egyptian depictions — there are in toto five temples that present a visual panorama of the battle — provide a sumptuous panorama of the camp that Ramesses set-up when arriving at the head of his army. (See Plate X, page 139.) It is commonly argued that with his five divisions, four having accompanied him personally, there were about 25,000 men present. The Poem indicates that there were 18,000 enemy thr warriors (R 43 [R2 and Abu Simbel] and R 44 [Abydos, K2, L1, R2, and Abu Simbel respectively) provides a possible additional (kj) 19,000 thr’s. These men were not chariot warriors. Notwithstanding the egregiously large numbers, it appears that these men never saw combat on the first day of fighting. I firmly believe that these numbers are not real.

The figure of 25,000 may also be questioned, and it is perhaps best to be cautious and decrease this total by at least ten percent owing to mechanical faults and human weaknesses. From the Egyptian records of the Poem we are given a grand total of 3,500 chariots and 37,000 opposing soldiers. These integers are often considered to be valid, but one can argue that the strength of the opposition has been purposely increased by the pharaoh in order to reflect his superiority in the closely-fought encounter just as the Hittites are depicted with lances in their chariots even if that weapon appears not to have been a staple of the Hittite chariot warriors. On the other hand, it can be hypothesized that the Egyptian reliefs added many lances to the military equipment of the enemy chariot soldiers owing to artistic reasons rather than ideological ones, as has been surmised. Yet the written and visual accounts concur in emphasizing the Hittite three-men-to-a-chariot system of their mobile troop, and thus we may assume that the tactical dispositions of the enemy are well recorded from the Egyptian side.

The tactical arrangement of the large pharaonic army cannot be blamed to have been a major error on the part of the pharaoh. It was necessary to establish large units of forces each independently of one another and led by one of the king’s generals. When the king arrived near Kadesh at the head of the first division, Amun, his second group was crossing the ford south of Shabtuna about one iter (2.65 km here) from the king’s
position. Hence, that division, Pre, was not far away from their monarch. Indeed, it was crossing the southern ford south of Shabtuna with Ptah further south and Sutekh proceeding at the rear of the rather elongated army train. In essence, Ramesses had planned to remain to the west of Kadesh, but whether this was his original plan or not is unclear. From the complementary written account, the Bulletin (B), we learn that at morning he departed from his camp and was just south of Shabtuna when he received an intelligence report given to him by two Shasu. Here we must deal with “intelligence in war.”

Sight is the sine qua non of real time intelligence before the modern industrial era. The two Shasu scouts claimed to have deserted the enemy side and falsely gave to Ramesses a disastrous report that his enemy, the Hittite king Muwatallis, was at Aleppo and not at all in the environs of Kadesh. We rely solely upon the Bulletin for this historical data, a written account with accompanying relief that solely deals with this remarkable intelligence lapse. Consider the location plus the ability of generals to ascertain the whereabouts of their enemies. In the pre-electric age the operational ability for intelligence — determined by scouts — was at most about 161 kilometers. Keegan points out that a scout’s horse could cover around 18 miles/hour divided by two or 9 miles/hour, 14.5 km. Given the location at Shabtuna, the Shasu had not travelled too great a distance from their original home base, and one might hypothesize Kadesh and not “Kadesh the Old,” although this can be questioned. Surely, Ramesses would have realized that their original stationary position was very close to Kadesh if not outside of that city.

The events at Kadesh also provide useful empirical support to the necessity of a general-commander to have great intelligence reports. Ramesses was campaigning in nearly mapless country. Even if he had simple maps he also could have known — or was supplied with — information concerning the major routes and arteries of this region. Ramesses had to advance by questioning the locals, sending out spies, and making reconnaissance. He was no different than Thutmose III, or for that matter, any Egyptian king on the march.

The Bulletin further adds that Muwatallis was located at “Kadesh the Old,” an intriguing passage that has been underscored in its significance most recently by Obsomer. His reconstruction of the ensuing battle is thus different from those of previous scholars. For our purposes, it is sufficient to state that, notwithstanding the false information procured by Ramesses from these Shasu, his plans appear not to have changed. The pharaoh set
the camp to the west — indeed northwest — of Kadesh and not on the east side of the Orontes. Therefore, we cannot argue that the preferred military location for the king’s entire army — all of his divisions — was not just outside the walls of Kadesh. Following Obsomer for the moment, we can readily ascertain that Muwatallis had to have been further north and roughly on the same latitude as the Egyptian army of Amun. What were the other pre-arranged spots for the Egyptian divisions?

At this point we enter into a very murky reconstruction of the king’s expectations even if one thing is certain. Ramesses had not planned to fight his enemies on the day of arrival. If only for this reason the tactical thoughts of the Egyptian monarch may be reconstructed:

1. Arrive close to Kadesh but not across the river Orontes to the east.
2. Set up his own camp to the north of Kadesh on the west side of the river.
3. The divisions of Pre and Ptah might have been planed to be close to the ford across the river. There-by they would have guarded the ford. If not, then all five divisions were
4. The Na’arn troops, entering the combat zone from the west, would have erected their camp close to Ramesses’.
5. The final or fourth main division, that of Sutekh, could have been stationed further south but still north of Shabtuna.

These are only speculations, of course, but at least we are able to visualize Ramesses’ original plans for his encampments. In no way did he desire to cross over eastward. After all, he was constantly worried about the up-to-date location of Muwatallis. Did he not bring along to Kadesh a quite sizeable number of soldiers thereby indicating that he duly took into consideration his strategic aim and the necessity of securing complete domination in Amurru? His entire campaign was not a hasty one. Nor was it precipitous. As is well-known Ramesses had already advanced north to the Lebanon coast in the previous year. This previous strategic undertaking was linked with a greater move to the central region of Syria which he most definitely had considered after returning to Egypt in year four. I am not the first to have evaluated both northern campaigns together, but
this needs to be reiterated in order to eliminate any misinterpretations concerning the king’s abilities, either strategically or tactically. He knew what he was doing from the very start.

Consider, for example, the formation of his army on the march.\textsuperscript{20} The Na’aarn division, for example, appears to have marched with chariots guarding at least the front and read. In between advance the heavy infantry, and at least their presence indicates that the Na’aarn were not traversing Syria from the coast, as is presumed, up to Kadesh, in a rapid manner. But there were also light infantry which, for the most part, was formed into groups of three or four men unlike their heavily-armed companions. The latter was composed groups of fifteen men, all set in columns. (NB: the source material for these reconstructions is the visual record, and I have chosen the Abydos reliefs for the moment.)\textsuperscript{21} But as for the duration of the march to Kadesh, Ramesses reached Shabtuna in thirty days after covering ca 600 km. Hence, that point, the most crucial one for the ensuing battle at the camp, left around 11-14 km which could have been achieved but the king in less than a day. Thus Shabtuna was a pivot for the final advance to Kadesh. Heagren maintains that unlike Thutmose III, Ramesses “was able to maintain a steady rate of march until reaching Qadesh.”\textsuperscript{22} The textual accounts assume a clear strategic objective for the pharaoh, the surrender of Kadesh, of course. But was assumed to occur thereafter remains speculative.

Let me consider, as well, the king’s army divisions. He must have realized that his Na’aarn division was close to his division of Amun. The reason for this seems readily evident: the pharaoh steadily moved north on the west side of the Orontes and pitched camp slightly north of Kadesh itself. There was no hesitation on his part to proceed almost in a true northerly direction. I must conclude that the pharaoh has brought together in a superb manner a series of sequential operations, each dovetailing the other:

1. Arrival at the town of Ramessesmeryamun
2. Arrival at the Hill Country south of Kadesh
3. Arrival south of Shabtuna, but not far from that town
4. Arrival at the northwest of Kadesh.

It is easy to see the ratchet-stop advance of Ramesses, who also relied upon a secondary operation — the advance of the Na’aarn from west to east.
As for the Hittites, Muwatallis was not discovered until new intelligence reached Ramesses, and that altered the fourth operational stage listed above. But can we assume that the Egyptian commander also had his own intelligence servants operating in this theatre? If not, must we then chide him for not realizing that the great Hittite army, with all of the neighing horses and possible loud noises and dust clouds of some sort, was simply overlooked by an inept strategist? In 1914 ten divisions of superb French cavalry failed to detect the German army’s several million advance. Stonewall Jackson easily mystified and trapped larger numbers of Union troops in 1862 in the Shenandoah Valley. His motto, ‘to mystify and mislead,’ fits to a tee what occurred to Ramesses at Kadesh, but with Ramesses II feel that Obsomer’s arguments (and others) with regard to Kadesh the Old — i.e., its location — may explain the Egyptian monarch’s inability to determine where Muwatallis was.

Yet in contrast, we cannot fault the “proper” advance of the massive Egyptian army. Muwatallis wisely — I believe purposely— left the division of Amun in its camp, preferring to move his chariots out from Kadesh and across the Orontes. They were directed this way to obtain a breakthrough of division number two, that of Pre. Surely Muwatallis was aware that his enemy, Ramesses, was leading a New Kingdom multi-division combat force, one that therefore lacked complete personal and direct control. None of this is reported in the Egyptian written war records, but it should be apparent that all of his divisions save the one with which he was, operated separately, each having its own command. Therefore, the subordinate generals or commanders had a great degree of leeway in tactical dispositions and could operate independently although still following the basic strategic parameter of the campaign. Similarly, these trusted subordinates would maintain the heavy reliance placed upon archers. But Ramesses’ aim was to separate the city of Kadesh from the hinterland and so force either a set battle — and his superiority in troops would be the telling factor for success — or an immediate surrender. The Egyptian at this time “were highly selective in targeting the logistic elements of their enemies.”

But further intelligence was soon delivered to the Egyptian monarch. Again, it is only in the Bulletin that this account is presented. That narrative is set in a tight and narrow time frame wherein the pharaoh’s surprise is revealed. The Bulletin as well as an accompanying dramatic relief presents a follow-up series of events at the specific time when Ramesses was already settled in his camp. He first trusted the report of the two Shasu,
neither of which was in the pay of the Egyptians. Subsequently, an Egyptian scout came in with two additional enemy scouts. He brought along two Hittite ones who promptly informed the king that the Hittites were close to his position. This is the dramatic turn of the entire story, and not surprisingly it is given a major act in the entire written and visual story of the battle. To heighten the narrative tension Ramesses then goes on to blame his Asiatic governors or the garrison commanders for their ignorance in this matter. Part of that strong vituperative attack in which the “great crime” (but ʾṣt) that they have committed has been covered by Jan Assmann and this accusation need not detail us from the qualities of generalship seen in Ramesses. To me there is one interesting sidelight connection to combat expectations — namely, Ramesses’ expectation that his officials in Asia would have communicated to him, on a daily basis, of Muwatallis’s whereabouts. Morris, in contrast, feels that three categories of subordinates — the army commanders, governors of Egypt’s Asiatic territories, and the vassal rulers — are all blamed. Her additional point is worth repeating at this juncture. Realizing the importance of an intelligence system, Morris hypothesizes that adding more subordinates would have helped the Egyptians to secure better their conduits of information. But of course we are dealing with intelligence reports in real time and not delayed verbal accounts that refer to past events such as one day earlier. To quote Keegan, “‘Real-time’ intelligence — where the enemy was yesterday, in which direction his columns were headed, where he realistically was expected to be today — was arcane news, rarely to be collected on a real battlefield.”

Ramesses II had to have possessed a fast intelligence system, composed of men on horseback who could outstrip in speed the enemy’s advances, marches, or whatever movement they was to occur. From the Bulletin’s account it is apparent that the Egyptian outriders referred to belonged to the king’s army on this campaign. That is to say, they were not operating independently of Ramesses days or weeks, if not months, earlier. Both the Egyptian as well as the Hittite scouts were not spies regularly living and operating over vast distances of Asia — encompassing cities, highways, and fields. Thus the king had to rely upon the scouts in his army and possibly other foreign non-combatants, such as the clever two Shasu whom Ramesses encountered previously.

John Darnell and Colleen Manassa feel that he had blundered strategically, “racing ahead with but a portion of his force and leaving his other army groups strung out behind.” But the disposition of his large army was but part and parcel of the operational art of the New Kingdom
army in its developed phase. If he was truly caught with his pants down, Ramesses cannot be faulted for his method of military organization. How else could he have led a vast army? In fact, how else could have Muwatallis organized his poly-ethnic soldiers without relying upon small cohesive unites of soldiers, such as Arzawians, Lukka people, and the like?\textsuperscript{30}

Granted the speculative nature of some of the above evaluations, what is incontestable is that Muwatallis, centered eastwards across the Orontes, dispatched his initial chariot attack against the second Egyptian division of Pre. We have now arrived at the surprise enemy onslaught and therefore a serious temporal analysis of the events preceding the enemy’s attack on the Egyptian camp is a desideratum.\textsuperscript{31} Let us survey first the Hittite side before moving to the northwards advance of Ramesses II and the positioning of his division in the field. Here are the parameters:

1. Muwatallis moved south into North Syria and, I assume, marched through Carchemish, the vice-regal siege of the Hittites.
2. There was no way that any Egyptian administrator, or even a scout of Ramesses, could have known the true plans and the direction of the enemy. All of the lands in Amurru northwards were pro-Hittite.
3. To blame the pharaoh for crass stupidity is reasonable. To heap opprobrium upon Ramesses’ officials in Asia is one thing, yet it misses the logistic background of combat.

Let me specify these remarks. Gardiner already noticed that the scouts of the Hittites and Egyptians, the $h\textsuperscript{2}$\textsuperscript{putj}w,\textsuperscript{32} were not mere Shasu. This situation has been already covered previously, but it is necessary at this juncture to note the two-fold timing of the intelligence received by Ramesses. South of Shabtuna was the place where the two Shasu met up with the first division of the Egyptian army.\textsuperscript{33} To me it seems to have been a deliberate encounter, and virtually all Egyptologists agree that their purpose was to deceive the Egyptian commander. But one cannot argue that the timing was deliberately chosen. Muwatallis had craftily sent on local non-Hittite men in order to make contact with the advancing Egyptian troops and thereby to relay to Ramesses false information. Muwatallis was already at Kadesh the Old for some time, but for how long must remain a moot question. At best, all that can be surmised from this datum is that the Hittite king knew very well that Ramesses was coming to Kadesh.
4. The deception may be felt by some to indicate that Muwatallis was not yet ready for battle. Here, I agree. In fact, his decision to send his chariots south of Kadesh and across the ford was a gamble, but an extremely daring one.

5. All depended upon slicing through the second division.34

6. Muwatallis did not move against the first Egyptian division. Why? If he had been settled in camp and possessed the information that Ramesses was marching north, mainly parallel to the Orontes just south of Kadesh, why not send his chariots across the river and then attack the most important sector of the Egyptian army. I confess that I had not considered this final aspect. Let us assume that Muwatallis was already at Kadesh the Old on the previous day. His whereabouts were definitely not known to Ramesses. Equally, the Hittite ruler had no specific up-to-date notification in real time concerning the specific location of the first Egyptian division until it came nearby. But Muwatallis had the perspicacity to send out two “Bedouin” deceivers who were not regular soldiers of the Hittites. I.e., they would be trusted better than any captured Hittite scouts. Subsequently, those Shasu were questioned (B 28)35 — and I believe with determination — in order to clarify their report. Ramesses then marched to the northwest of Kadesh but did not cross the river Orontes.

The distance between the Hittite camp of Muwatallis and the Egyptian was not great, 2 km at most. Nonetheless, hiding behind Kadesh the Old reveals a careful and alert general. For the sake of fairness, let us assume that Ramesses was as mentally perceptive as Muwatallis. From the account of the Bulletin his alertness and vigilant behaviour can be observed. The Egyptian war records, pictorial and written, are a gold mine insofar as they provide a host of specific details concerning the final hours of marching and relaxation that were left to the Egyptian monarch. The written accounts and accompanying reliefs depicting the beating of the Hittite scouts were purposely included in order to delineate in a precise fashion the time remaining before actual combat. Even more, the Bulletin and its pictorial equivalent provide a timeframe for the incipient riposte of the pharaoh.36 Moreover, they dramatically inculcate to the outsider the shock of discovery and the immediate reactions of Ramesses and his military commanders to the fateful news.
The written narrative of the Poem provides a rather lengthy historical reconstruction that reveals a lot about the Egyptian and Hittite monarchs. Muwatallis had sent forth scouts, just as Ramesses did, and indeed as all good general do. Most certainly, the Egyptian king had no idea where his enemy was. Muwatallis, on the other hand, did. Why, then, did the latter not send his chariots across the ford of the Orontes, south of the metropolis of Kadesh, against the division of Amun? This point I have sketched earlier. It would appear that he had enough time to prepare those military vehicles for their surprise attack on the division of Pre. That is to say, in phase one of the battle the Hittite leader benefited from his stationary and established camp. He also wisely waited, but whether he had arrived at his base of operations a few hours or so before Ramesses did, or whether he was already there for one day if not longer must remain, as previously stressed, a serious conundrum for modern reconstructions.

If Muwatallis was already ensconced for some time at Kadesh the Old, he would have had no idea of where Ramesses wished to be located. (His camp ended up being approximately 2 km east of Ramesses’s.) The Shasu contingent of two men were sent out to meet up with the Egyptians and to relay false information to Ramesses. This indicates that Muwatallis was awaiting Ramesses but had not yet decided to move upon his foe. The reason for my supposition is a simple one. If he had acted immediately, surely he would have moved his chariots across the Orontes — south of Kadesh as he did later — and smashed the division of Amun. The arrangement of the Egyptian army divisions indicate that at least two hours of marching separated Amun from Pre, Pre from Ptah, and so forth. (When urged to advance quickly, as later occurred, this temporal interval would naturally be less.) It would have been straightforward to “slice through” that crucial section of the Egyptian forces. The first division would have been caught just as Pre was later on in the day.

Furthermore, if this action was set in motion the same time interval separating Amun from Pre would hold. This is why I can visualize only two possibilities for the decision of Muwatallis to act fast. After all, he had to do so — Ramesses, in camp, had discovered the Hittite whereabouts. We cannot automatically assume that the Hittite commander knew (in real time; i.e., immediately) that his opponent had ascertained his hidden location. Hence, it is better to hypothesize a scenario in which Muwatallis took the chance to defeat the Egyptians as soon as possible. I believe that he did not earlier moved against the first division owing to the following possibilities:
1. He had not the time to dispatch his chariots against the division of Amun when the latter division were still marching. Perhaps the hesitation was a result of his lack of preparations for attack. Namely, that he was not yet ready. This is why I can hypothesize that he may have arrived at the environs of Kadesh not too long before Ramesses did.

2. P 71 specifically notes that Muwatallis had positioned his chariots behind Kadesh. Thus they easily could have moved against the first division. That they did not may be explained by 1, or else we may argue that Muwatallis awaited the passing of the first division with the specific intention of immediately hitting the second.

The chariot attack was a gamble as I have written above. All depended upon a concatenation of successes. First, although catching the Pre division neatly, Muwatallis had sent his troops west from Kadesh across the ford south of that city and not across the river directly at Ramesses’s camp. Once more, a new issue arises and needs explication. It is noteworthy that in some modern reconstructions of the later phases of battle the Hittites sent their last soldiers directly westward from Kadesh the Old. Obsomer’s worthwhile analysis has the Egyptian counterattack moving eastward from the Egyptian camp and then engaging with the Hittite forces, still chariot based, so does Giacomo Cavilleri. Why at this later time and not earlier?

The cause for the original attack, which I cannot but feel was less effective than an earlier attack on the Amun division could have been, has to be interpreted from the operational plans of the Hittite king. First, he only used chariots and thus needed a ford. Second, surely he was worried that Ramesses had determined his real locality at Kadesh the Old and not at Aleppo or its vicinity. Real time thus came into play, abruptly I feel, although we cannot be sure that Muwatallis had already understood that his present location was no longer a secret. He moved fast. But he had to go around Kadesh a bit and then proceed westward as quickly as possible. Muwatallis further knew that his chariots would need to cross the flat terrain on the west — an easy task — and so lose some time. To his advantage was the decision to await the march of the second division northwards. He had to disable the second division before his troops reached the camp of the Egyptians else his chariots would have been caught between two pincers. But any success depended upon speed. They cut through the Pre division, but they could not stop and mop up their opponents.
As for this second division of Ramesses, the Poem specifically states that his infantry and chariotry “became discomfited before them,” while marching unaware of any Hittites and not prepared to fight (P 73-74; see B 81-82.) This is all we read of the fate of Pre. Considering the rapid move of the Hittite chariots then northwards, forming an arc moving west, north, and then finally east, it is highly probable that there was no total destruction of Rameses’ second division. The goal of the Hittite king was to get his mobile troops as quickly to the Egyptian camp of Amun and destroy it, pharaoh included. Time was of the essence, particularly so as there were additional divisions of Egyptian soldiers to the south of the lower Orontes ford, and that of Ptah would have taken a bit over 2 hours to reach Ramesses’ camp.

I do not assume that Muwatallis had any idea of the precise nature of the great army which Ramesses had brought with him. That is to say, he did not know of the fifth division, the Na’arn, as well as the precise number or size of each of the other four cohorts. His first chariot attack surely was not composed of 2,500 war vehicles. Kitchen, in fact, hypothesizes 200. Ramesses had accepted the account of the Shasu, a decision which Raphael Giveon, for example, regarded as foolhardy. That unwise decision having been made, Muwatallis simply capitalized upon the foolhardy advance of the division of Amun and set his plans into motion. As a summary of the aspects of generalship on both sides, we may set up the following chart. Its use is not merely to contrast both sides in the conflict but, more importantly, to reveal the imponderabilities of warfare and the chance encounters that lead to success or defeat. Fortuna was most certainly present at all of the stages of this combat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ramesses</th>
<th>Muwatallis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knew nothing about</td>
<td>Knew nothing previously about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>his enemy’s position</td>
<td>the Egyptian army’s set-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Keegan has an interesting commentary on similar lacks of military intelligence. Specifically, he refers to Napoleon’s attack at Quatre Bras during which advanced French troops met up with a relatively small number of British soldiers. There was a tactical loss to the British to be sure, but the latter managed with no hardship to regroup rearwards with Wellington’s main troops at Waterloo.
Sent two Shasu to reconnaissance and to meet up with Ramesses so as to deceive the pharaoh.

Appears to have kept most of his troops, if not all, hidden at Kadesh the Old.

There was no apparent reason to do so.

Avoided “showing his hand” at Kadesh.

Previously to the Egyptians, the Hittite king had set up his camp.

The timing of both logistic dispositions is unclear, but an argument can be made that Muwatallis had recently arrived at the metropolis, but before the Egyptians of course.  

Sent out reconnaissance as soon as he camped. Proper procedure.

Muwatallis had likewise sent out scouts to find where Ramesses precisely was. We cannot automatically assume that he did this immediately before he dispatched his chariots.

Both sides participated in the fog of war. Intelligence of the exact location of the enemy was, as to be expected, imprecise, delayed, and often blank.

Ramesses’ choice of his camp position allowed the remaining divisions to settle south of...
advancing the king’s. south, then west, and finally north. Space was available. Hence, a chariot attack was de rigueur.

But neither opponent had ever planned the battle.

Expected a battle on the next day, the tenth of III shemu. The Hittite king purposely sent his chariots across in order to cut off Ramesses from his second division. This superlative decision was, however, not pre-planned. It depended upon specific timing.

Otherwise, Muwatallis expected combat either on the east or west of the Orontes.

Not seeing any Hittites at Kadesh Ramesses must have expected a set battle on the following day which he expected that he would win owing to the overwhelming size of his army. Muwatallis waited in order to find out when Ramesses would be exposed. He apparently did not chance an immediate thrust to the Egyptian camp if, quite possibly, he had arrived at Kadesh not too early than Ramesses.

Owing to the discovery that Ramesses’s second division was exposed and I feel, more importantly isolated, he relied solely upon his chariots. This decision had to have been made on the spot.

Ramesses had no immediate pressures. Muwatallis was pressed by time and speed.
Owing to his proximity to Kadesh he marched blithefully to the northwest of the Orontes but did not cross the river.

Result

Ramesses was exposed. Muwatallis had to have achieve an immediate and rapid destruction of the entire army of Amun.

Uncertainties

Would Ramesses discover the location of the Hittites? Muwatallis hoped that he was undiscovered. But for how long was the problem.

He eventually did, and the facts were relayed before the Hittites attacked his troops. He got them. Muwatallis did not expect the arrival of the Na‘arn division.

Ramesses needed more troops. The plan was to get to the Egyptian camp as quickly as possible. Hence, the annihilation of the division of Pre was not intended.

Note that we do not know where, even roughly, the enemy chariots penetrated those troops. They needed to get to Ramesses swiftly, but to hit the head of the Pre division was not the optimum location.
Considering the plan of the Hittites it is unclear if the Pre division was *hors de combat* for the entire time of the ensuing combat. One assumes so.

It is now necessary to focus exclusively upon the generalship of Ramesses under duress. First and foremost was the report of the Shasu. They were sent to scout out the Egyptians but at the same time not to run away. To the contrary, they were instructed by Muwatallis to tell Ramesses that his present location was in the far north. Using Shasu instead of Hittites was very astute. If Ramesses had encountered Hittite scouts he would have surely have interrogated them severely and not necessarily have believed their story. Then too, he would have suspected that Muwatallis was close by, or at least not around Kadesh. Yet Ramesses trusted the Shasu report, perhaps not indicating extraordinary cupidity — one heaped upon him by posthumous armchair generals — but nevertheless revealing his personality. Backup information is always necessary, especially when marching though enemy territory in which all of the fortress-cities were inimical. I suspect that part of the pharaoh’s obliviousness to the false intelligence was conditioned by his expectation of division five, the Na’arn. He was depending upon their move eastwards, and his operational art here was superb. To put it another way, he was confident, indeed over-confident. Ramesses worked with a division of military forces when he, at the head of his enormous army, advanced north through Asia. Does not the pre-arranged junction at Kadesh indicate that he possessed a discerning and foresighted character? His strategic and tactical manoeuvres were so far first-rate. Notwithstanding these factors, Ramesses assumed that the Shasu were not purposely sent by the Hittites, as they themselves maintained.

But did Ramesses let the two Shasu depart from his bivouac when he was close to, but south, of Shabtuna? This is what Kitchen assumes, and there is no evidence to contradict the evaluation. Given this hypothesis, Kitchen then calculated the time that would have been covered for the Shasu to return to Kadesh the Old and then for Muwatallis to react. Yet the timings of all of these interconnected stages of reconnaissance are very tight. Did the Shasu get back when Ramesses was marching on the west of the Orontes and parallel to Kadesh? Did other Hittite soldiers or allies, centered at that city, see the movement of division one and so report back immediately to Muwatallis? If so, and there was enough time
for the Hittite king to ponder what to do: let Ramesses proceed north but await a second division and then cut that one up. Assuredly, Muwatallis knew very that his opponent had not yet brought together all of his forces. Large armies at this time had to have been divided into small sections and advanced in a file.\textsuperscript{49}

It now behooves me to present some caveats with regard to the battle images of the New Kingdom pictorial schemata of warfare. As Heagren indicates, their primary purpose was not to indicate the use of tactics for combat.\textsuperscript{50} In evaluating the scenes of the Kadesh encounter he remarks that the Na’arn division (L3 version)\textsuperscript{51} apparently lacked light infantry which could provide additional protection on the right and left sides. In that depiction the Ptah division is artistically “represented differently from the other formation but the mass of heavy infantry is still shown being protected by chariots on their flanks.”\textsuperscript{52} It is significant that, in battle, the Na’arn march from right to left with the left flank making contact with the Amun division whereas the right engages the Hittite chariots. Significantly, the last group fused with a chariot detachment manned by the king’s sons and other high-ranking soldiers of the royal entourage (L1 version)\textsuperscript{53}. Yet let me add that in Luxor version L3 each man appears to be carrying quivers and personal weapons — daggers, sickle-shaped swords, fighting sticks, axes, and bows — are present as well. Yet how can we assume that these depictions are one hundred percent accurate in their visual records of battlefield tactics? “Generally, when depicting Egyptian soldiers carrying shields in formation, the artists attempted to ensure that the outer face of the shield always faces the viewer.”\textsuperscript{54} Yet this is not always attempted when chariot shield bearers are depicted even if this convention persists when auxiliary troops are present, such as those in the Abydos reliefs. Consider further the Abu Simbel representations. The Amun division is not as heavily manned as in those representations at Abydos or Luxor.

With regard to the attack upon Pre additional commentary is now needed.\textsuperscript{55} Chariots were most effective only after the enemy formation had been broken. Interestingly, in the Kadesh melees chariots fought against chariots, but the rarity of such depictions seems to indicate that they were, at best, extremely uncommon. The attack upon Ramesses’s camp was a unique occurrence, but it shows that chariots could operate independently and effectively at a distance from the main infantry-based army. Muwatallis’ striking force possessed the ability to operate against the vulnerable elements of the Egyptian army, in this case the advancing
second division. They lacked and infantry screening support, a fact that
the Hittite ruler most definitely was aware of. Moreover, they could not
retreat behind heavy and light footsoldiers.

Up to now I have concentrated upon the historical record of the
Kadesh Bulletin in order to evaluate the preliminary events of the battle
of Kadesh. Its purpose, as I have indicated previously, was to cover the
reports of the enemy’s dispositions from the viewpoint of Ramesses, now
seated in his camp and listening to the fateful accounts of the scouts.56
Likewise, the pictorial evidence presents an identical scenario, to be sure
from a visual point of view. All, nonetheless, is concentrated upon the
heroic decisions of the pharaoh. We thus meet once more a Königsnovelle
account in which the presentation involves speeches and decisions, all
committed textually to provide one dramatic outcome — the decision of
Ramesses to fight. The monarch first listens to the reports and then calls
in his military men to reveal the deception and the serious danger looming.
Ramesses also briefly indicates — and this is provided by the manner
of the narrative — what has transpired. Then his high ranking military
officials respond. It is important to remember that almost all of this took
place before the Hittite chariots reached the Egyptian camp.

Thus we encounter again a concatenation of independent phe-
nomena, all of which are conveniently placed either simultaneously or
side-by-side, and nested within an increasing dramatic tempo. At first,
the new information is given. Then Ramesses calls for a war conference.
Immediately thereafter he orders the vizier to go to the south to press for-
ward the third division, that of Ptah; the accompanying visual accounts
show the same.57 Kitchen has placed the latter in his Episode II which
he labels, “The Battle.”58 Actually, this arrangement is not valid. The
Bulletin needs to be starkly separated from the Poem at this point. The
war council is a result of the earlier misleading intelligence of the Shasu.
In the visual accounts the Hittite chariots are seen attacking the perime-
ter of the Egyptian camp at the same time when Ramesses is having his
council as well as his earlier discussion with the scouts.59 Included as
well as the physical punishments meted upon the Hittite scouts. More
than combat is covered, and thus I preferred to label the Bulletin as
“Ramesses II’s Trial under Fire.”60

The Bulletin presents a closely-oriented and personally oriented
Egyptian monarch. He is not limned as an ideal stick-figure but, as with
Thutmose III’s at Aruna, Ramesses is drawn as a war leader affected by
events in which sudden and tense events ratchet up the suspense. Indeed,
right from the king’s commands to all and sundry we are directly led into battle. Hence, this written version is concerned with Ramesses’ decisions, and thus it tends to provide more aspects of his decision-making than the far more elaborate recital of the Poem.

1. Background and arrival south of Shabtuna.
   This portion is the heading.
   The specific date is given.

2. The arrival of the two Shasu.
   Their information is specified.
   That they lied is spelled out.
   This leads one to pinpoint the unexpected bivouac of Muwatallis.
   A detailed background is given to the reader: the location of enemy plus the allies of Muwatallis.

3. Ramesses moves north to his final encampment.
   He seats himself on his golden throne.

4. The arrival of the two Egyptian scouts with their two captured Hittite scouts.
   The new information is also given.

5. Ramesses has his war council.

6. The vizier is sent south. Additional men also go with him.  

7. The Hittite chariots arrive at the Egyptian camp when Ramesses is still speaking with his officers.
   Further background information is given to the reader: the chariots slice through the second division — not named — and the rapid advance to the Egyptian camp.

The report of the Bulletin thereby offers us a general who is in total command of the situation.\textsuperscript{62} No hesitation is indicated. But even if we discount the royal ideology there remains the tactical decisions of Ramesses. They are, after all, the theme of our discussion. The dispatch of the vizier and messengers occurred before the Hittite chariots had reached the king’s encampment. Indeed, they must have raced southwards and met with no serious impediment. Therefore, we may assume that Muwatallis’s chariots
had not yet crashed into the army of Pre. But attacking an enemy force in the middle of a formation on the march was, as Heagren notes, a key means of doing damage to one’s opponent.\textsuperscript{63}

The Bulletin notes that after the king’s immediate actions the Hittite forces crossed the ford and entered into the middle of division number two. Time was the crucial factor now. The pharaoh had acted quite expertly, considering that he had to prepare his forces for a concerted defence of his quarters. Furthermore, this account stresses that the king was hemmed in. Unfortunately, the narrative becomes more general in outlook, eschewing any temporal arrangement of combat. It is characteristic of the Bulletin that it does not concern itself with the battle per se but rather paints a geographically and temporally-oriented scene in which the king deals with specific problems and issues his commands. The actual combat sequence of Ramesses is significant to be sure. However, it is the \textit{Königsnovelle} result, the effective completion of the king’s resolutions that matters here.

This account is the center of the drama. Here and only here does the historical outline focus primarily upon the strategic and tactical decisions of Ramesses. How much time did he have in order to establish an effective resistance and, equally, how much time did Muwatallis’s chariots have to catch Ramesses?

\textbf{Ramesses} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{Muwatallis}

1. He had the time to dispatch his vizier and messengers south to meet up with the army of Ptah. 
2. He had a considerably reduced number of troops, but they consisted of infantry as well as chariotry.
3. He was expecting the arrival of the Na’arn. Hence, the danger was lessened, notwithstanding the immediate insecurity.

1. He had the time to dispatch a chariot cohort westward and south of Kadesh, right across the ford.
2. He relied solely upon chariots.
3. They had to “pass through” the army of Pre, but that involved fighting. Hence, a delay would have occurred.
4. He possessed the crucial data in the eleventh hour.

4. If we follow Kitchen et al., Muwatallis had greater time to move fast owing to the return of the Shasu. If the latter never came back he would have awaited the march of Ramesses northwards to west of the Orontes.

Ramesses does not appear to have lost courage at the critical Schwerpunkt of the battle. He managed to understand the situation, send some men south to Ptah, and continue conferring. Then the Hittite chariots arrived. But at the point when they were pressing on the northwestern side of the pharaoh’s camp the Na’arn arrived. Caption R 11 of the reliefs, the most famous one for all Egyptologists, contains the additional fact that the first division had not yet competed the pitching of the camp while Pre and Ptah were still marching. The chronological setting is a bit topsy turvy in this small report because at the time that the Hittite chariots reached the camp of Ramesses Pre was already cut through. Hence, only a slip can explain the mix-up, and one that was committed way after the king had returned to Egypt. Yet additional data are given, and the role of Ramesses as a general now is to be seen from R 11:

1. The Hittite chariots had reached the Egyptian bivouac.
2. Ramesses was still conferring with his immediate subordinates at that time. His is said not to have been completely finished bivouacking.
3. The Hittites had penetrated a bit the defence of the Egyptian camp.
4. The Na’arn reached the camp but, if we follow Obsomer, “their chief had not yet arrived [with ?] his troops.” This would imply that the fifth division sped on very quickly when they were able to perceive how much the Egyptians were in danger and their commander was left behind, or preferred to be controlling — if he could — from the rear.
5. The Na’arn fought with the Hittite chariot warriors after the latter had entered the camp.
6. The exact location of the division of Ptah is difficult to ascertain at this time. Obsomer, for example, states that this division did not arrive at the battle before the end of the engagement. The treacherous situation therefore involved first, the arrival of the Hittite chariots at the west. They penetrated a portion of the defensive perimeter of Ramesses’ camp. He and his personal escort, perhaps his bodyguard (some of the šmsw), were reasonably “prepared,” but the entire camp was not. The quasi “bucolic” nature of the reliefs shows the settled position of Ramesses’ troops, the guards and palisade of shields, the unharnessed horses and rows of chariots placed side-by-side, and the like. But the charging Hittites had at their rear an equally determined and rapidly advancing foe, the Na’arn. They too were now caught, especially as the resistance of Ramesses’ infantry, still trapped in the camp enclosure, could come to the assistance of their pharaoh and general. The pharaoh had already received the information of the slice movement of Muwatallis chariots and the fast charge northwards, or so maintains the account of the Poem (P 76). Once more, the amount of time left for Ramesses to counterattack in addition to the timing of the Hittite onslaught and the subsequent pressure of the Na’arn remains, as is the always the case with this battle, unknown.

One interesting comment has been made concerning the Hittite chariot attack. This point is separate from the well-known remarks in the Egyptian texts that the enemy had three men to a chariot. Gerhardt Fecht argued that Ramesses’s foes are not shown with bows and arrows. But at Abu Simbel one key Hittite “third man” in the lower right hand side (northern wall depiction) carries an unflexed bow. Of course they possessed these standard weapons, and thus the surmise of Fecht was that the artists followed a “convention.” Yet when we examine the actual chariot versus chariot combat at Kadesh the Hittites are depicted already in the state of total collapse. Their chariot forces were successfully resisted and pushed back, with many of their soldiers being killed. It is not a mere standard artistic device to have depicted them as predominantly lacking archery equipment. The complete destruction of the enemy mobile forces is visually represented by their inability to provide any effective offensive capability to Ramesses. The key examples of these representations will be found at Abu Simbel, the Ramesseum, and Luxor. The enemy are mainly shown in a near complete state of confusion.
The Kadesh encounter, one that was to involve two attacks by the Hittites, was unique and unexpected on both sides. I can imagine the enemy chariot drive into the Egyptian camp as swift and determined, and suppose that the Hittites, at least at the start, had not yet relied upon the use of archery. The second wave of enemy chariots faced a similarly-equipped Egyptian resistance in the field. On that occasion the combat was mainly chariot versus chariot. But I find it extremely improbable that the Hittites did not use their archers in their chariots at that occasion.

The number of enemy chariots has always been problem for modern interpreters. We have seen above that Kitchen hypothesized 200. This figure I find too small, especially when we know of close to 1,000 enemy Asiatic chariots at Megiddo during Thutmose III’s attack outside of the wall of that locality. (And let us not forget the presence of 1,900 Egyptian chariots.). The Egyptian text of the Poem presents 2,500 — P 94 and 132 but see as well R 19. The latter caption is useful to discuss, even briefly, as with the better-known R 11, is relatively long and thus more narrative in orientation then the others. R 19, albeit rhetorical, is not a mere rubric that heralds something to be identified such as a person, a location, a designation of an army or the like.

Subsequently, in the second Hittite chariot attack an additional 1,000 of the enemy vehicles is given (P 153: versions K1, L1, and L2). This makes a total of 3,500 under Muwatallis which, let me stress, operated without the support of any infantry. I can accept the round number to a great degree, if only as the earlier integer is about 29% of the number given for the Kadesh battle. Muwatallis was a major potentate in Western Asia and his army was first-rate in addition being large and well-equipped when having to face the Egyptian threat. His coalition was expertly led and far more cohesive that that of the lower-ranking monarch of Kadesh during Thutmose III’s reign. From Megiddo we know of at least 1,900 chariots on the Egyptian side. Surely Ramesses had more at Kadesh if we consider the number of divisions present. The size of the Egyptian chariot sector at Megiddo comes to a bit over one half of what the Hittites are presumed to have mustered in battle at Kadesh. To me the lower numbers for Megiddo fit with the presumed higher numbers for Kadesh, keeping in mind the impossibility of any contemporary Egyptian knowing the total sizes. Nonetheless, an enemy reasonably larger than Ramesses’ forces may convince many, including the contemporaries, of the Egyptians’ abilities under duress and success.
How is the king depicted at this juncture? As stated earlier, any historical reliance upon the Bulletin ceases at the point when the pharaoh moves in person against the Hittite chariot onslaught. For the moment the narrative progress of the events is lost to a very great degree. Even the number of 2,500 chariots is not given. The relief captions are mainly useful for only the Na’arn arrival of R 11 and the rhetorical-literary account of R 19; even R 18 can be added. But the pictorial evidence is extremely helpful. Yet the scenes also contain threads that need careful unravelling. The four main temples that present a relatively complete snapshot of the battle combine the chronological development of the battle. The camp scene of L1, to take a case in point, narrates pictorially the beating of the Hittite scouts underneath the king’s audience and conference.\(^74\) To the right may be seen the attack of the enemy, and there is no doubt that the camp itself is being penetrated. But so far Ramesses has not engaged his foes. Outside of the perimeter of the bivouac may be seen the chariots battle between the Hittites and the Egyptians; the latter are the Na’arn. A second large snapshot presents the king in battle with his push to the Orontes specifically drawn. It is fair to state that the combat is chariot-oriented, as is to be expected. This depiction thus represents phase two of the engagement.

Abu Simbel, though compressed, arranges the scenes in an identical manner, but only on the northern wall. The arrival of the Na’arn is to the left, and it is balanced by the “reception” depiction of Ramesses who is still depicted sitting.\(^75\) Nevertheless, his team of horses plus chariot is waiting for the king to enter the fray, just as in L1. Some fighting within the camp is depicted, and the penetration by the Hittite chariots is carved in the middle of the visual scenario. Nevertheless, much of that portion of the relief presents a quiet and relaxed situation. This is, in fact, in sharp contrast to L1 where most of the camp is under attack. R1 is arranged in a more clearly defined manner with the camp scene in the middle once more. The Na’arn come to the rescue at the left whereas the king is on his throne to the right. The use of shields as the camp perimeter is designed very impressively because they separate all three components of the conglomerate image. The penetration of the Hittites is once more located at the top of the scene whereas the rest of Ramesses’s military quarters shows a peaceful condition.

As an aside let me explicate their presence in this relief caption as well as their pictorial representations with regard to importance. In this matter the absence of the Na’arn in the Poem and the Bulletin is not surprising. They were not covertly ignored or overlooked. Both major
written texts, composed in a literary manner, are narratives of the king.\textsuperscript{76} Ramesses is not merely in the center of the action, he is the hero. Yes, he is also pharaoh, king, and general, but these two accounts solely concentrate upon him. (For his charioteer Menna see below.) They have to, and not only from an ideological perspective. The \textit{Könignovelle} format of the Bulletin and the genre of \textit{nhtw} of the Poem require that the living monarch determine all policy.\textsuperscript{77} Hence, at the crucial juncture when the Hittite chariots come into the Egyptian camp these two versions ignore the Na’arn. Ramesses is the heavyweight par excellence, the luminary, and the one who resisted the chariot onslaught. I am aware of the ideological nature of these royal narrative accounts in which all hinges upon the leadership of the king. But with the Poem and the Bulletin, and independently of the battle relief portrayal of Ramesses at Kadesh, other royal as well as non-royal personages cannot participate in the success.\textsuperscript{78}

It was history, the event in the past, the contingent nature of reality that focussed the performance of Ramesses in these accounts, not just as the expected and required hero, but as the Hero par excellence. Thutmose III had no need of this orientation. His intention in proclaiming his role as commander-in-chief and royal leader was otherwise. But he did not face a potential disaster. In the “Annals” he remains the commander to be sure, and one who is also careful of plans and wise in tactics. There was no apparent need, if not desire, to have him portrayed in combat. The defeat of the Asiatic coalition outside of Megiddo is brief, to say the least. No exposition is provided that demonstrates his military virtù.\textsuperscript{79} In contrast, Ramesses does exactly that. His Eighteenth Dynasty predecessor is not interested in self-reflection of bravery and demonstrable actions of courage and personal achievement in a chariot. Instead he is, especially as his account reiterates again and again his isolation and solitary resistance.

The war scenes of the New Kingdom — and not merely of the Ramesside Period — position the Egyptian ruler within a two dimensional structure.\textsuperscript{80} He fights in his chariot, normally against an enemy outside of a fortress-citadel. But he is never alone unless the depiction is extremely compressed and schematic.,. The pharaoh is carved as well as his army. Just as the Na’arn had to be present in Ramesses’s picture so, too, must the soldiery of the king occupy portions of the vast composition. In the pictures, the king is stylistically both alone and not. As hero he is the center of attention usually stressed by centrality and always by size.\textsuperscript{81} He fights alone in his chariot. Not infrequently, especially after the combat is
over, his chariot plus team of horses capture the viewer’s attention owing to their central location. Deviations from the norm appear to be mainly caused by artistic preferences (dramatic intent included) as well as the precise location of the snapshot depiction.

When I wrote that the pharaoh is solitary in combat I indicated that as a rule the onlooker is first directed to him. Noteworthy is the frequently-mentioned written comment that the king is also devoid of human assistance. That is to say, in all pictorial representations the Egyptian monarch stands and shoots his arrows alone in the cab of his war machine. Moreover, as befits a human hero, albeit divine at the same time, no overt godly assistance is given to him excluding the regular contribution of the Nechbet vulture high behind the warrior-king, or else the common symbol of Re over the king’s head with two uraei. Here are the examples from the Battle of Kadesh:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Depiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Simbel (I)</td>
<td>nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abydos (A)</td>
<td>missing and lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnak (K1 and K2)</td>
<td>missing and lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxor (L1)</td>
<td>Re</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxor (L3)</td>
<td>missing and lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramesseum (R1)</td>
<td>Re (very compressed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramesseum (R2)</td>
<td>Re</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These typical age-old icons play no important role in the action. They may, in fact, be omitted or occur randomly as the Beit el Wali evidence precisely shows. But it is fair to maintain that the two virtually stereotypical presences of the divine (Re and Nechbet) are banal. Seti I in combat in the Sinai has Re and Nechbet as supporters, or Re alone, but on his return, and about to cross into Egypt, only Nechbet is present. Granted all of this, as with the Hittites and Neo-Assyrians as well, the warrior kings were totally human in combat, and if Ramesses later invokes Amun in the Poem — this will be subsequently covered — he does so in an address which may or may not have ever occurred in real life.

But the camp invasion of the Na’arn is depicted textually and in written format seamlessly. The latter pictorial representations had to merge the Na’arn arrival with the Hittite chariot attack yet include the throned Ramesses conferring with his high ranking military advisors. In the Poem and the Bulletin we move right from the enemy attack — no mention of the fifth division being given — to the personal involvement of the king...
in battle. The Bulletin, being shorter and possessing a textual orientation considerably different from the Poem, presents a straight-forward continuation, in narrative format, from what precedes. With great alacrity one encounters a series of verbal ‘ḥ. n sḏm.n=f formations (B 81, 83, 84, and 88)\(^8\), which cease by the time we reach the pharaoh entering the fray in B 88. They do not occur thereafter. The Poem uses the same standard verbal structure to commence a new section in P 86 with, however, providing the temporal backdrop in P 75 with jīḥ ḥm=f smn(\(w\)). This lengthy composition is most definitely far more sophisticated than the Bulletin.\(^8\) Therefore, we must now direct our primary attention to the Poem.

At first, the account is easy to penetrate. Ramesses finds, after “looking about him,” as only a wise general would do, that 2,500 Hittite chariots had attacked him. It is noteworthy that nowhere does the Poem supply the information that the enemy had reached Ramesses’s camp and entered it. Furthermore, the narrative eschews mentioning any discussion with the king’s high ranking soldiers. To the author these facts are not essential. Other details are provided such as the important statement that the Hittites had three men to a chariot. But that is recorded, as well as the integer 2,500 not present in the Bulletin, because the Poem offers its account with the heroism of Ramesses uppermost and thus needs historical underpinning. Furthermore proffered is a brief statement concerning the “fast troops”\(^9\) of Arzawa, Masa, and Pitassa (P 85). These three members of the coalition of enemies under the suzerainty of Muwatallis are enunciated here owing to their rapid charge into the Egyptian camp, even if earlier in the Poem in P 43-47 they are listed in a more mechanical accounting fashion. (P. Sallier III adds the Gasgaens, Arwanna, Qizzuwatna, Alleppo, Ugarit, Kadesh, and Lukka).\(^9\) On other words, the dramatic tension is increased by reference to their rapid assault upon the Egyptian bivouac.

Noteworthy as well is Ramesses strongly-worded lament that he lacked any high ranking military officer, charioteer, army-soldier, or shield bearer. No scholar takes his words as literally true. I contend that the account simply means that he was, as of yet, unable to have his army in the camp ready to fight. The Poem, however, stresses their cowardice. Ramesses’ troops “scampered away,” to quote Gardiner. In fact, the lack of support is elsewhere also directed against the absent divisions to the south who were still marching. The men of the division of Amun including the king’s entourage, his šmsw or the “followers,” and others could resist. I believe that many did. Obsomer, for example, argues successfully that nothing
permits one to affirm that they would have been neutralized by the Hittite onslaught. If not, how could Ramesses have survived? The assumption that the Na’arn had arrived at so conveniently a time to catch the enemy chariots from the rear at the moment that they had entered, even very partially, the camp of Ramesses, is once more like having God assist you in the direst of circumstances. After all, as Obsomer also noticed, the reliefs indicate that some Egyptian countervailing resistance was already in action separate from the Na’arn. This has to have been the case.

He further argues further that the Hittites had encircled the camp, a conclusion that has much to recommend it. The written account, pinpointed by Obsomer under R 11, most certainly refers to the Hittites surrounding Ramesses’s bivouac. The reliefs, on the other hand, do not indicate this expected manoeuvre of the enemy. Instead, as L1, R1, and even the Abu Simbel snapshots indicate, the camp has been entered, and not from the main entry point I hasten to add. We should not assume that both methods of narration — textual as well as pictorial — will present exactly the same thing. To assume that the foe’s chariots moved around the entire camp of the Egyptian is not merely a reasonable speculation. It is also to be expected: the Hittites were looking for entry points. As for the enemy horses, I feel that the animals would be hard to control as they were aimed at the Egyptian defence “wall of shields.” A horse “will not gallop at an obstacle it cannot jump or see a way through, and it cannot jump or see a way through a solid line of men. Even less will it go at the sort of obviously dangerous obstacle.” (Horses moreover avoid tramping on dead or wounded soldiers lying on the ground. They shy away from the small piles.) Horses, maddened or terribly frightened, do of course collide with themselves and other objects, alive or not. It would have taken the enemy charioteers some perseverance to aim their chariots directly into the perimeter of the camp. The pictorial evidence, nonetheless, states that they were successful, if only to a small degree.

Ramesses, with support, enters the fray on chariot. But the combat did not go well immediately, or at least this is what the Poem indicates in P 90-91. This is a most reasonable evaluation. The pharaoh was now “alone” because most of his troops in the bivouac were still in preparation for combat with others fighting on foot — L1 and R1 provide excellent visual data on this fact — and I will assume that some, at least at first, were paralyzed by fear and cowardice. But also a few Egyptian chariots may be viewed already engaging the enemy. Significantly, the king’s tent remains intact and is not penetrated.
At this very point of crisis the Poem then switches to the plea of Ramesses to Amun. It would be ludicrous to argue that Ramesses spoke any of these highly-constructed sentences, ones that von der Way calls an *Amungebet*. According to Assmann, this is the theological-literary core of the king’s written presentation, and most definitely a later but contemporary valuation of the king’s relation to his god-father. For Assmann the “prayer” demonstrates the deep religious motivations of the age, especially with respect to piety. The pharaoh refers back to his pious deeds to his father-god Amun and emphasizes that his infantry have deserted him while there was no chariot support (P 113-114). He implores Amun to aid him in this hour of distress and no one heard his calls for assistance. Let us also keep in mind that in Ramesses’s camp there was the “portable” Amun, a statue that was brought along on campaigns, often cited by Egyptologists with the native term “Amun-of-the-Road.” Hence, I believe that a desperate invocation by Ramesses to that religious representation of his god-father may very well have really occurred. Was it not to this Amun that Ramesses invoked his cry for help? I think so, but it is unfortunate that without the indirect pictorial evidence from the Kadesh reliefs we would be much in the dark concerning the physical presence of Egypt’s chief deity during campaigns.

In P 120 we reach a zenith of emotion: “I have not transgressed your counsel (*sḥr*).” Not “command,” *wḏ*, but “advice,” “support,” “plan” is the key word. And when he called out to him, Ramesses “found” Amun. Then follows a further subsection of Ramesses’s address (commencing with *jšl* in P 121 and ending at P 142). It reveals additional emotionally strong pious remarks of the pharaoh. He calls out and implores Amun from where he is in Ultima Thule, precisely where he now found himself, so far removed geographically from his homeland and the religious capital of Thebes. His voice reaches, “circulates” to be precise (*pẖr*), Southern Heliopolis. He is heard. Amun “arrives” as support. What matters if there are hundreds of thousands of soldiers, Amon is the “Lord of Victory.” Very noteworthy is the phrase “He gave to me his hand” in P 124, and I feel that the brief passage indicates an unexpected bonding of father-god to his son. The pharaoh then goes to fight, with no one else aiding him. This is a remarkable theological aspect of the composition, one that truly deserved the expert analysis of Assmann.

The loneliness of Ramesses purposely conveyed to the reader, and that cannot but reflect the deep emotional aspect of the monarch.

We can disregard his strident and caustic remarks about the absence
of military support, but the king’s innermost feelings emerge at this precise point. Not merely did he underscore his deepest relationship towards feelings towards his father-deity, one that he paints his relationship with intimate and personal words., but he also demonstrates a cementing bond of support. When he was totally isolated

Ramesses was caught like a fish in a net. We can wonder how he felt at the precise moment when some of his troops informed him of the imminent arrival of Hittite chariots? When P 76 reports laconically, and stereotypically, “Then one came in order to say it to his majesty,” at least one fleeing Egyptian from the army of Pre must have scooted back on horse or chariot to the camp of his king in order to broadcast the oncoming crisis. To add to the disarray, at least momentarily in Ramesses’ mind but also elsewhere, the Hittites were soon upon the king’s camp. I earlier remarked that it seems less probable that those enemy chariots bothered to destroy or mop up the second Egyptian division. Their purpose was to cut off any support from Pre to the Egyptian ruler. Far more importantly, they had to achieve the annihilation of the first Egyptian division as quickly as possible. How distraught was Ramesses?

In the Poem he definitely was “discomposed,” although that word, as well as “distressed,” may appear to be too weak in the context. He had military assistance and it must have been enough. Osbomer additionally wrote that:

The king and his shemsu, who had left the camp on chariots perfectly operational, would have henceforth been able more specifically to undertake harassing the runaways and to counter the second wave of enemy chariots by destroying them or forcing them back towards the Orontes.

This was after Ramesses with military support had already countered the first Hittite attack.

Without the Na’arn could the pharaoh have defeated their attack? Egyptologists suspect not. P 128-143 continues the narrative in which Ramesses was successful. He encountered the 2,500 chariots — so says the text, and pushed them eastwards to the Orontes. He is then victorious. The Hero prevails. No more is Amun referred to. But the entire scenario is murky. No matter how we large we reckon the number of chariots and footsoldiers in the Na’arn division, how many troops remaining
in the Amun division were able to engage the Hittites, and of course how numerous was the foe, the Egyptian king did prevail. If Kitchen’s figure of 200 chariots is accepted, and not 1,000 at the minimum did all of the enemies reach the Egyptian camp or were some still engaged fighting with the Pre division? These factors cannot be ascertained from the official accounts, nor from the pictorial representations of this phase of combat.

The reliefs are organized as to present the king in battle defeating an immense Hittite chariot-based army. The enemy is pursued to the Orontes, many high level Hittites and their allies are shoved, exhausted or wounded, into the river. Few manage to be rescued. There is a differentiation in the pictorial record between the two phases of combat: the first involving the attack on the camp and the second, having taken place when Muwatallis sent an additional cohort of men on chariots to the west. But the latter is not precisely differentiated enough in the reliefs, as in the written account. The figure of chariots given in the Poem for the second enemy charge is one thousand, another neat integer, and the lengthy narrative explicitly indicates that when Ramesses pursued his foes to the river, some “plunged into the water” (P 138). Von der Way, among others, has seen the possible incompatibility of the Poem’s account with the key relief caption associated with the Na’arn (R11), but he does not analyze this portion of the Poem with respect to the later subsections that are concerned with the second phase of the enemy’s onslaught. One may very well feel that telescoping has taken place because Ramesses certainly won the first duel and oversaw the flight of the Hittites eastward. During the following phase of combat.

Does facing death mean that one’s deepest religious attitudes necessarily emerge? I think so, even if the Poem’s description of the king’s piety is a subsequent interpretation of Ramesses’s innermost feelings. As pharaoh is the Hero par excellence, and so the Na’arn are not given written credit in the victory. But without them could Ramesses have triumphed? Indeed, do we not have a situation very similar to Wellington at Waterloo? His victory certainly depended upon additional military support without which he probably would have lost the battle. Some not so temperate remarks have been made over the years that without Blücher Wellington would have been defeated. The Duke himself is quoted, later in his life to be sure, that “It has been a damned nice thing — the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life.” Similarly, without the Na’arn Ramesses would likewise have been defeated. At the minimum Wellington would not have lost his life if Blücher had not been present. Yet Ramesses would have.
Additional details must be supplied concerning the king’s encouragement of his troops later on in the second phase in addition to the actual situation in the camp earlier. Let me sift through the first event before turning to Ramesses’ exhortations in the second by providing an additional useful parallel, one that hinges as well upon the literary reconstruction of the victorious general. Keegan has provided an extremely worthwhile parallel to the events surrounding Ramesses in his camp by referring to Caesar’s success in the Battle of Sabis.\textsuperscript{106} For our purposes note that both Caesar and Ramesses were faced by similar circumstance of defeat. Both generals act independently, leading their troops out of a very messy situation, Caesar with his red cloak and Ramesses with his two horses, push forward into the fray, each acting as the solitary leader or general of his army. Both are highly visible and both show no hesitation. Keegan’s commentary on the Roman battle is significant and pertinent to my evaluation of Ramesses charging “alone” both into the fray at his camp, and also during the second phase.

\textbf{Phase I}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Disjunctive Movement}
  \begin{enumerate}
  \item Ramesses’s division is surprised; death faces all; troops “scamper away.”
  \item Caesar’s legion division is equally hard pressed; some of the soldiers slink away.
  \end{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Moment of Truth}
  \begin{enumerate}
  \item Ramesses sends for help, imploring Amun, readies his chariot, and fights “alone.”
  \item Caesar arrives and advances the standards.
  \end{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Uniformity of Behavior}
  \begin{enumerate}
  \item The enemy are all attacking until Ramesses’s thrust into the fray makes his soldiers fight/ resist strongly.\textsuperscript{107}
  \item Caesar’s arrival makes his troops fight with fervor.
  \end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

\textbf{Phase II}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Moment of Truth}
  \begin{enumerate}
  \item Ramesses faces the second onslaught.
  \end{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Uniformity of Behavior}
  \begin{enumerate}
  \item Ramesses’s personal involvement repeats itself but here he rallies his troops.\textsuperscript{108}
  \end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}
Personalities

1. Simplified Characterization
   a. Only two people are named: Ramesses and Menna.
   b. Only two people are mentioned by name: Caesar and Sextius Baculus.

2. Overt Stress on Horses
   a. Only in the Kadesh Poem: both of the king’s horses are mentioned by name.

The terminology of Keegan is as meaningful in our context even if it is abstract. His appreciation of a famous engagement of Caesar bears directly upon our analysis of the dire situation of Ramesses when Ramesses was on the defensive. Moreover, Keegan’s selection of the term “simplified characterization” is meaningful in both contexts, Egypt and Rome, for it allows one to view the two literary records with a heightened sense of dramatic awareness, and the effect of one man upon victory.

The “will to combat,” also a theme in Keegan’s *The Face of Battle*, is extremely appropriate to cover here as well. What sustained the Egyptian men in the camp? Their horizon was bleak and their isolation acute. If Ramesses was “abandoned” by his other troops, so were they. But is this not the key event in all of the Egyptian literary and historical war records where morale was presented most at risk? The main factor that would have been felt by any Egyptian soldier at the camp involved defeat and disaster. This personal aspect had to have been combined with the pressure of compulsion by their general-pharaoh, and that involved physical/moral coercion if not force. Remember that severe violence in war is a norm, and thus there never is anything unimaginable or irrational about combat and the chance of extreme violence and death. Peer pressure on the part of the Egyptian first division soldiers, a vector always combined with performing well in combat, if not heroically, cannot be overlooked by us. Yet this is also linked with pride of mutual acquaintanceship and, in contrast, the suppression of fear by the officers.

How, then, did Ramesses’s soldiers react with the fear of annihilation coming upon them? We cannot answer this as no Egyptian narrative has any interest in elucidating these characteristics of Egyptian soldiers. But the supposition of personal collapse leading to lassitude and...
obliviousness for one’s life, indeed the future, is what Keegan stresses in his *The Face of Battle*. Surely some of these fears emerged within the Egyptian bivouac. Lord Moran, to refer to a second military commentator, is more specific in arguing that there are basically four degrees of courage:

1. Men who did not feel fear.
2. Men who felt fear but did not show it.
3. Men who felt fear and showed it, but did their job.
4. Men who felt fear, showed it, and shirked.

Let us assume that whatever any individual soldier of Ramesses felt during the first Hittite attack, it was necessary for the pharaoh to act decidedly regardless of what he observed in the field.

That is why the Poem on more than one occasion depicts the energy of the pharaoh directed outwards and victoriously. First mentioned are Amun and the pharaoh, then come king and troops (plus Menna). Ramesses plus Amun is subsequently replaced by Ramesses plus Menna. By doing this does not the author of the Poem purposely emphasize the greater importance of the first combination? Namely that the king’s success at his encampment must have been of greater importance than his role as general-warrior on the field in battle? When all is said and done, Ramesses’s actions in the first phase of combat gave the Egyptians the success they needed to withstand the enemy and then to propel the second attack back to the Orontes in defeat.

The quality of leadership which we might describe as genius, following Moran, has to be of a practical nature. The art of commanding soldiers, as Ramesses II must have possessed during the Hittite onslaught was tested to the nth degree. His abilities in this area cannot be overlooked or downplayed. Training is one thing, but his soldiers must have realized that without firm and positive leadership they would be doomed. This is why the second phase of the Battle of Kadesh can be regarded similar, but by no means identical to the first. When Muwatallis applied considerably more pressure through his second chariot attack Ramesses had to re-affirm his leadership. It is futile to speculate how Rameses had stamped his character upon his warriors, but from the successful Egyptian counter-attacks I think that he was not merely courageous and heroic, but he must have possessed a personal magnetism. That our extant accounts do not allow us to see. Instead, at the onset of combat we are given Amun with Ramesses.
The second phase of the battle occurred when Muwatallis sent across additional chariot troops. At this point it is impossible to be delineate a probable location of the opponents in combat once more. Obsomer, who splits the Hittite army into two main sectors — infantry at Kadesh the Old and chariotry at Kadesh — appears to argue that Muwatallis moved his infantry southwest at the time that the Na’arn arrived. Cavillier attempts a different interpretation. Disregarding exact timing, Muwatallis’s second chance opened when he either realized that the first chariot thrust had failed or ascertained that further chariot support was needed. And so he sent an additional 1,000 chariotry against the Egyptian army. As is well-known, the Poem stresses the policy of Muwatallis to stay away from the fray. That decision is so prominent in the reliefs, and a quick examination of one key scene in L1 strikingly reveals this avoidance.

Somehow fleeing Hittite charioteers managed to get to Muwatallis although we do not know when this occurred. I assume that they crossed southeast of the Egyptian camp and raced ahead of any possible pursuing Egyptians soldiers in order to inform their leader that the immediate daring attack had failed. That they crossed the ford south of Kadesh seem an inescapable conclusion even if the more direct route was immediately east and aimed at the environs of Kadesh the Old. (There was no ford there.) At this point the Poem turns its narrative focus away from the pharaoh and onto Muwatallis who, incidentally, is never referred to by name in any of the Egyptian accounts. Interesting as well is the reference to the Hittite king’s brothers in the narrative (P 152, with R 23 as the specific reference to one slain; cf. P. 233), a note that is amplified by the relief captions. The luckless prince of Aleppo, who later almost drowned in the Orontes is added to the list of new coalition chiefs, all called princes (wr). I find it significant that the most significant leaders of the enemy army, significantly chariot warriors, were purposely dispatched to curb the Egyptians. (The elite nature of charioteers in the Late Bronze Age cannot be overlooked.) Surely Muwatallis realized that he must use the best commanders whom he had at hand. The defeat on the west — a rout if we believe the Poem — had to be deflected with a great show of strength. These troops must have come from their original hidden place behind Kadesh and thus were able to move rapidly upon the Egyptians as they were charioteers. Muwatallis most certainly analysed the time factors for success very well.

Obsomer reconstructs the second phase as a Hittite attack directly across the Orontes at the immediate east side of the camp. The reliefs are basically non-committal. Abu Simbel positions the enemy king too far
away at the upper right for us to comment positively or negatively. L1 can be argued to be contrary to this analysis whereas R1 might be seen as favourable. I think that the R2 version is probably ambiguous at best. But in all cases let us remind ourselves that the pictorial data do not interweave perfectly, or neatly, with the chronologically more exacting details related in the Poem. I believe that a sub judice conclusion must be offered with regard to the events of combat during the second phase when Muwatallis sent over the additional chariots, keeping in mind that the Poem earlier states that he had hidden his chariots forces — at least those dispatched immediately to, and then through, the division of Pre — behind Kadesh. For the sake of simplicity, I still assume that his additional war vehicles were there.

But it was necessary for the author of this narrative to return to his hero. Again in first person narrative Ramesses addresses his army. This portion of the composition is purposely set up as an antithesis to the earlier plea of Ramesses to Amun. At this juncture the pharaoh bestirs his army (P 169-170). From Ramesses calling out to Amun in the first phase we subsequently encounter Ramesses encouraging his soldiers:

Be firm. Fortify your hearts, O my army!
See my strength (nḥtw) while I am alone —
Amun is my protector and his hand is with me!

(Note the resumption of the “hand” of Amun.)

Ramesses, as a good commander, thus pressured the entire Egyptian soldiers to no small extent. It must have succeeded, undoubtedly based on the ferocious and successful counterplays at the camp and the subsequent mauling of the Hittite by the Na’arn. After a not too long military engagement — let us say one hour at the most owing to the time of day (Kitchen would have it be around 4 pm but I place the time frame a bit later).118 Here is a summary of Ramesses’s speech. He steadies his troops when the new attack has just begun.

1. The pharaoh shows himself to be an effective leader with charisma. He opens his address with firm words of encouragement.
2. Then he refers to the assistance of Amun, thereby allowing the reader to reflect back to his previous deep emotional relationship with his father-god.
3. But in contrast to that earlier segment of the Poem Ramesses, speaking directly to his charioteers and not to any infantry (P 172) stresses his benefits that he has done for them. The parallel of one section in Ramesses’s earlier address to Amun is self-evident.

The literary kernels of both addresses of the pharaoh are direct and uncomplicated:
- To Amun:
  The king indicates his pious works which he regularly had instituted (offerings, building projects, etc.).
- To the chariots: 119
  The king indicates his benefits which he had given to them.

In both cases the pertinent issue is one of support in the past. And as Amun came to help Ramesses, so too must his soldiers. The king concludes by returning to his godhead and refers to the “crime” of both sectors of his army (P 193). 120 This portion of his address resonates with the earlier lack of military support at the camp indicated by the pharaoh. He felt himself deserted and isolated, and from a personal point of view this is correct. Earlier he had relied upon Amun; now he has to depend upon the efficacy of his army. Subsequently, the king indicates that the support given to him by Amun provided the success in phase one. Facing the new Hittite onslaught he verbally propels his troops and therefore spurs them on by means of his rallying cry.

In the midst of this new combat occurs the famous speech of the charioteer Menna to the pharaoh (P 205–223). 121 We read that the charioteer feared the new conflict (P 209-213): 122

My good lord, strong ruler, great savior of Egypt
on the day of combat,
We stand alone in the midst of the enemy,
The infantry and chariotry have abandoned us!
Let us clear, save us, Usermare-setepenre!

It belongs only to the second act, and is also contained in a separate section. According to Manassa we witness “a possible inversion of the role of the king and official, and thus a crossing of the boundaries of decorum.” 123 She further writes that Ramesses’s emotive speech to Amun and this one
indicate a personal relationship as well as a textual orientation that might be subversive. Yet Menna is the one who is the coward, not Ramesses the Hero. He never is. Previously he invoked assistance from Amun. But at this instant it is Menna who implores Ramesses. The two-way structure of low to high parallels perfectly the duality between Amun and Ramesses introduced earlier and the subsequent one connecting Ramesses to his troops. Under the life-or-death situation Amun was the prime mover. Afterwards, and in the midst of fighting the second wave of Hittite chariots, it was Ramesses.

The specific location on the battlefield of this second phase remains problematical. If we assume that Ramesses pushed the first wave of chariots out from his camp and then pursued those in flight the position would undoubtedly have been in the south, but still north of the ford. Hearing of the lack of success Muwatallis dispatched his second wave across the same area and the two antagonists met in the field. From the pictorial evidence we see only the pressure constantly maintained by Ramesses eastwards. But the end of the fighting witnessed the Hittites still in possession of the east and the Egyptians possessed the west. Any further engagement had to await the following day. But then some type of pre-arranged combat would have to have been set out officially, and this is why I argued for a set battle piece, possessing a *homo ludens* character, for the second day of battle.\(^{124}\)

I find it intriguing that Menna also repeats the king’s complaint. The two are now alone — just as Ramesses was alone with Amun — and also “abandoned” (ḥꜣ). It is self-evident that this theme rankled with the pharaoh over and over, and his composer of the Poem insured that it would remerge as a *Leitmotif* from time to time. Ramesses answers his trusty companion-underling and then rushes forward. Here, he is stated to have done so for “a sixth time” (P 221).

After the combat all ceases except the possible cynical remark in the Poem that his infantry and chariots saw the king’s victorious combat and entered the camp at early evening (ruh₂₇: twilight at best, P 229-230). These must have been the division of Ptah, and I find the comment somewhat of an understatement. Pharaoh is praised by his soldiers, officers,\(^{125}\) and charioteers (P 236). But Ramesses is not yet finished with his vituperation. They, his infantry, officers, and charioteers are chastised for not aiding him in battle. Stressed is that they did not fight and they abandoned him in combat (P 259 with ḥꜣ again, to which add B 103). To quote Kitchen: “Does a man not make himself honoured in his city,
at his return, when he has played the hero before his lord?” (P 255-256). But was it not Ramesses who was the Hero in front of his personal lord, Amun? To heap further opprobrium Ramesses signals out his two great horses, Victory-in-Thebes and Mut-is-Content, as well as Menna, but also the butlers who supported him. (He does not add his “escort,” the šmsw). Observe the final remark that all of these were “witnesses” (P 275: mtrw) to the king’s success, a remarkable statement that reminds one on being a “witness to Christ.”

We can now survey the pharaoh’s reflection on his conduct at Kadesh. The second day can be left off as it presents a different situation. Irrespective of the ideological nature of the Egyptian monarchy and the deification of the pharaoh, when the king was a commander-in-chief he was fully human in character. In the visual repertoire of the Kadesh battle Ramesses appears in the guide and performance of any New Kingdom ruler. Yet the written accounts, especially the Poem, are what reveal his personality. In short, to borrow the translation of Kitchen referred to earlier of P 255-256, he is the Hero. His logistic abilities, poor, middling, or impressive, are not what mattered to him. To Thutmose III they were important, but with regard to Ramesses only something deeply personal and self-centered was important. We hear of his rallying cries, or commands, and it is he alone who acts. Granted that elsewhere in Egyptian royal accounts such is the norm. But with Kadesh the aspect of loneliness, solitude, and abandonment come to the fore.

Hence, there are repetitive statements concerning “abandonment” as well as negative remarks concerning the “crime” of his officials. As he was left high and dry in his camp at Kadesh so, too, was he forsaken by his troops. He lacked three divisions. What else could he do but fight alone, albeit with support from his first division. And were they in a state of full preparedness? This being given, his condemnation of his troops makes some sense insofar as three divisions were desperately needed when the Hittites attacked his camp.

Ramesses skirts over his fatal reliance upon the Shasu “intelligence report,” but he does not avoid mentioning it. The Bulletin is there to be consulted, and provides a self-standing literary unit in evidence of what might be called “fair-play.” But this report had to be included owing to the narrow chronological setting of the Bulletin which connects the Shasu report with the later one concerning the two Hittite spies. From there on the scene of battle opens. The Poem, on the other hand,
had as its main purpose the depiction of Ramesses as Hero. Shasu and spies are cut out of the narrative. We encounter the pharaoh as a self-possessed warrior, but being alone and caught. There are strong dramatic aspects in that literary composition that enhance the king’s personality. We can feel for him, and with him, even though he avoids telling us much about non-personal affairs. Perhaps the most self-indulgent is the elimination of the Na’arn.

Ramesses is additionally depicted as a leader of his troops. On two separate occasions he is shown rallying and urging them on. His role as commander takes over, but even here the monarch’s personal separation from his soldiers is made clear. In a later account Ramesses claims that the reason he was isolated was owing to the situation that three of his armies (i.e., divisions) were not with him. This recollection thereby supports the case that I have mentioned more than once above — namely, that the pharaoh blames his isolation upon contingencies that we can readily ascertain to be logistic ones. But they could only be extremely hazardous if Ramesses was duped. And he was. He did win the battle on day one, and I would maintain on the second, but he had to leave the area. His army defeated two Hittite chariot assaults, the follow-up one being surely the greater in number. (Speed was less significant then because Ramesses had defeated the first wave and had Na’arn with him as support.) But neither foe could cross over the ford owing to the existence on day two of two major chess pieces virtually side-by-side, as in Alice’s situation between the red and white queens on row eight of the chess board. A double-bind situation had come into effect.

How much we chastise or blame Ramesses — and I do so here with no hesitation — he did perform excellently in combat. Keegan has aptly written “though bad logistics may lose a battle, even good logistics will not win a battle.” Ramesses was a true commander-in-chief when pressed to fight. He was the hero of the day, the only one, of course. His personal attitudes are presented within the middle of the Poem, first with respect to Amun and second to Menna. Relying on Assmann’s seminal evaluation of the king’s we can piece together more successful than previously the king’s attitudes which he desired to be recorded for posterity. In the visual scene of the battle proper he is triumphal of course. The enemy is crushed and few escape by fleeing across the Orontes. And as the Poem as well as the relief captions indicate there were quite a number of very significant leaders of enemy countries as well as high-ranking Hittite military men who lost their lives, etc.
But the Poem’s intent is far less to iterate or even list these defeated foes. Rather, it presents in the core the solitary Ramesses who calls upon Amun, goes hand and hand with him into battle at his camp, and then wins, notwithstanding his isolation (P 124-125):

He gave to me his hand. I was rejoicing.
And after I called him I found that Amun came.

In the realm of gods there was only Amun. In the human realm just a few were faithful. In fait, Ramesses enumerates his “good deeds,” his religious service to Amun just as he pressures his army to show equal devotion and obedience when under great pressure. When the second wave of the enemy arrived, it was Menna to whom Ramesses spoke. Here there is a dialogue as was not present earlier. (I.e., with Amun and later with the troops whom Ramesses rallies.) Menna is fearful though not cowardly. Ramesses rejuvenates him for the counterattack, and there is no mention of any previous goodly deeds which the pharaoh had performed for his charioteer. Menna nonetheless was terribly frightened before the second Hittite thrust and wanted to clear the field. He wishes his pharaoh to save “us all” by not remaining to fight. Considering his role as the second man in the king’s chariot, his words must be taken seriously and not just reflective of boilerplate rhetoric. But at this time, as previously, Ramesses rallies the fainthearted. This attitude shows the heroic character of the man as well as his superb ability as a leader of troops.

Following the modern work of Yvon Garlan, who in turn paraphrases the ancient Athenian Xenophon, be brave but not rash. Naturally, it was part of the military upbringing of the crown princes of Egypt to have experienced warfare at an early age. By the Eighteenth Dynasty the ars belli was a required “ingredient” of rulership. Ramesses additionally had inculcated in him the fundamental of strategy, logistics, and leadership. He could not have retreated or surrender. He had to enter the fray in spite of the odds of success. On the other hand, how serious was the Hittite thrust? The assumption, which I and others have followed, is that he managed to stave off destruction until the Na’arn reached his vicinity. Equally, how dangerous was the second wave of Hittite chariots? Both cases remain unclear because we do not know the size and composition of the Egyptian forces and their opponents. Still, it can be argued that Ramesses had enough for both battlefield victories. Muwatallis definitely saw the failure of the first thrust across
the Orontes despite its initial alarming success. Hence, his dispatch of a new cohort of charioteers, among whom we have noted the presence of very significant leaders from the north.

There are two useful passages which the Poem inserts to explain the background of the enemy troops sent across the Orontes. P 86, covering the initial thrust, has already been covered earlier, and among the foes were men from Arzawa, Masa, and Pitassa.\textsuperscript{134} P 149-152 refer to the second chariot sweep and these foes are listed: the princes of Arzawa, Masa, Arwanna, Luka, Dardanaya,\textsuperscript{135} Qarqisha, and Aleppo, not to mention the brother of Muwatallis. From the second reference I suggest that we can re-evaluate Muwatallis’s follow-up tactics. Realizing than an initial thrust had failed — and that would have taken some time considering the factors of combat and then pursuit — he went for broke once more. On the second occasion the chariot battalions were led by experts. I find it equally suggestive of the delaying and cautious tactical mind of Muwatallis that he did not dispatch more chariots after the initial wave, and to this I shall return in a moment. At this juncture, however, I can understand very well the fear of Menna and the necessity for Ramesses to rally his troops further. When the Poem moves its attention to the east of the Orontes it specifically, albeit carefully, places some opprobrium upon Muwatallis for not fighting personally. Instead, he sent these elite war machines forward, each cohort headed by a prominent leader. The pharaoh, not necessarily surprised, but “discomforted” (to use the Egyptian term) to be sure, continues to fight. He then rallies his army with words that are to be viewed in contrast to those which he himself implored to Amun earlier in the fracas. Menna’s brief speech then follows. His words occur when Ramesses is already fighting the second wave, and thus are employed to demonstrate further that once more, we are projected to the king and not anyone or anything else. Ramesses is to remain the center of the action.

His ability as a warrior and hero is further heaped up from P 235 and following. Von der Way locates this subsection within a larger one that covers the army’s praises towards their ruler.\textsuperscript{136} But the textual analysis is not correct owing to the heading of the section and the following employ of two standard verbal narrative constructions.\textsuperscript{137} First the “slinking” army of the south arrives at camp. This is followed by the exhortation to Ramesses by his returning soldiers in P 235, praise which is unbalanced by Ramesses’s stringent remarks concerning his soldiers’ inability to fight. And he once more blames them for abandoning him. On this occasion Ramesses vociferously declares that he was their great leader, and he sticks to the narrow theme of generalship, as befits the art of combat.
How to evaluate Ramesses is not overly difficult. But there remains his Achilles’ heel. He failed in intelligence gathering and, more importantly, in intelligence evaluation. Full kudos must be given to him for his effective resistance at the camp and his following destruction of the first chariot attack. Equally, despite Muwatallis’s succeeding wave of chariots, he won again. Heroically speaking, he showed excellent battlefield tactics. There is nothing inherently at fault with his strategic objective — there was only one after all\textsuperscript{138} — as well as with his operational procedures. How he got to this strategic position opposite Kadesh on the west of the Orontes is the nub. After all, he relied upon false information and should not have been there. But his original goal was not faulty. The Kadesh records insure that his entire obsession was with the solitary position in which he found himself. The continual refrain of blaming his troops pervades the Poem, yet in the Bulletin the only condemnation expressed is by the high officers who rebuke the failure of the Egyptian commissioners in Asia and the allied princes therein. But he himself was to blame.

The considerably larger narrative of the Poem describes the actions of the pharaoh under severe duress. The writer composed a complex story in which their king was alone yet triumphed. Hence, Ramesses as Hero is an automatic image derived from that basic orientation, even if we can see through the king’s crucial error. But he is not a mere pharaonic hero. Ramesses not merely won — and many Egyptian monarchs did as well — but his was a victory owing to he himself, alone and in despair. He calls to Amun and is supported. In a nutshell, Ramesses’s ego pervades the ensuing descriptions of combat and success.

Ramesses states that his soldiers were not with him, but any impartial judge knows otherwise. True, three divisions were missing: Pre, Ptah, and Sutech. And even the pharaoh would acknowledge the incapacitated nature of his second division, even it is unfair for him to conclude that he was left in the lurch by them (with ka as the key verb). Yet the ruler did save all from the disaster, and a Hero for the day he thus was. His crucial error was in intelligence reconnaissance. Keegan has significantly written that “Opposed enemies, if they really seek battle, will succeed in finding each other and that, when they do it, it will rarely be intelligence factors that determine the outcome. Intelligence may usually be necessary but is not a sufficient condition of victory.”\textsuperscript{139} Force is. Which is why Ramesses won the test of combat.

As for the second day, the Hittites had to cross the Orontes. Were they given “permission” so as to present a show of strength? Either side could have blocked the other’s advance. Muwatallis had lost many
of his chariots and Ramesses a large number of his soldiers. But we cannot evaluate the military clash on the following day except to state that the pharaoh claimed victory in combat. Even if the later Hittite reflection on their success at Kadesh against Ramesses is consulted,\textsuperscript{140} can we explicitly trust the Hittite account?\textsuperscript{141} Kitchen maintains that “Ramesses won, Egypt lost.”\textsuperscript{142} But Ramesses, as commander, also lost.\textsuperscript{143} General Lee, after Gettysburg, was of the same opinion regarding an equal failure.\textsuperscript{144}

\textbf{notes}

1 See the key references to the immense scholarship on this issue in notes 68-69 to Chapter 1. Let me list the most recent studies here: Murnane, \textit{The Road to Kadesh, passim}; Spalinger, \textit{War in Ancient Egypt}, Chapter 13; Mayer and Mayer-Opficius, “Die Schlacht bei Qadeš,” Jürgen Kenning, \textit{Der Feldzug nach Qadech: Das Ägypten des Neuen Reiches auf der Suche nach seiner Strategie} (Hildesheim: Olms; 2014); Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires” in: Karlshausen and Obsomer (eds.), \textit{De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte ancienne/ War in Ancient Egypt}; Guidotti and Daddi (eds.), \textit{La battaglia di Qadesh. Ramesses II contra gli Ititì per la conquista della Siria}; Assmann, “Krieg und Frieden im alten Ägypten. Ramses II. und die Schlacht bei Kadesh”; and Spalinger, \textit{Icons of Power, passim}.


The Abydos reliefs are now re-published in exemplary fashion by Ogden Goelet and Sameh Iskander, The Temple of Ramesses II in Abydos. Volume 1: Wall Scenes — Part I: Exterior Walls and Courts (Atlanta: Lockwood Press; 2015); and for Abu Simbel there is Christiane Noblecourt, Sergio Donadoni, and Elmar Edel, Grand temple d’Abou Simbel. La batailles de Qadech (Cairo: Centre de Documentation et d’Études sur l’ancienne Égypte; 1971).

A forthcoming volume by Brand, Ramesses II: Egypt’s Ultimate Pharaoh, Chapter 4, may be cited in this context. He provides a fresh re-interpretation of the combat at Kadesh.

Finally, the standard abbreviations for this campaign are as follows: P = the narrative Kadesh Poem, B = the shorter narrative Bulletin, and R = the textual sections accompanying the pictorial representations. The temples are listed as A = Abydos, I = Abu Simbel, K = Karnak (more than one version), L = Luxor (more than one version), and R = the Ramesseum, the king’s mortuary temple.

2 Cf. Spalinger, The Transformation of an Ancient Egyptian Narrative: P. Sallier III and the Battle of Kadesh. For the literary qualities of the Poem, see the major work of Von der Way referred to in the last note.

3 Conveniently, see Lorenz and Schrakamp, “Hittite Military and Warfare,” 142-143. This study is useful in analyzing the number of arrows in the Hittite quivers as well as the Egyptian capacity on page 139. For the timing of the battle in the mid-afternoon, Spalinger, War in Ancient Egypt, 212-215; and Kitchen, Ramesside Inscriptions. Translated and Annotated. Notes and Comments II, 44-45 (330 pm).

I am indebted to Rolf Krauss for the following data: “according to UraniaStar sunset occurred at Kadesh between 1285 and 1275 BC on III shemu 9 (= May 14 to 12) at 18:13 (May 14) and 18:12 (May 12).” The end of the civil evening was 18:40. (Sunset is defined as the upper rim of the disk touching
the mathematical horizon with refraction considered). Time: UT + 2 hours; the sun culminated at 11:30. See now his study, "Über die L-förmigen Schattenuhren und die Schlacht von Megiddo."  

See Spalinger, *Icons of Power*, *pam*., but especially Chapter 14 ("Locations of the Kadesh war of Ramesses II"). I followed Kenneth Kitchen's organization when he divided the scenes into "Episodes." He has four: Episode I (The Camp and Council of War), II (The Battle), III (Captors and Spoils Presented to the King), and IV (Presentation of Spoils to the Gods). Heinze, *Die Feldzugsdarstellungen des Neuen Reiches*, has: Lager, Kamp, Siegsfeier, and Präsentation. Essentially, the two do not differ even though the exact cut-off of I and II is not evident in the Bulletin.  

They were labelled Amun, Pre, Ptah, and Sutekh.  

5,000 men is the assumed integer for an Egyptian division at this time. In addition, was the Na’arn division, which traversed Syria from west to east, also of this strength? Weapons and chariots would have been somewhat incapacitated by the march, and likewise so to would have been the soldiers as well as the horses.  

Lorenz and Schrakamp, *“Hittite Military and Warfare,”* 140. However, their argument is weakened by the fact that Muwatallis's army was composed of many ethnic groups, dependencies of the Hittite state located in Anatolia (west and east as well as north and south) as well as in north Syria. Hence, the Egyptian visual evidence need not be discounted automatically.  

Ibid.  


Muwatallis and Ramesses. He assumes that these two men went back to the Hittite ruler and Muwatallis was thereby informed of Ramesses’ location about 2 pm in the afternoon. But their return to the Hittites, surely possible, is not indicated in the text. Brand *Ramesses II: Egypt’s Ultimate Pharaoh*, Chapter 4, is also as equivocal on this matter as I am. Were the Shasu permitted to leave or not?

12 Spalinger, “Divisions in Monumental Texts and their Images: The Issue of Kadesh and Megiddo,” in: Gruber et al. (eds.), *All the Wisdom of the East. Studies in Honor of Eliezer D. Oren*, for the literary-historical background of the Bulletin. The study also covers the modern terminology employed by Egyptologists (Poem, Bulletin, Captions, Reliefs), and their applicability to the source material as well their appropriateness.


13 Scouts have been discussed earlier. Keep in mind that one’s intelligence-gathering men need time to go to a location and to come back to home base.


16 Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires” in: Karlshausen and Obsomer (eds.), *De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte ancienne/War in Ancient Egypt*. “Kadesh the Old” is thus not the same as “Kadesh.” This is a very important analysis. He places “Kadesh the Old” at Safinat Nuḥ, ca 3 km north of Tell Nebi Mend. See as well von der Way, *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht*, 365 (under R§26). This is generally agreed upon.
And thus Ramesses original plans, perhaps readjusted after the report of the two Shasu, was not identical to Thutmose III’s at Megiddo. The latter had been able to approach the enemy who was depleted of troops and caught by surprise. For the latter general a quick victory in the field was all that was necessary. In fact, he effectively blocked the Asiatic coalition from securing additional troops. (And it is not to be forgotten that there were other foes present close to Megiddo.)

In particular, see P 63. Military camps are best positioned near one another but not immediately adjacent and too close. A high degree of independent action is needed for each separate large cohort else the ensuing melee would get too confused. Keep in mind the latrines, cooking facilities, guards, etc. It is also important to have a Feldherrnhügel close by or therein.

E.g., Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant. The Life and Times of Ramesses II, King of Egypt (Warminster: Aris and Phillips; 1982), 50-53.

Heagren, The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt, 26-34. See as well, Kenning, Der Feldzug nach Qadech: Das Ägypten des Neuen Reiches auf der Suche nach seiner Strategie, 134-138.

The Luxor reliefs, however, provide more detailed information.

Heagren, The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt, 344.

Ibid., 485.

The “great crime” (but ḥḥ) at this juncture is not stated by Ramesses to have occurred owing to the poor abilities of his high officials in the army, but rather due to his overseers of foreign lands and local administrators.

The negative word used for the high ranking soldiers in P 193 is btḥ — von der Way, Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeḥ-Schlacht, 317 note r. See Spalinger, The Transformation of an Ancient Egyptian Narrative: P. Sallier III and the Battle of Kadesh, Chapter III (“The Speech to Menna and the ‘Great Crime’).

Assmann, “Krieg und Frieden im alten Ägypten. Ramses II. und die Schlacht bei Kadesch.”

Gardiner, The Kadesh Inscriptions of Ramesses II, 33 with B 55, is still useful to read.

Morris, Ancient Egyptian Imperialism, 198. See note 24 above.

Keegan, Intelligence in War, 21.
29 Darnell and Manassa, *Tutankhamun's Armies. Battle and Conquest during Ancient Egypt's Late 18th Dynasty*, 177.

30 Related to this issue is the movement of the Hittite army. Unfortunately, extant data from the Hittite side are slim, to say the least. Nonetheless, Lorenz and Schrakamp, “Hittite Military and Warfare,” 144, provide some useful facts. They feel that the chariotry were placed on the right and left flanks of the army, “whose centre consisted of infantry.” This supposition is unclear although reasonable, because they provide the useful information that officers were in charge of 1,000 chariot units of the left as well as of the right.


34 Traveling in two is for protection and survival. See Kenning, *Der Feldzug nach Qadech: Das Ägypten des Neuen Reiches auf der Suche nach seiner Strategie*, 139-153.


36 The B references refer to the Kadesh Bulletin and the P designations indicate the Poem.

37 Conveniently, Heinz, *Die Feldzugsdarstellungen des Neuen Reiches*, 281 — compressed (Abu Simbel, I), 283 (Abydos, A; with Goelet and Iskander, *The Temple of Ramesses II in Abydos*, 32-33), 285 (Karnak, K1 top), 287 (Luxor, L1 left), 291 — right (Ramesseum, R1). R 8 provides the key relief text/caption.
We hear nothing more of them after their questioning south of Shabtuna.

Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires,” in: Karlshausen and Obsomer (eds.), De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte ancienne/War in Ancient Egypt, 150 — Fig 3, is worthwhile to contemplate. Cavillier, La battaglia di Qades, 50, presents a similar interpretation in Figura 5. But his later evaluations of the final phases of battle must remain speculative. Earlier, in his “la fasi della battaglia,” 182-191, and especially page 188 with Fig. 4.4, in: Guidotti and Daddi (eds.), La battaglia di Qades. Ramesses II contra gli Ittiti per la conquiesta della Siria, the identical reconstruction is given.

But were not the additional chariots located to the south around Kadesh? In addition, was not the ford easier to cross than the waterway near Kadesh The Old? Granted that the Poem does not indicate the direction of the second wave of Hittites, but does this automatically indicate that the second charge was directed north of Kadesh?

Kitchen, Ramesside Inscriptions. Translated and Annotated. Notes and Comments II, 44, argues that Muwatallis’s chariots must have sped forth at top speed, ca 15-20 miles/hour (= 24-32 km/hour), after piercing the division of Pre.


Kitchen, Ramesside Inscriptions. Translated and Annotated. Notes and Comments II, 44. He is not necessarily correct. True, we cannot trust any of the numbers for the Hittite attacks given in these war records. It is hard to envisage the logistic arrangements at the Hittite camp, the possibility of troops at Kadesh (see below), and the time moving behind Kadesh southwards and then to the west with such a large number of chariots as 2,500. But 200 seems too small.


Keegan, Intelligence in War, 22. The advancing army of Napoleon unexpectedly bumped into the defensive British outposts on 16 June 1814. The latter withdrew to an earlier reconnoitred position. Quatre Bras was a delaying battle, but one that
was a result of two armies meeting, one advancing and the second on the defence.

44 This was adumbrated earlier. The reconstruction follows upon the decision of Muwatallis to attack the second division and not the first.

45 To be specific: at least those troops in his home base. The timing of these events is not at all clear in the accounts of the Poem, Bulletin, or the reliefs. Therefore, we do not know exactly when the Hittite scouts were interrogated and when the chariots of Muwatallis reached the king’s bivouac. As stressed earlier, the pictorial evidence appears to make a coincidence between both occurrences, but this I maintain was done for the narrative pictorial arrangement.

46 First, the Hittites had sent only their chariots. Whereas I believe that many more than Kitchen’s supposition of 200 (see note 41 above) — the data from the Battle of Megiddo indicate otherwise — these elite soldiers intended to crush Ramesses in his camp. Therefore, they would not — indeed could not — readily stop and mop up their opponents. Second, the Egyptian may have been severely penetrated, but the number of dead, wounded, and chariots disabled was limited by the final aim or purpose (“Zweck” again”) of their orders.

47 The reconstructions by historians of “sole” pharaonic marches, advances, and an assumed reliance upon single-minded pharaonic-lead strategic objectives needs to be revised more than done at present in the scholarly literature. I can refer to notes 68-71 in Chapter 1 as well as my remarks in Icons of Power, especially when I dealt with Merenptah’s Canaanite war and the campaigns of Seti I in Chapters 1 and 5.

48 See note 11 above.

49 Heagren, The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt, 18-43, provides a wealth of information, both empirically as well as methodologically, on this matter.

50 Ibid., 17; Spalinger, Icons of Power, passim.

51 Heinz, Die Feldzugsdarstellungen des Neuen Reiches, 289.

52 Heagren, The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt, 29.

53 Heinz, Die Feldzugsdarstellungen des Neuen Reiches, 287.

54 Heagren, The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt, 32.

55 Ibid., 80-87 in particular.

But they add more: see Kri II 133 — all in the Abu Simbel version; but R 12 is also present in Luxor versions L1 and L3. Conveniently, see Heinz, *Die Feldzugsdarstellungen des Neuen Reiches*, 281 (Abu Simbel), 288 (L1), and 289 (L3). Add von der Way, *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses' II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht*, 269 note 469, who stresses the additional evidence in R 12-15. R 13 states that the royal butler and a messenger also were sent south with the vizier to hasten the army of Ptah.

59 Gaballa, *Narrative in Egyptian Art*, needed to specify the ideological and narrative aspects of the scenes in more than a temporally-oriented presentation. Cf. Spalinger, “Notes on the Reliefs of the Battle of Kadesh.”

60 Spalinger, *Icons of Power*, 168. See as well pages 204-209.

61 See note 57 above. Note that no high ranking military men are dispatched.

62 Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires,” in: Karlshausen and Obsomer (eds.), *De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte ancienne/War in Ancient Egypt*, 96, makes an important point when he writes that in caption R 11 Ramesses is called ḥm=f, as is done so in the Poem. Cf. Kenning, *Der Feldzug nach Qadech: Das Ägypten des Neuen Reiches auf der Suche nach seiner Strategie*, 179-186.


64 Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires,” in: Karlshausen and Obsomer (eds.), *De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte ancienne/War in Ancient Egypt*, 96, is clear on this matter. Cf. Kenning, *Der Feldzug nach Qadech: Das Ägypten des Neuen Reiches auf der Suche nach seiner Strategie*, 203-218, on the Na’arn.
In particular, see the important study of the Na’arn by Obsomer, *ibid.*, 92-138 and 150-158. Add Kenning, *Der Feldzug nach Qadech: Das Ägypten des Neuen Reiches auf der Suche nach seiner Strategie*, 187-191.

Obsomer, *ibid.*, 96-97 with note 63.

See Mohamed Abbas, “The Bodyguard of Ramesses II and the Battle of Kadesh,” *Enim* 9 (2016): 113-123; Stephen Quirke, *Titles and Bureaux of Egypt 1850-1700 BC* (London: Golden House; 2004), 104-105; and Daniela Stefanovic, *The Holders of Regular Military Titles in the Period of the Middle Kingdom: Dossiers* (London: Golden House; 2006), 152-169, with her “Soldiers of the Middle Kingdom,” *Wzkm* 98 (2008): 233-248. But the evidence still cannot prove that these of Ramesses II were only bodyguards. See also Claude Obsomer, “Sinouhê l’égyptien et les raisons de son exile,” *Le Muséon* 112 (1999): 207-271, in particular, page 240 with note 151, for the Battle of Kadesh example in the Bulletin (B 33). In essence, ʿmsw is a vague and global term, one that could include bodyguards, but also other men close to their ruler such as army scouts.

Gerhardt Fecht, “Ramses II. und die Schlacht bei Qadesch (QidSa). Ergänzende Überlegungen im Anschluß an meinen Aufsatz in der FS Helck (Šak),” *GM* 80 (1984): 40-41. See additional data contradicting this supposition in Heagren, *The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt*, 77 — in the Tutankhamun reliefs the enemy are shown with three men to a chariot, “but unlike the three man Hittite chariots at Qadesh, the third man in these chariots is armed with a bow rather than a spear.” One cannot follow Fecht and argue for a Darstellungstabu.” Add Paul Raulwing, *Horses, Chariots and Indo-Europeans. Foundations and Methods of Chariotry Research from the Viewpoint of Comparative Indo-European Linguistics* (Budapest: Archaeolingua; 2000), 52 with note 83.

Noblecourt, Donadoni, and Edel, *Grand temple d’Abou Simbel. La batailles de Qadech*, Plate IV.

Heagren, *The Art of War in Pharaonic Egypt*, 77-78: Outside of Abu Simbel the examples are the R1 and L1 versions. L1 is, however, somewhat different insofar as it lacks a dramatic rendition of confusion and total destruction.
71 See note 41 above. On such integers, I can refer to two I have found extremely pertinent to this issue at Kadesh in my “Mathematical Factors of the Battle of Kadesh,” 94 note 15.

72 With the Megiddo data: enemy chariots ca 1,000/Hittite chariots = 28.5%, and Egyptian chariots ca 2,000/3,500 = 57%; if for the second calculation there is 1,900/3,500 we have 54%.

73 Note the qualification “in battle.” Then too, add those vehicles partly broken or damaged, lacking two horses, etc. I am referring to wear and tear.

74 Heinz, Die Feldzugsdarstellungen des Neuen Reiches, 285-286.

75 Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires,” in: Karlshausen and Obsomer (eds.), De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte ancienne/War in Ancient Egypt, 97, has some pertinent comments on the verbal use of ḫmsj here.


78 In Königsnovelle texts — see Loprieno, “The ‘King’s Novel’,” in Loprieno (ed.), Ancient Egyptian Literature. History and Forms — there is a discussion, and frequently an official is referred to. But the pharaoh’s utterances/commands are the modus operandi.

79 And with virtù we thereby return to our discussion in Chapter 1 and Machiavelli’s Arte della guerra wherein Tugend (virtue) is virtù, but the latter word can be further construed to mean Mut (courage) as well as Klugheit (intelligence) and Tüchtigkeit (ability; proficiency; excellence). See Eduard Mayer, Machiavellis Geschichtsauffassung und sein Begriff virtù. Studien zu seiner Historik (Munich and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg; 1912). All of these translations reflect what qualities a great captain of arms should be.

80 Spalinger, Icons of Power, passim, especially Chapter 1.
81 One useful exception is of Ramesses III in his second Libyan war (Heinz, *Die Feldzugsdarstellungen des Neuen Reiches*, 309, I.22) where the two Egyptian western desert fortresses operate at the left as superimposed nexi of Egyptian resistance. Others can easily be found such as the king’s Sea Peoples land battle in Heinz, *Die Feldzugsdarstellungen des Neuen Reiches*, 306, I. 16.

82 Heinz, *ibid.*, 301 (Ramesses III, first Libyan war, I.6).

83 See note 54 to Chapter 1. But the cases of any type of divine help in written royal war accounts can be interpreted as literary/metaphorical.

84 Conveniently, Heinz, *Die Feldzugsdarstellungen des Neuen Reiches*, 250, where the smiting of an Asiatic foe by Ramesses II occurs with the Nechbet vulture above and behind the king and also is present in an Asiatic campaign. On the other hand, Re is carved above the pharaoh’s head in a simple but dramatic depiction of the capture of a norther fortress-citadel.

85 *Ibid.*, 242-244.

86 P 92ff. and von der Way, *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht*, 150-152, 174-197, and 302-305. For the Hittite equivalence, see Anna Polvani, “Le divinità ittite e la guerra,” in: Guidotti and Daddi (eds.), *La battaglia di Qadesh. Ramesses II contra gli Ittiti per la conquista della Siria*, 122-125. Again, the role of that monarch also was totally human, a conclusion that should not surprise anyone.

87 B 52 with ‘ḥʹ.n ṅḏj.n ḥm=f introduces the council of the pharaoh and the Hittite attack on the division of Pre which ends at B 75. B 76-80 provide us with a temporal backdrop just preceding Ramesses’s entry into the fray. See Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires” in: Karlshausen and Obsomer (eds.), *De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte ancienne/War in Ancient Egypt*, 95, wherein a useful discussion of Htrw is presented.

88 Gardiner’s contention, *The Kadesh Inscriptions of Ramesses II*, 3-4, that the Bulletin was not an “Official Report,” and merely an extended caption is not valid even though he recognized that it was relatively short and contained data not present in the Poem but carved in the reliefs. E.g., the arrival of the Hittite scouts or spies. Cf. Spalinger, “Divisions in Monumental Texts and their

I covered the hieratic versions of the Poem in The Transformation of an Ancient Egyptian Narrative: P. Sallier III and the Battle of Kadesh. On the sections, see Obsomer’s latest observation, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires,” 130-131.


See Spalinger, The Transformation of an Ancient Egyptian Narrative: P. Sallier III and the Battle of Kadesh, Chapter V (“The Enemy Coalition”). Only the Sallier III papyrus (copy of Pentawaret) includes the fuller list. But the papyrus version adds more by error. The two lists of P 43-47 and P. Sallier’s do not coincide.

Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires,” 127 under f.


Keegan’s description the “ripple effect” when a horse or horses encounter lines of men — may be pertinent to cite: The Face of War, 97. If a parallel is to be drawn one must replace “men” by “infantry” and “horses” by “chariots.” The effect is human and not equid.

Von der Way, Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht, 302. See my earlier comments earlier and note 86 above.

Assmann, “Krieg und Frieden im alten Ägypten. Ramses II. und die Schlacht bei Kadesh.” We need not concern ourselves with the veracity of Ramesses’s speech to Amun. I believe that he did say something!

On “Amun of the Road,” see most recently Shirley Evian, “Amun-of-the-Road: Trade and Religious Mobility between Egypt

98 Von der Way, *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht*, 207-218, following Assmann, *ibid*.

99 Kitchen, *Rameside Inscriptions. Translated and Annotated, Translations* II, 8 note 8, has a very useful remark on this passage.

100 The Egyptian has $dj=f\; n=j\; drt=f\; hn‚=j$. Note the $hn‚=j$. Amun is thus accompanying Ramesses in battle.

101 Von der Way, *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht*, 123, has a sketchy discussion of the king’s Einsamkeit.

102 Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires,” 127 under f.

103 Von der Way, *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht*, 361 under note 72 and pages 122-124.

104 Meaning, in a now obsolete sense, “uncertain, delicately balanced.”


107 Not given in the Poem, of course, but I would say “obviously.” The Egyptian ideology must deal with the pharaoh above all.

108 Because Amun is with Ramesses in Phase I the Poem does not provide a rallying-call to the soldiers on his part.


111 Obsomer, *ibid.*, 167 (Fig. 25).

112 Cavillier, *La battaglia di Qadesh, 46-52*, and La fasi della battaglia,” in: Guidotti and Daddi (eds.), *La battaglia di Qadesh. Ramesses II contra gli Ittiti per la conquišla della Siria*.

113 This is von der Way’s “Forcierung and Niederlage” in *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht*, 308-311. I am not in agreement with Tara Prakash, “King and Coward? The Representation of the Foreign Ruler in the Battle of Kadesh,” *JSSEA* 38 (2011-2012): 141-147, concerning the analysis.

In L1 the Hittite monarch is located at the bottom left. Muwatallis is not as prominent there as in R1 where he is set almost on the same line as Ramesses. I.e., the two antagonists — the Hittite king being large but dwarfed by the pharaoh of course — are purposely juxtaposed. Abu Simbel places Muwatallis at the upper right with Ramesses, logically, at the upper left. The Hittite king looks at Ramesses even if his chariot is directed in the opposition direction. I see no hidden or subversive attitude expressed here. (I am not at all one who looks for enemies under my bed, convinced that one must be.)

Prakash, “King and Coward? The Representation of the Foreign Ruler in the Battle of Kadesh,” could have added that fact. This absence may have very well been deliberate: impersonalize the opponent so as to reduce his aura of power and importance.

At this stage in the combat infantry could be of no use because the Egyptians were using chariots as a rule and the time frame was so limited that speed was of the highest necessity.

Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arin, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires,” 150, provides a useful analysis of this action.

“Mathematical Factors of the Battle of Kadesh,” with my earlier more summarized analysis in War in Ancient Egypt, 214-217.

Note that Infantry and chariotry are both mentioned in P 181 and 184.

On the word bt; see as well von der Way, Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht, 317 note 2 a and my comments referred to above in note 24.

On the role and significance of Menna, at least from a literary perspective, see Spalinger, The Transformation of an Ancient Egyptian Narrative: P. Sallier III and the Battle of Kadesh, Chapter VII (“Military Compositions as Literature”). Manassa, Imagining the Past, 110-111.

For the verb “to save,” we can remind ourselves that it is used in many of the so-called pietistic stelae of private individuals during the Ramesside Period. This passage is useful to quote because it reveals Menna’s feeling that the army has not supported
Ramesses. In this case (as previously with the Bulletin) the author has placed his pharaoh’s feelings of desertion in the mouths of another. Quite clever, quite expected, and quite appropriate for Ramesses.

123 Manassa, *Imagining the Past*, 111.


127 See note 45 in Chapter 1. In B 88 only Victory-in-Thebes is mentioned. This was the more important horse of the king. Note that the name has a more aggressive character than Mut-is-Content.

128 Obsomer, “La bataille de Qadech de Ramsès II. Les n’arîn, sekou tepy et questions d’itinéraires,” 97; see note 67 above.

129 Note 116 above.


The “I did and I implore you to do” of the Ramesses-Amun junction or the “I did and you do” of the Ramesses-army link is not present.


See notes 90-91 above.

P. Sallier III adds the Gasgaseans.


One commences, to be sure, with the heading in P 224 — *hr jr-dr*. But to break off at 250, with P 251 having *ḫr. n dd.n hm=f*, seems forced. After all, P 235 also uses the same constriction, *ḫr. n p₂j=j mš*, as does P 251, which is where von der Way sees an important switch. The effective (major break) is with P 277: *ḥḏ tꜣ ṯs.n=j*.

Retake Kadesh and then control Amurru.

Keegan, *Intelligence in War*, 383.

See the evaluations of the primary material offered in note 130 above.

Mention can be made of Albert Grayson, “Problematical Battles in Mesopotamian History,” in: Hans Güterbock and Thorkild Jacobsen (eds.), *Studies in Honor of Benno Landsberger, April 21, 1963* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1965), 337-342. He writes on page 342: “In every one of the battles between Assyria and Babylonia or Elam studied in this article Assyria lost but Assyrian sources claim victory. The unreliability of Assyrian documents is not a startling revelation.” What about the Hittite historical sources covering warfare?

He did not obtain his strategic objectives. The same may be said for the Battle of the Coral Sea. Moreover, at this ancient time in human history there was no “Egypt” which lost.

Wilson, *Patriotic Gore*, 330, quoting a letter of Lee written soon after the battle: “You will, however, learn before this reaches you that our success at Gettysburg was not so great as reported — in fact that we failed to drive the enemy from his position, and that our army withdrew to the Potomac.” Lee suffered a strategic defeat. So did Ramesses. See Keegan, *The American Civil War: A Military History*, 202; and Thomas Goss, “Gettysburg’s ‘Decisive Battle’,” *Military Review* 84.5 (2004): 15 — “Regardless of the battle’s scale, magnitude, and casualties, neither side achieved all it set out to do.” The same can be argued here. See Chapter 2 note 112.
Pianchy: the multi-tasked General
Our last evaluation is that of Pianchy, ruler of Kush from ca 744 to 714 BC. This is because he has left us a lengthy report on a granite victory monument — a granite stela — originally set up at Thebes, but now located in Gebel Barkal, as well as numerous reliefs covering his early campaigns. (Plate XI, page 203, provides an up-to-date photograph of the Great Stela.) Background information with respect to the Kushite military system as well as Pianchy’s attitudes supply the basis of this discussion, but the overwhelming evidence of his role in combat as well as his personality are found from the Great Stela’s narration of his campaign to the north in regnal year twenty. Still, it is necessary to turn first to the social and political underpinnings of the Kushite war machine in the middle of the eighth century BC. Fortunately, re-evaluations of the battle reliefs in the Great Temple of Gebel Barkal (B 500) enables us to survey the non-Egyptian system in practice at this time.

Pianchy’s military reliefs are located at the front of B 502, the hall constructed by him soon after his accession. The cultic reliefs in B 502 are located at the back, thereby indicating the design was conceived to be close to the sanctuary of the temple deity, Amun of Napata. This dichotomy between religious and secular is not surprising. The pictorial evidence is arranged in this manner, with the alphabetic nomenclature presently followed by myself:

1. Scenes D1 and D2: horse representations.
   Inner right side, front.
2. Scenes E1 and E2. major battle and possible triumph depictions,
   Inner left and right side of Pylon II.
3. Destroyed portions of the front area of the inner left side.
   Here, one can argue for symmetry with scenes D1-D3.

The Egyptian method of narrative, which I have only surveyed in Chapter 3, has been supplanted by a Kushite ideological interpretation of events. The scenes E1 and E2 presents a triumphal “return to home,” can be set in contrast to the Egyptians outlook. Within the representations no Egyptians may be found. If one reads from bottom to top promenading horses separate three detailed pictorial registers. Pianchy’s attention paid to the royal horses is part and parcel of the Kushite interpretation of these grandiose scenes of the triumphal march home, but even more, that of the warrior pharaoh. Pianchy, in contrast to New Kingdom kings, is not depicted
XI Front of the Great Stela of Pianchy (Photograph Courtesy of Claude Obsomer).
Leadership under fire

XII Political Situation in Middle Egypt at the Time of the Great Campaign of Pianchy (Nicolas Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pi(ankhy) au Musée du Caire, JE 48862 et 47086-47089, Cairo: Institut français d’Archéologie orientale; 1981, 222).
there as the King in Battle. He remains outside of his army’s success. Instead, there is a static procession that appears to reveal an official triumph. Differences between the chariotry and the infantry are not delineated here. Furthermore, Pianchy never subdivides the latter into archers and footsoldiers, not to mention runners and other specialists. E1, D1, and D2 emphasize his horses, as does his Great Stela. E1 stands as an embodiment of the Kushite mentality. But there is no historical development as we see in the New Kingdom snapshots of war. The difficulty for us is determining the timing of the event — whether it is to be separated from the accompanying picture to the left on wall E2.

From this visual evidence, perhaps not startling, is the overt presence of chariot warfare in which the age-old six spokes to a wheel are present. In addition, the battle armour, if we can call it that, is highly backward for the age. The helmets are clearly made of leather and there are no cuirasses or metal armor. One of the major scenes is recorded in E1. This is located at the inside right side of the original pylon that fronted Hall B 502. The horses appear taller than those of the New Kingdom but this may be too impressionistic an evaluation. The weapons cannot be analysed well from these reliefs. E2, facing E1 on the inner side of the pylon, is located to the left, and it is even more important for our reconstruction of the weapons and war material of the Kushite. The shields are round and thus totally different from Egyptian New Kingdom ones. (I exclude the round shields of the Sherden mercenaries from discussion). The bows and spears of the Kushites do not appear to be significant in any manner. Indeed, they reflect those of the New Kingdom if not earlier. Unfortunately, this encounter provides little in tactical detail and is not oriented tactically. Yet we can discern horseback riding with the equestrian rider located at the forepart of the back. This must indicate a development in the breeding of horses in the Nile since the New Kingdom. But the pictorial representation remains oriented to a one-on-one format, a system of visual presentation that parallels the triumphal one-on-one representations to the right such as in E1.

If we cannot provide a more explicitly-oriented resolution to Pianchy’s warfare within the pictorial framework of the Great Temple, we can at least determine successfully who the king’s opponents were. They were most definitely not Libyans, Egyptian, or Neo-Assyrians. Rather, as I have argued, the evidence points to locals whom we may label Nubians. The type of fighting as well as the war equipment certainly appears more limited, if not primitive, than what we would expect from a battling
New Kingdom pharaoh. But, as is notable in Pianchy’s Great Stela, a considerable amount of technical and other historically-oriented details are given therein. I can mention sieges and battling-rams, for example.\textsuperscript{10} Thus is it speculative to conclude that Pianchy’s temple scenes of Kushite warfare reflect fully his army’s war paraphernalia and fighting tactics — though this may be queried. The scenes are relegated or limited to the upper reaches of the Nile and thereby not truly representative of his subsequent warfare within Egypt.

We are obliged to turn our attention instead to the Great Stela because it is within this textual report of the pharaoh that his personality only can be described and his warrior ethos be seen. (Plate XII, page 204, provides the historical setting of Pianchy’s “great campaign” in Middle Egypt.) This is owing to our desire to set out the qualities of leadership that he exemplifies. One recent study of the king covers modern receptions of the stela and has strictly emphasized that the story gives special dramatic tastes to certain incidents, among which we can single out Pianchy’s involvement in logistics and sieges.\textsuperscript{11} Before proceeding with a chronologically-ordered analysis of that narrative, I shall discuss one aspect of warfare or combat, to be exact. This involves his regulations and rules of fighting which he expected in Egypt. They were drawn up and explicated by Gardiner many years ago but need re-evaluation at this juncture.\textsuperscript{12}

The king’s norms of battle cannot be placed solely within an anthropological interpretation of a “segmentary state model” as advocated by Katheryn Howley in a very useful discussion.\textsuperscript{13} To me they indicate an intense systematic code of honor pervading though the Kushite conception of combat. Specifically, these stipulations, ordered by Pianchy to his army, appear to reflect a system of military action that assumes a modicum of rules. I do feel that they may have been developed from an earlier reliance upon chariot warfare, now transformed in Western Asia but not in Egypt or Kush. But this is a pure speculation on my part. Yet these rules assume a waiting time. Pianchy’s troops, and I presume likewise the enemy’s, allow the enemy to assemble and to declare their hostile intentions. We are, it must be stressed, only at the very opening of combat. But his soldiers, nevertheless, are given the opportunity for watchful expectation before combat is to commence. Thus once more the modern concept of a “set piece” battle comes to mind wherein two opponents challenge each other from afar. Right at the start, each side can see the other, can assemble his necessary troops, and send a challenge to his foe. The address in which these regulations
are presented by Pianchy occurred when Namlot of Hermopolis had managed to escape the Kushite soldiers and to arrive safely from the north back to his capital of Hermopolis.

The expectations of battle, and my interpretations, are as follows.  

1. Take action during daylight.  
   Night is therefore prohibited.  
   This appears commonplace, but there emphasis is still given by the stipulation, Hence, night warfare must have occurred, even if infrequently. However, the king’s army is not to do so, and thus it might be argued that “partisans,” paramilitary soldiers, scouts or spies, do not come under this rubric.

2. Fight within visual distance.  
   This requirement also appears to be straightforward if not trivial, but the following one is connected to this stipulation. Both of them, in fact, could only occur when the two antagonists were within close proximity of each other.

3. Challenge the enemy.  
   With this third prerequisite the entire battlefield scenario emerges. It is not necessarily correct, indeed relevant I feel, that all of these rules of Pianchy overly indicate a “feudal” or “semi-feudal” society in which individual heroism is supreme. We are not viewing Homeric warriors and individual combat. On the other hand, the actual beginning of combat is specified.

4. Remain steady if the foe awaits infantry and chariots support from another city: t-nt-htrw, “chariots,” is used here.  
   This restriction is highly intriguing. The reference to a city is set within the historical scenario of Pianchy’s campaigns in Egypt where the warfare
took place within a divided polity including local potentates, pharaohs, some separately run nomes and metropoleis. Even more important is the withholding of any advance to combat. Here, Gardiner's remarks concerning the medieval outlook of Pianchy hold some water. One must await an enemy's decision to be also prepared, although I do not think it possible that more than a few hours was intended.

5. Fight when an opponent wishes to do so. This is connected with the previous requirement.

But I also must remark upon additional stipulations:

6. If the enemy has allies, await them as well. This is similar to the fourth in the preceding list.

7. With regard to the local leaders or Libyans — the distinction and the equality of treatment are significant — “challenge them to battle in advance” (to quote Gardiner). Therefore, the first phase of assembling is completed. Now comes the “challenge,” which I presume was made by a herald.

8. Demand that the enemies prepare their horses (for chariot warfare) and form a battle line. Outside of the refrain connected to horses, this stipulation further indicates the rigorous nature of combat preconditions. But it also supplies the useful comment that the engagement assumes some type of chariot advance, a rapid one, at the start. This is linked with number 4 above.

One final point needs to be stated. I assume that these combat provisos apply to monarchs such as Pianchy (acting as war commanders) as well as to his soldiers. Indeed, it is assumed in the narrative of the Kushite monarch that all should fight this way.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to visualize why Pianchy issued these instructions to his army. He did not do so earlier. This is the historical background to the warfare. (See Plate XIII, page 210, for the political situation in the Delta).

1. Tefnacht of Sais had already begun expanding in the West Delta. He took over Xois and other small localities therein and finally Memphis joined him. So did Meidum, Per-Sechemkheperre and others.

2. He received news of this advance from his “army commanders” (jmjr ṣḥ — I prefer “generals”) who were in Egypt.¹⁶

3. It is taken for granted that Pianchy already controlled Aswan, Thebes, and much of Middle Egypt but not Memphis or the Delta.¹⁷

4. According to Nicolas Grimal, when we first encounter Pianchy’s personal attitudes there is detachment.¹⁸ By this he, and so too I, feel that the pharaoh expresses himself clearly and with a degree of personality thrown in.

This is why the Great Stela is so informative for any reconstruction of the generalship of Pianchy. These orders, set within a series of preliminary military actions undertaken alone by Pianchy’s armies while the pharaoh was still in his homeland at Gebel Barkal/Napata, must be seen and understood in conjunction with the opening salvos, so to speak, of the arrival of Tefnacht as well as the serious hostility of Namlot. Because the Great Stela first describes the reasons for Pianchy’s campaign, the following events — and their repercussions in Kush — lay at the heart of the king’s later personal military involvement in Egypt. On a previous occasion I put some emphasis on Pianchy’s reactions to the growing hostility of the north.¹⁹ In that study I presented a literary-background wherein the concept of *homo ludens* was explored greater than I did previously. I then turned to Pianchy’s immediate reactions after he received news from far-away Egypt. His laughter I found unique and telling.²⁰ These opening responses were purposely added to the account in order to reveal some facets of his personality. Right from the start Pianchy appears somewhat aloof from the ominous events in Egypt, and he remains steadfast. When he learns of Tefnacht’s advances, all of which are conceived to be hostile, we wait for future events. After all, did he not have troops already in Egypt?

Leadership under fire

Royauté de l'Ouest

XXIe dynastie

XXIIe dynastie

Carte T1a - État politique duDelta
au début de la campagne
Indeed, if only for that reason one might surmise that the Kushite monarch’s “control” over Middle Egypt was recently achieved because he had left many of his soldiers there. On the other hand, it can be argued that the type of Kushite administration was highly dependent upon garrisons stationed in the Nile Valley, such as at Thebes since the time of his father Kashta. The Great Stela in line 5 refers both to his troops (mš) as well as his governors (hꜣtjw-ꜥ) and soon thereafter in line 8, there is mention of these two loyal elements of Pianchy in addition to three commanders, ṭsw.

The telling reaction of Pianchy is: “Then [his majesty] heard [that] with ‘pluck’ [Grimal’s word — crânerie], laughing and overjoyed.” His outstanding self-assuredness is most definitely indicated here. Consider how different is this response to a New Kingdom pharaoh’s reaction in a war account. In a nutshell, and from our present viewpoint, emotion is revealed. Pianchy provided no immediate assistance, either through additional troops and supplies or by tactics. From the narrative it was the report of Namlot’s decision to switch sides and to support Tefnacht I of Sais which determined the Kushite monarch to act strongly. Those military and administrative Kushite officials who were in Egypt complained that Pianchy had not done anything. But this, I suspect, is part of the dramatic aspect conditioned by the Kushite ruler and his author, and the attitude presented is akin to “wait and see.”

When his military and civilian officials in Middle Egypt appealed to their monarch for a second time, they opened with a reflection upon Tefnacht but then moved in greater detail upon Namlot of Hermopolis who was a staunch supporter of the Saite ruler (lines 7-8). This additional threat to Kushite dominance led Pianchy to order his military overseers to seize Namlot’s domain, Hermopolis. Often overlooked, these words of Pianchy also show some aspects of his military mind, but not as involved as the later detailed combat instructions:

Advance in a battle line! Fight it! Surround it!
Hem them in!
Seize its people, its cattle, and its ships
on the river!
Do not allow the cultivators go to the field(s)!
Do not let the plowers plow!
Hem in the Hermopolite Nome’s foreland!
Attack it every day!
Here, Pianchy’s determination is self-evident, but also are his tactical abilities. He first indicates combat, but no immediate seizure of the metropolis is envisaged. Just trap them in their capital, Pianchy indicates, but insure that they are starved. Finally, continually press on the periphery of Hermopolis. It is significant that Pianchy does not assume that Namlot’s city of refuge will immediately fall. What he wants is wisely arranged tactically owing to a policy of local military success that would be followed up by a new army which should reach Namlot’s domain and then force him to surrender. But it is telling that Pianchy’s tactical dispositions for his soldiers, who are directed to advance swiftly north and engage Namlot, are combined with strategic ones. This is why I have labelled him as a “multi-tasked general.” Can we not see him considering how to deal with serious military operations at the very point of decision? Having easy and fast access to the Nile, he is not lacking intelligence reports. Contrarily, he shows no haste. But if this conclusion be viewed as stretching the data too much, then we must still conclude that Pianchy was not a precipitate warrior lacking the ability to size up the geographic limitations of his enemy as well as the constraints of his enemy’s supports.

It can be argued that all good generals instruct their soldiers, great and small, especially before a battle. But it is Pianchy, and not either Thutmose III or Ramesses II, who deliberately adds such required military discipline. He most definitely wanted to include his rules and regulations in his narrative, and by this means he reveals his abilities in military leadership, all referring to combat before a battle has occurred and, perchance also significantly, when he is not present. The second series of stipulations opens with the admonition not to attack at night, but here in line 9 Pianchy appends the words “in the manner of a game” (m šḥr n ḫbꜥ), and I presume that an open air fully sunlit event is indicated. The statement does not prove that Pianchy regarded war or combat solely as a “game.”

The king then enjoins his army further, and we must remember that at this point in the narration he is still at home in his capital. We soon become aware that his troops (and later he) stay for some time in Thebes, following proper religious attitudes which he tends to uphold. Because he assumes that Namlot was trapped in Hermopolis owing to the first series of commands to his local army in Middle Egypt, he can then afford the time to prepare his troops efficiently. Note once more that his policy is conditioned by a careful appreciation of the enemy’s actions and locations. It is furthermore conditioned by timing as well as his trust that his soldiers
in Egypt, though not able to take Namlot’s metropolis immediately, can nonetheless bottle him up. Then the fresh troops can arrive and take care of his opponent.

It appears that Pianchy did not feel that it was necessary for him to travel in his armada (‘ḥꜣw) immediately north to Hermopolis, and even more, that Tefnacht was not the main enemy to defeat, at least at first. It this is nevertheless suggestive of a thoroughgoing and organized policy because the pharaoh gives full details to his fresh troops, those not already engaged in battle, whereas his rules to his local soldiers are more general. Considering the latter, we are dealing with an ultimate siege whereas for the former combat was immediately expected. Is this difference significant or merely a reflection of Pianchy’s personal wish to emphasize his regulations to the second Kushite army? Nevertheless, at this point we encounter some conundrums.

The second army departed from Thebes in ships and then encounters the enemy coming south on the Nile. The composite nature of the foes is not detailed as the Great Stela presents the antagonists as soldiers (mꜣ upro), not necessarily footsoldiers), sailors (ḥmnjw), and commanders (ḥswt). However, in Pianchy’s instruction to his army he only notes the land dispositions of the enemy troops. The type of warfare may be redolent of the military conflicts that raged in Egypt before the army was developed for overland warfare at the close of Dynasty XVII and onwards: move on the Nile but fight on land. Can one posit here that a riverine battle and its expected manifestations took place? This is moot, but as an aside, only once do Pianchy’s chariots receive mention.

Grimal has set out the naval sectors of Pianchy’s second army — the one which he sent to Egypt — and includes further specifications that indicate a rather diverse nature to his armada. His navy included the following ships: wjȝ — but not necessarily for war, mhnt, shrjt — surely standard and not purely war vessels, and as Grimal writes, “simple ḏꜣjw.” It appears to me that not only was Pianchy fleet “diverse,” but it also included marine craft that were not uniquely suitable for war. Here, at this first battle, only the soldiers of the enemy are specified, not their ships, nor Pianchy’s.

Where did this combat take place? Slightly later, and in line 17, we learn that the army reached the boundary (ḥnt) of Heracleopolis, and then “demanded battle” (sr ‘ḥȝ). Grimal and Dieter Kessler, among others, have seen the problems connected with the geography of the Nile. The first felt that the battle on water took place downstream
from Hermopolis, but observe nonetheless that a junction with the Bahr Yusuf — and so south of the Nome center of Hermopolis — was also possible. I felt that the latter was the best location, notwithstanding the vagueness of the text; Kessler stood aside in his conclusion. Both Heracelopolis’s southern border or the entrance to that city via the Bahr Yusuf fits and indicates that some military support was sent to Namlot. If the former, then we must assume that Kushite mastery of the Nile, at least up to the zone just south of the Delta, was easily re-affirmed, and his flotilla moved north of Hermopolis before returning to that city. Yet it was on land that the battle took place and Namlot was among the opponents. Therefore, since the Kushites moved on the Nile up to Heracleopolis, Namlot must have done so earlier.

There were two military encounters. Whether the first one at Heracleopolis was on land or on water is impossible to determine but I opt for combat on land. However, the foes were strong enough to cross over to the west side and await combat at dawn on the following day. This was the major battle and it included a large number of enemy potentates. All are said to have been united with and under Tefnacht of Sais. This was the crucial military encounter before Pianchy arrived in Egypt. A list of the key protagonists is given and there was to have been an list of the killed added. The number of men is, however, missing. But many survived, and the official roster of the foes should not be interpreted as indicating that these leaders were killed or captured. The ships of the enemy were captured but the final victor occurred one day later, and on land.

But it is now necessary to return to the Kushite monarch. The siege of Hermopolis then took place because Namlot sailed south and avoided the Egyptian flotilla’s control of the river at that point. This must indicate that the Kushite siege would not be very strong. At first, Pianchy’s soldiers were on the river and the bank of the Hare Nome. In fact, the stela emphasizes that Pianchy army soon had to surround the zone “on its four sides” (line 23), overly indicating that they had not completely invested the locality. (But, of course, the area was not small.)

This is when Pianchy acted in person. He was not content to allow the rebellions — to him — Namlot survived, even if he was caught at his capital. At this point the religious side of the narrative tends to move into center stage. The account first narrates Pianchy’s anger at his army’s failure and then indicates that he will go to Thebes, worship there, receive the blessing of Amun, and then proceed further north.
In the meantime three key cities in northern Middle Egypt are captured by his army: Oxyrhynchus, Tehneh (where Tefnacht’s son was — he later went north to Per-Sechemkhéperre, and a battering ram was employed), and Hut-benu. (Note the emphasis on the technical side of warfare.) They are conveniently placed in the story, not as an afterthought, but to indicate that despite their effective success Hermopolis was still not captured. Still the heart of Pianchy was not “appeased” or “satisfied.” (The verb used is ḥtp.)

We now encounter more of the religious nature of Pianchy, and this further helps us to explain why the Great Stela was set up at Thebes. Besides the important references to Amun in the narrative there are two sections that emphasize the southern Egyptian religious capital. The first occurs when Pianchy was about to send his second army north and the second involved his arrival there. On both occasions the connection of the Amun cult to the kingdom of Kush and its pharaoh are central and demanding. Whether or not we feel that he delayed things too much by stopping over at Thebes for some time — more than one month as he planned to celebrate calendrical New Year’s there, to remain to the end of the Opet festival in civil month two, and stay on to day two of the third month — is another matter. But it can be argued that his time was occupied with military preparations outside of religious ceremonies. I further point out that when Pianchy sailed upstream after the conclusion of his warfare, we see people clamouring for him as a “Ruler, beloved of Thebes” (line 159). Once more, Amun’s capital mattered most. But Pianchy’s leadership as a war commander must have definitely involved complicated and well-thought out arrangements for war while he was at Thebes. The pharaoh-general had more than enough time to gather additional intelligence reports from the north as well as to make ready his new army and navy for war. The “real” campaign was now to take place.

Now let me focus attention upon his generalship at Hermopolis. He built up an effective siege there with an embankment and a tower to be used for the archers. I am sure that earlier New Kingdom rulers of Egypt also employed sappers, specialists in fortification and sieges, and the like. Some of the data assembled in chapters 2 and 3 indicate this. But it is only with Pianchy that we read of these procedures. Thus further, albeit brief, details in the Great Stela reinforce my perception of the monarch as a multitasked general. His personality aspects which I have previously surveyed can be listed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event/Timing</th>
<th>Aspect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advance of Tefnacht</td>
<td>a. Self-centered superiority: quiet, caustic or cynical assured, “laughs”; receives report with <em>wr-jb</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. No immediate military response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namlot moves fast to control the northern portion of Middle Egypt, strongly supporting Tefnacht</td>
<td>a. Pianchy orders the army in Egypt to confront the enemy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. The response indicates a swift reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. There is an assumption that Namlot’s domain will be surrounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pianchy sends his second army to Egypt. Here, we can see that his planning is well-organized and thought out carefully</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle on the river</td>
<td>The account is detailed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is followed by the arrival near Heracleopolis</td>
<td>The pharaoh is furious that the enemy coalition still remains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two further acts of combat</td>
<td>Apparently, Pianchy expected a total victory and surrender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege of Hermopolis</td>
<td>Siege not ended. Pianchy then prepares for a major campaign which he will lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following this are the captures of Oxyrhynchus, Tehneh, and Hut-benu</td>
<td>Pianchy remains unappeased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a coda to this outline we cannot but stress that the Kushite ruler, when going to Hermopolis, further chastises his army. This was preceded by three convenient pharaonic reactions of displeasure. No matter what his second army performed — for example, by providing additional captured cities to their lord — he still is angry and enraged. In line 31, for example, after Pianchy arrives at Hermopolis, his rebuke employs the common phrase “raging against them like a panther,” one that is to be connected to a pharaoh’s reaction to an enemy, not to his soldiers.\textsuperscript{37} The king then arranged an effective siege which, one presumes, was not previously accomplished so well.

Our immediate perceptions of Pianchy thus include determination, single-mindedness, and sharp criticism of what he conceives to be failure. The Great Stela also provides much useful information with regard to geography, physical constraints, leadership, and so forth. But above all there are the expectations of the king. He may stand aside personally, expecting — so he assumes in the narrative — that his soldiers and the generals can win the day. From the very start one can interpret his immediate response to the news of Tefnacht’s successful manoeuvres to be restrained, or at least limited in scope. We do not know how long the Saite king gathered allies and expanded his West Delta principality. Owing to this lack of data I cannot be assured that Pianchy’s immediate response to the initial report of Tefnacht’s dramatic rise in importance and power occurred soon before warfare commenced. It would seem more probable that, owing to the laconic nature of Pianchy’s initial response to the threatening moves in the north, he originally expected that his local army or armies could deal with the matter. Hence, his rather oblique and distant reaction to the initial intelligence report.

Subsequently, however, we grow to recognize him as a fastidious architect of warfare. He gradually arranges military responses, carefully preparing in advance what should be done. To be sure, the ideological coloration of the account purposely sets the pharaoh as the final judge and decision-maker. Yet one cannot but observe that some important details are granted to his second army’s battle at Heracelopolis. To the author of the narrative, and thus to the ruler, it was crucial to include the list of the participants of the northern coalition.\textsuperscript{38} Although the lunette provides the names and title of the four enemy pharaohs in the north, Padiese the Hereditary Prince of Athribis (the “reconciler”), and other less but still significant opponents, this section of the text is the first place where we are given a detailed list
of the kings’ foes. Of course, that is the main reason why it is included, but the setting is even equally significant, if only because Pianchy was not leading his troops at that point.

But Pianchy often remains unsatisfied, as the account more than once indicates. This further reflects upon his character, as do the siege preparations at Hermopolis, accomplished under his personal command. The army was unsuccessful despite all. Only the individual presence and directorship of the king can accomplish total victory. Therefore, we may view his negative reactions to his soldiers’ activities as indicating a further personal attribute. Not merely that he and only he can win. But also that he becomes terribly disappointed to the point of rage — taking the text’s comments at face value for the moment — because his troops did not complete their tasks. By “complete,” I mean totally, or total victory.

I feel that we can link up the king’s expectations of success on the part of his armies with that of his logistic or “mechanical” approach to warfare. For example, immediately after he reaches Hermopolis, we are given a brief account of the siege undertaking, apparently suddenly being ordered by the Kushite ruler. This seems as if nothing of the sort occurred before, despite the fact that at Tehneh a battering-ram was used. Later on, at Memphis to be exact, Pianchy additionally reveals his interest in and utilization of these war machines. I maintain that this side of Pianchy’s nature is not merely a by-product of the need to invest cities such as Hermopolis and later Memphis, but his capabilities, ones that he preferred to emphasize. This may have been partly due to the fact that he did not fight on open fields all the time as pharaohs did in Asia during the New Kingdom. I.e., there were no set battle pieces during which his individual heroic bravery and command in combat could be emphasized. Nevertheless, my evaluation does not imply that other pharaohs, Thutmose III in particular, had not faced similar circumstances. But in the Great Stela, reliance upon sieges and war machines is most definitely indicated in the narrative.

Eventually Namlot, realizing his trapped situation, sent messengers to Pianchy, giving him various costly items, including his crown, the most important attribute of his kingship. Significantly the chief foe significantly sent his wife, Nestanetmehu, to meet the most important female members Pianchy’s royal family, and this must have been achieved with expressed permission of Pianchy:

Then his wife, the king’s wife, the king’s daughter,
Nestanetmehu was caused to come beseeching the king’s wives,
women of the harim, the king’s daughters and the king’s sisters.
On another occasion I turned to the kingship terminology in Dynasty XXV and the later Napatan Dynasty by Kumiko Saito in order to explicate this lengthy segment of the narrative. She showed that the terms $snt\ nsw$ and $sꜣt\ nsw$ refer to parallel cousins, and the Kushite royal succession was matrilineal. And if the queen possessed both kinship titles ($snt\ nsw$, $sꜣt\ nsw$), then she could be a parallel cousin of the reigning king and a daughter of the previous king, Kashta in this case. Above all, it was the matrilineal succession that determined the right to rule, and it is reasonable to expect Pianchy to be overly responsive to the female side of his family. As a rule the male heir to the throne passed from the mother’s uncle to his nephew. Yet how does this fit within the queen’s presence at Hermopolis? (Note that Nestanetmehu’s name is not enclosed in a cartouche. Is this also reflective of Kushite practice?)

I believe so. Pianchy and the key female members of the royal family acted in this way because they are Kushites and not Egyptians. Namlot thus arranged peace through the female sides as he knew by this way a formal reconciliation could be achieved. At Hermopolis, and therefore earlier, Pianchy was with his wives and some female relatives all together. (A parallel to this has been seen by Peter Brand with respect to Kadesh.) Their crucial role within the matriarchally-oriental society of Kush must have been known to the Egyptians. If the king’s wife was the first to whom the wife of a chief enemy would go to ask for peace, this indicates that female roles played an important role in the ensuing actions at Hermopolis. Namlot’s queen addressed the king’s wives, the women of the harim, the king’s daughters, and the king’s sisters. One is thus provided with a panoply of the crucial designations of the female side of the royal family of Kush. Nestanetmehu went to the “women’s house,” surely a tent outside of the besieged city, and supplicated on the ground to “the king’s wives, the king’s daughters, and the king’s sisters.” Namlot then beseeches Pianchy, but his entreaty is totally rhetorical.

In his military escort to Hermopolis Pianchy had his key royal women with him. Moreover, not only the women but also their servants and all sorts of their paraphernalia had to be transported on ship northwards from Napata. Pianchy’s court, or the innermost members of it, moved with him. I feel that this partly reflects Howley’s assertion that the Kushites operated within a social norm, royal to be sure, that was based on “segmentary state,” one that had various centers of power for and in the court, among which we have focused upon the royal wife
and other female relatives. Pianchy also records in line 81 that he had treasurers with him we can add the presence of a ritual priest among Pianchy’s entourage in line 140.

New Kingdom warrior pharaohs bivouacked in tents but never established such a developed “palace” in the field so far as I know unless Kadesh is a counter-example.44 In fact, the reliefs of that military encounter reveal what the camp of an Egyptian king was. In line 59 of the Great Stela we read of the king’s “palace” (ꜥḥ); a “camp” is mentioned earlier when Pianchy was in the field (line 31: jꜣmw), but subsequently as well at Athribis (line 106: jꜣmw). When Namlot sent his wife and other female royals to the king they went to the “house of women” (pr ḥmwt, line 34), a term which does not indicate a purely military encampment. It is additionally remarked later on that the four opposing kings or pharaohs, former opponents of the Kushite ruler, could not enter the “king’s house” (lines 150, 153: pr nsw) because they were ritually unclean. This section of the account also refers to Pianchy’s palace, ’ḥ, in lines 151-152.

The nature of my argument surrounds Pianchy’s peripatetic court. True, Egyptian rulers also had more than one palace. Yet they virtually never travelled outside of their country with a court. But the Kushites apparently did, and this was apparently expected of them. The “ambulatory nature” of their kingship, as analysed by Török, is perhaps relevant at this juncture between Namlot and Pianchy’s wives. He summarized his ideas as follows:45

The rites of the coronation journey presented a theological and “constitutional” formulation of a federation of original independent polities which centered around the individual stations of the journey and from the unification of which the kingdom of Alara and Kashta emerged in the first half of the 8th century BC.

His original evaluation of Kushite kingship, especially at a very early stage in the development, not to mention the expansion of that kingdom, ties in perfectly with the later evaluation of Howley. The Kushite ruler used many cities or metropoleis as bases for his rule even if Gebel Barkal/Napata was the original center, and we assume that there were multiple palaces with royal courts. We can now understand better now the unexpected presence of Pianchy’s “royal house” or “palace” within the narrative of the Great Stela. Pianchy transports verbally one crucial aspect.
of his kingship to the north — the royal house “on the move.” I feel that this is yet another example of the un-Egyptian nature of his kingship, one that dovetails nicely with the anthropological analysis of Howley.⁴⁶

There is a further side of Pianchy contained within the account of Namlot’s surrender that is equally expressive of his non-Egyptian-ness. I am not referring to his well-known attraction to horses — so well revealed by his reliefs at Gebel Barkal as well as his lunette at the top of the Great Stela (Plate XIV, page 222) — but instead to his reaction when visiting the palace of Namlot (lines 62-63). After inspecting the royal quarters, treasury, and magazines, he then required that the female members of Namlot be brought to him. He then says nothing, not turning at all his face to them. Was it taboo in the eyes of Pianchy to avoid any response to their effusive greetings? If so, why bother to have them be brought to him? Did he mean to indicate that their earlier and effective strategy in going to his own royal harim was a surprise, one that put unexpected demands upon him vis-à-vis Namlot’s desire for surrender? Or, instead, did he realize that their approach broke through his earlier, more stringent demands upon the Hermopolite ruler? I do not think that we can draw any firm conclusions with regard to his innermost feelings, yet the reaction is so unexpected, and non-Egyptian as well, that this attitude towards the high-ranking women of Namlot’s domain needs to be recorded.

The next series of riverine victories recounted in the Great Stela involved the relatively easy submission of Heracleopolis.⁴⁷ It reaffirmed its loyalty to Pianchy. “Closed up,” and therefore potentially offering to Pianchy siege conditions, Per-Sechemkheperre (with the son of Tefnacht being taken as well), Meidum, and Lisht surrender. Note the triadic formation, just as earlier there was the triple capture of Oxyrhynchus, Tehneh, and Hut-benu. All three of those northern cities fell without a fight to the Kushite monarch. Moreover, there is no bloodthirsty attitude of Pianchy reflected in the account. Subsequent to the fall of Hermopolis — and even there Pianchy apparently did not engage in combat with his foe — his attitudes appear to alter. In the Great Stela Pianchy appears to be conciliatory or, at least, does not express feelings so strong as those earlier relating to Namlot or even with respect to the apparent failures of his own armies This difference of approach to his enemies may be that he was soon to be at the political and religious center of Memphis. In addition, he was quickly approaching the zone of another power, that of Tefnacht, and perhaps he had to be more conciliatory in order to gain support
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XIV Top (Lunette) of the Great Stela of Pianchy

(Photographs Courtesy of Claude Obsomer).
from the northerners. In fact, it would not be too long for Pianchy to deal with the political make-up of the Delta. Did a political awareness for peace or compromise now begin to affect his military reactions?

But he had to take Memphis. That pivotal metropolis did not automatically open itself to Pianchy. His strategy must have become relatively simple after the fall of Hermopolis. What in fact was Pianchy’s goal after he moved up to Memphis? I suspect that he expected some type of battlefield confrontation with Tefnacht somewhere, but now he was about to move into a different geographic region, the West Delta, and politically he would have to face unified Libyan armies which hitherto he had not. Furthermore, he would have been even more north from his homeland and thus at a greater logistic disadvantage even if he had already insured that his control over Heracleopolis and the Egyptian cities north of it, surely by means of garrison troops. Otherwise, how could he insure their loyalty after he travelled even further north? And if he suffered any loss, how would they react?

Commanders must insure that every citadel, fortress, and militarized city is securely taken before advancing further. I am excluding those hostile and fortified metropoleis and strongholds that would be distant from the general’s line of attack or irrelevant to the tactical and strategic dispositions of his army. Pianchy’s advance northwards was tactically easy as it involved the use of his armada. His method of attack was likewise straightforward because it involved the surrender of major cities adjacent to the Nile. Sieges, as I have previously indicated, were to be expected if Pianchy met any resistance. But as with Namlot, he had little difficulty in isolating Hermopolis. The other small metropoleis were not so major a threat to his northern trajectory. One threat would be that a siege could lead to the exhaustion of his army, even if he eventually took the city. This factor, sometimes ignored by generals, was surely not lost on Pianchy. Witness his use of armies and the tactical military arrangements plus the war equipment brought along, not to mention his thorough planning of the Hermopolis siege.

Pianchy possessed a logically-minded character because he foresaw that Hermopolis was the midpoint of his opposition. He had to capture it just as Santa Anna had to capture the Alamo or, equally, the Libyan coalition attacking Egypt from the west during the reign of Ramesses III had to remove, or at least avoid the Egyptian fortresses on the periphery of the West Delta. Without the demilitarization of such fortified roadblocks no successful general can depend upon being caught by supply
problems and isolation if he bypassed a major garrison. This is especially crucial when moving up or downstream on any river. Pianchy definitely understood that. Even if his strongest opponent was Tefnacht of Sais, the latter did not rule south of Memphis on the Nile, but instead controlled that very northern Lower Egyptian zone indirectly, thereby running this Egyptian region as a satellite just as Pianchy probably did elsewhere in Egypt. Tefnacht, after all, depended upon Namlot who earlier had been loyal to Pianchy (lines 7-8 of the account).

From the royal narrative we may conceive that Pianchy’s wish originally may have been to take Memphis and then end the conflict. The Great Stela records the following development at the time when the pharaoh reached the city walls:

1. Pianchy urged the city to surrender. He had done this before with respect to Per-Sechemkheperre, Medium, and Lisht; and all three, almost immediately, opened their gates.
2. He had with him the necessary siege equipment which had been used more than once earlier, either by him or by his army. It is not difficult to conclude that Pianchy and his troops were well-prepared for siege undertakings.
3. When he arrived at Memphis Pianchy must have known that Tefnacht was not in the citadel. The enemy leader later arrived and entered it.
4. Memphis made some attempt to prevent the Kushites from setting up their war equipment. In lines 86-87 the account notes that Memphis had sent its host (mš) against Pianchy’s “host” which consisted of artisans (ḥmww), chief builders (jmjw-r qd), and sailors (sqdwn).
5. Palaeographically, it is significant that the determinative on the sign for the enemy “host” (or troops) is the common sign of the soldier with feather on head, bow in arm, and quiver. Pianchy’s soldiers are represented by the newer sign with the round shield.
There was to be a siege. Memphis was too close to Tefnacht’s core domain not to resist the Kushite monarch. Significantly, Tefnacht came to the capital at night and entered it with 8,000 soldiers of his own — soldiers, sailors, and elite troops are indicated. In his speech to his army he stressed the importance of the locality, the ample granaries that it had, all of which would allow Memphis to withstand any siege for some time before he returned with more soldiers. Stables are also referred to, but only oxen are mentioned. He further indicated that its battlements were strong and part of the Nile to the east effectively covered that side from direct attack. Very intriguing and most definitely reflective of Pianchy’s character, is the remarks that Tefnacht quickly left Memphis on a horse, as if he were a scout of the enemy, but not on his chariot (line 89). He did so in order to depart as rapidly as possible. Reinforcements were necessary and we may conclude that combat outside of the walls of Memphis was in his agenda.

With the description of the seizure of Memphis Pianchy’s character as a leader once more unfolds. Having prepared for sieges, he was not perturbed by the resistance. At this point the account expands to present a description of the fortified city, its new ramparts (ṣꜣw) and battlements, and military advances. It is reflective of both the composer of the Great Stela and the pharaoh himself that independent approaches to combat and attack are given, none of which is said by the king. The key plan was to lay siege to the city. This was, of course, an expected policy and one that Pianchy threatened earlier as well as successfully employed against Namlot. A second proposal was more specific: to erect a causeway; and a third involved siege towers. It is notable that Pianchy’s troops give these military recommendations for attack without the text specifically indicating that a war conference was ordered by the king. Surely such had occurred.

The portrayal of military choices is quite different from that revealed at Aruna during the Megiddo campaign of Thutmose III. No high military advisors are referred to. The stela states that “Then every man said his piece in the army of his majesty” (\(wn.jn.s\ n\ hr\ dd\ r=\ f.m\ mš\ n(w)\ hm=f: \) line 90), proposing the simplest solution, a blockade. “Others” maintained that it would be best to construct a ramp, a causeway, and provide the fighting men with towers. A rather architecturally-oriented specification of what this would imply is written down in the account (lines 91-92), thereby confirming what I felt earlier indicate one aspect of the king’s personality — namely, that he is highly specific logistically and tactically, and has an engineering side to his personality.
As to be expected from ancient Egyptian royal war narratives the king is “enraged” and posits a different approach to victory. Pianchy instead sent out his soldiers with his flotilla to seize the port of Memphis, a wise decision. We can therefore observe his visual perceptions of the fortified city and his optically-oriented logistic ability. Both the fleet “and his army” moved fast upon the weak sector of Memphis, the area which was not well fortified owing to its level, and I believe its partly-open connection to the Nile. The Great Stela thereby provides the reader with the success plan of Pianchy and its effective operations. But then we encounter a third list of royal orders, this time addressed to his army. He ranges his ships in a battle line — they are not specified — and many others found in the harbour. With them he then order the attack (lines 95-96):

“Forward against it! Mount the ramparts!
Enter the houses atop the river!
If one among you enters over the rampart,
no one will stand in his way,
[…] no troops (tswt) will repel you.
It is despicable, then, to pause,
we having sealed Upper Egypt,
moored at Lower Egypt, and yet
sit at “The Balance of the Two Lands.””

This final speech of Pianchy, his rallying-cry to his soldiers, reads as standard boilerplate verbiage. But this battle offensive must be viewed from its operational side. Both here, and slightly earlier at the harbour, Pianchy stipulates his commands on his army. Just as at the beginning we saw him sending his army north into Egypt with specific land-based rulers of battle, the he now provides detailed military instructions. Pianchy does not want a siege even if that method of success was proposed to him by his soldiers. He then sets in a row (sk) his ships for the assault and urges his army to proceed.

This capture reveals many useful sides of Pianchy’s generalship, and we can summarize them here. He is depicted as a logistically-oriented planner. He appears to have a keen visual appreciation of physical layouts. In this case it is the city of Memphis itself which is carefully and expertly viewed for capture. Most definitely, we are offered the personality of a carefully prepared assault and not one precipitously adapted, albeit if Pianchy’s stratagems had to have been made on the spot.
His procedure also involved a clear understanding of the harbour topography of Memphis where he must have realized that he could effectively use the local ships lying at rest in order to augment his own so that the army could move to houses. Above all there is the absence of a characteristic reflective of a single-minded hero, Pianchy is victorious, but not as a champion warrior. When it comes to discussing the means of attack in conjunction to the logistic side of the assault, Pianchy shows himself to be remarkable prescient. This side of his generalship differs from that of Thutmose III. Here we are presented means of capturing Memphis. Unlike the Eighteenth Dynasty pharaoh Thutmose III there is no Königsnovelle setting, no war council setting. In its place the proposals of the army are followed immediately upon Pianchy’s decision.

The Kushite monarch is never seen or reported at the head of his army as are Thutmose III or Ramesses II, or even other pharaohs of the New Kingdom, either pictorially or textually. Indeed, in the reliefs at Gebel Barkal he is not involved personally with his troops. The same may be said with regard to the narrative in the Great Stela. Unlike any New Kingdom warrior pharaoh is any account of Pianchy’s physical leadership in battle. He appears to stand aside, both at Gebel Barkal in his pictorial representations of early warfare and here in the Great Stela as well.

The recent study of Martin Fitzenreiter is redolent of these impressions. He pointed out the numerous lengthy “personally-driven aspects of the Great Stela when discussing the various episodes, or “chapters,” as he labels them. The entire narrative is colored by various small stories, among which we have already signalled Pianchy’s instructions to his army, his religious admonitions to his army before it departed for Thebes, the expected religious observations that Pianchy will perform in Thebes, the arrival of Namlot’s queen at the tent of the king’s harim, the commentary of Pianchy with regard to Namlot’s starved horses as well as his peculiar reaction to the royal women in Hermopolis. I can also add the issue of impurity which turns up later on in the story (lines 150-152). The latter event occurred when the opposing pharaohs of the north were not permitted to enter the “palace” of Pianchy owing to their impurity. (Namlot, to the contrary, was.) All of these are non-military in nature, and by and large I have not dwelt on them. Yet we can add Pianchy’s role outside of Memphis, an account which I have just discussed.

Thus the narrative differs greatly from the key battle accounts of Thutmose at Megiddo and Ramesses at Kadesh. I do not necessarily follow Fitzenreiter in the latter’s assertion that some epic-mythic elements...
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may be read deeper into the narrative.\textsuperscript{56} Yet his acute observation of the strands of literary presentation needs to be stressed at this juncture.\textsuperscript{57} But none of them — and I have mentioned the major ones only — are connected with actual combat. At best, the Memphis subsection deals with the king’s preparations for assault, and the emphasis is most definitely on avoiding long siege, which I am sure Tefnacht desired.\textsuperscript{58} But the Great Stela also provides military engineering asides which seem to reflect Pianchy’s interest and abilities. If the narrative, which is rather simplistic in structure,\textsuperscript{59} never moves abruptly, it never describes a battle.

Unlike even short accounts of New Kingdom warfare, Pianchy’s Great Stela consciously avoids showing the King in Battle. We cannot compare his figure to those warrior pharaohs of the New Kingdom. Nowhere does the author relate Pianchy leading his troops. With regard to the Memphis assault it might be argued, quite successfully in my opinion, that he was not at the front of his army. There is no stress upon chariots or charioteers. Horses may be loved, but no horse in the Great Stela is named as two were in the Kadesh Poem. In nutshell, Pianchy is not a Late Bronze Age general. For just as his war reliefs in Hall B 502 of Amon’s temple at Gebel Barkal eschew personal involvement in combat, carnage, and the like, so too does his monumental granite stela avoid focussing on the king’s personal bravery.

At Hermopolis Pianchy’s role as an active warrior is close to being non-existent. He arrived when the siege, already undertaken by his forces which were in Egypt and had also fought a series of battles. The king then besieged the metropolis, and one expects that some time had passed before the effects became severe to the inhabitants. (See lines 32-33). But the king does not mount in person the well-made battlements and towers to demonstrate, if not for his soldiers then for us, how brave, heroic, and mighty he was. The surrenders of Per-Sechemkheppere, Meidum, and Lisht follow on almost automatically from the capture of Hermopolis and the flow-on effect of the surrender of Heracleopolis without little martial description. And when Pianchy reached Memphis the same narrative approach is presented. As at those previous three cities, Pianchy orders Memphis to surrender. That is all. A battle ensued when the Kushite troops attempted to gain entry to the city by means of the harbour and, of course, war machines are mentioned. But the direct assault on this key city is described in detail only in the preparatory stage. We encounter him arranging the attack and commanding his army, but only at the very beginning of the advance.
Pianchy is not the focal point in any battle owing to the lack of any description of combat. Likewise, the army’s advances and onslaughts are not painted even cursorily. For us the clash of arms does not ring. But this approach is partly similar to that of Thutmose III’s at Megiddo. In the “Annals” the chariot-based combat with the Asiatic coalition just outside of the walls of Megiddo is also absent. Should we therefore compare rather than contrast both military commanders? I believe not. For Thutmose, as we have seen in Chapter 2, the aim of the writer, and hence the ruler, was to describe the king’s advance along the roads to Megiddo. By doing so, the author was purposely allowing us to travel with him to the conference at Yehem at which the crucial war conference occurred. Then comes the march through the Aruna Pass march. This “routier-oriented” Leitmotif still continues in the king’s account, for do we not traverse the pass with Thutmose and his army, stop outside and wait for the rear of his army to debouch, and reach the playing-field outside of Megiddo. I definitely feel, as I have earlier written, that this primary aspect of the “Annals” indicates a logistically-oriented mind of Thutmose, notwithstanding his ability as a warrior.

Ramesses in not at all interested in telling us a step-by-step geographically-fixated account. Owing to the Hittite surprise he expends his energies upon his heroic defence, which soon became an offense. Thus we see Ramesses in battle, and more than once. He invigorates his troops far more dramatically than Pianchy, although one might feel that he had better reason to do so — namely, the dire situation at the camp. But Ramesses also speaks to his father-god Amun as well as to Menna in addition to reviving his soldiers. Pianchy does none of this. In the narration he never provides the reader with an invocation to Amun before battle even if his religious faith is very strong and demanding. If Ramesses II at Kadesh is viewed as anomaly, let us turn to the numerous pictorial images of that pharaoh in war. He is steadfast in the center of battle, charging frequently in his chariot, shooting his arrows in the cab, just as other warrior kings of the New Kingdom did when they required grandiose images of themselves to be carved: e.g., Ahmose, Thutmose II, Amunhotep II, Thutmose IV (chariot depictions), Seti I, Ramesses II, Merenptah, and Ramesses III, to name the well-known cases. Irrespective of the unique aspects which took place at Kadesh, Ramesses II did not break away from the ideal image of the combat warrior and leader of Egypt.

But Pianchy in the Great Stela has to be understand differently from these other accepted roles of combat leadership. First, he was not Egyptian but Kushite, As such, his background, culture, and upbringing
were far different than that practised in the Kingdom of Egypt. To be
honest, we know little at all of any royal figure’s childhood, either from
Egypt or from Kush. If the origin of the Kushite state in the time predat-
ing Kashta and Alara is too murky for us to hypothesize, we can neverth-
less remark upon the military expansion of Kush commencing somewhat
earlier but remaining centered at Gebel Barkal. In other words, rulers of
Kush were at war, and Pianchy was no exception.

His lengthy narrative then turns away from warfare owing to the
king’s decision to stop. After he captured Memphis and received the sub-
mission of Osorkon IV of Bubastis, he visited Heliopolis, Pianchy then
moved to the harbour at Athribis. There, he received the official surrender
of his enemies and went into conference with the Hereditary Prince of
Athribis, Padiese. The final arrangements of peace were drawn up and
approved. Soon thereafter there was a disturbance at Mosdai (lines 122-
126), but this seems to have been easily crushed. Pianchy did not go there
in person. This quite possibly was Tefnacht’s last means of resistance, even
though one could argue that it was a pièce d’honneur which was a necessary
prelude to the acquiescence of Tefnacht. At this point it become readily
clear to the reader that Pianchy never conquered the Saite king. Tefnacht’s
Domain of the West remained essentially unaffected by Pianchy’s suc-
cess. Lichtheim, for example, writes that “When Tefnacht heard that the
resistance of Mesed [= Mosdai, north of Athribis] had been crushed he
surrendered but without appearing in person.” In other words, Kush
never conquered all of Egypt. A major portion of the northland remained
independent even if its ruler yielded, at least in spirit, to Pianchy.

Pianchy’s narrative portrays its protagonist as a mechanistically-
oriented and conciliatory general. Gore and slaughter do not permeate the
story. No massive destruction of enemy cities or any supplantation of rul-
ers belonged to the king’s policy. Leaving off the question whether Pianchy
could have establish a firm regime in the north, his role is made to appear
fair and just without destruction. One hears nothing associated with revenge.
The war was decidedly no “crusade” as some scholars believe. Pianchy did
not go to Egypt to re-affirm the worship of Amun. In similar fashion, even
though he extracts booty and tribute from his conquered cities, the Kushite
ruler remains cognizant of his own limitations. But whether he was highly
diplomatic, or instead, as I prefer to argue, was a man who could perceive
logistic and personal constraints, must remain unclear. At the very end he
sends his chief lector priest Padiamon(nesutawty and the general (jmjr-mš)
Pawarem to Tefnacht (lines 140 and following). Both the religious
nature of the required oath as well as the military side of the campaign are thereby stipulated. It is additionally noteworthy that Pianchy did not go to Tefnacht just as the latter did travel to Athribis earlier, or after the suppression of Mosdai. We must conclude that some type of *modus vivendi* between the two rulers was established. Does this not fit well with our appreciation of Pianchy’s careful approach to logistics and his diplomatic, or at least restrained, actions with regard to his defeated enemies?

How we view Pianchy as a general depends upon his record in the Great Stela. Even if we can reflect upon his war reliefs in the temple of Amun at Gebel Barkal, it is noteworthy that his approach to warfare and his leadership in battle appears very different than the preceding two rulers of Egypt. True, this is what he wished us to know, but then the same can be said about Thutmose III and Ramesses II. The literary aspect of the narration in Pianchy’s stela is very different from the war records of those two preceding kings. (See Chapter 5 for more detailed remarks.) I find Pianchy akin to Thutmose but one who prefers to enunciate his technical characteristics and abilities which the Dynasty Eighteen pharaoh does not reveal. From his story of warfare one encounters a series of separately-drawn logistically-related advances of different armies as well as the king’s own actions. We are thus not set within a New Kingdom, or even a Ramesside pictorial account wherein the pharaoh alone is everywhere. Pianchy wants us to see the entire political, geographical, and military layout of his great war of regnal year twenty. He never ceases the flow of the chronological vector to provide background sidelights save when describing some of his soldiers’ military engagements and, of course, his personal attitudes towards rulers, horses, fealty, impurity, religious observations, and the like. These are, what Fitzenreiter called “chapters,” highlighted historical incidents that tell us quite a lot about the ruler’s personality. Yet, as I have accentuated a great deal, they are not concerned with actual combat. We are unable to form a picture of the Kushite army in battle. His means of command can only be drawn from his logistical considerations and his stress on sieges. His personality appears fair, but he is no King in Battle. From the stela his generalship is reflected though his careful planning, apparent possession of gravitas (though I do note his quasi-cynical attitude at the commencement of the stela), and apparent slowness to move north, although I feel that he stayed in Thebes longer than one would expect in order to prepare his army. How unfortunate for us it is that no panorama of combat is given. At best, we must rely on his blueprints of action, almost as if we were examining a map of Egypt in order to discern his calculated offensives.
Frédéric Payraudeau, “Retour sur la succession Shabaqo-Shabataqo,” Nehet 1 (2014): 115-127. For a scintillating analysis of his reign, I can best refer to Lásló Török’s The Image of the Ordered World in Ancient Nubian Art. The Construction of the Kushite Mind (Leiden and Boston: Brill; 2002), 65-69 and 369-398. He has written extensively on Pianchy and this time period, but I have found this work to be his most superlative analysis on our theme. But the political set-up in Egypt is now best read in Payraudeau, Administration, société et pouvoir à Thèbe sous la XXIIe dynastie égyptienne (Cairo: Institut français d’Archéologie orientale; 2014).

For the now standard hieroglyphic edition of the stela Cairo JdE 48862 + 47086-47089), see Karl Jansen-Winkeln, Inschriften der Spägzeit. Teil II: Die 22.-24. Dynastie (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz; 2007), 337-350; and Nicolas Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pi(ankh)yu au Musée du Caire. Je 48862 et 47086-47089 (Cairo: Institut français d’Archéologie orientale; 1981) — this is a massive and important piece of scholarship.

Two very good translations are those of Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature III (Berkeley, Los Angeles, And London: University of California Press; 1980), 66-84; and Robert Ritner, The Libyan Anarchy. Inscriptions from Egypt’s Third Intermediate Period (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature; 2009), 466-492.

The Great Stela, as I shall call it, was set up first in Thebes:


I have recently covered a lot of the military attitudes of the king in “Pianchy/Piye between Two Worlds,” in: Karlshausen and Obsomer (eds.), De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte ancienne/War in Ancient Egypt, 235-274, The Persistence of Memory in Kush: Pianchy and His Temple (Prague: Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague; 2019), “Pianchy’s Great Temple and His Early War,” in: Julia Budka

5 Locations for these reliefs in Hall B 502 are: E1 — inside right side, rear of original pylon, D1 — inside right wall just next to the lateral entrance, one lost segment, and then and D2 — inside right wall at the corner of the right wall and the original pylon.

6 In particular, see Spalinger, “Notes on the Military in Egypt During the XXVth Dynasty.”

7 It is a vague possibility that the Kushite shields derived from the use of similar ones carried by the non-Egyptian Sherden (belonging to the so-called Sea Peoples) mercenaries of Dynasties XIX-XX and onwards. There needs to be a detailed study on this matter.


9 Spalinger, The PERSISTENCE of Memory in Kush: Pianchy and His Temple, Chapters 1 and 2.

and its Manifestation in the Ancient Near East. See further the additional scholarship cited in note 88 Chapter 1 and note 154 Chapter 2.


15 Gardiner, “Piankhy’s Instruction to His Army.”

16 Redford calls them “garrison commanders” in his From Slave to Pharaoh. The Black Experience of Ancient Egypt (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins; 2004), 75, and argues in Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1992), 344, that Thebes, as well, had a Kushite garrison.

17 For a recent study of the political situation in Egypt at this time, see Raphaële Meffre, “Political Changes in Thebes during the Late Libyan Period and the Relationship between Local Rulers and Thebes,” in: Meike Becker, Anke Ilona Blöbaum and Angelika Lohwasser, (eds.), “Prayer and Power.” Proceedings of the Conference on the God’s Wives of Amun in Egypt during the First Millennium BC (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag; 2016), 47-60. On page 48 she writes: “The text of Piankhy’s stele gives great importance to the two last-named kings. Indeed, since their cities, Hermopolis and Heracleopolis, were two fortified areas, they represented barriers between Thebes and Memphis for Piankh. This is particularly clear when the reactions of Piankhy to the progress of Tefnakht’s army are considered. When it passed south of Heracleopolis, Piankhy was informed but not very worried and he only took action when Nimlot D submitted to Tefnakht.”
Add her D’Héracléopolis à Hermopolis. La Moyenne Égypte durant la Troisième Période intermédiaire (XXIe –XXIVe dynasties), (Paris: PUPS Paris-Sorbonne; 2015), 336-339.


19 Spalinger, “Pianchy/Piye. Between Two Worlds,” in: Karlshausen and Obsomer (eds.), De la Nubie à Qadech/From Nubia to Kadesh. La guerre dans l’Égypte ancienne/War in Ancient Egypt.


22 We may assume that a ṭsw was a regional or local commander of the Kushite army. Quite possible “division commander” was meant. Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pi(‘ankhy) au Musée du Caire. JE 48862 et 47086-47089, 237, discusses the difference between ṭsw and ṭš. He considers the ṭsw to be a captain.


In the light of administration and political control, Török, The Periods of Kushite History from the Tenth Century BC to the AD Fourth Century (Budapest: Ízisz Foundation; 2015), 27-31 and Redford 45-50 (post Dynasty XXV), provides a brief summary. Pianchy first wrote to his commanders in Egypt and argues in Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times, 344, that Thebes, as well, had a Kushite garrison.

Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pî(ankhy) au Musée du Caire. JE 48862 et 47086-47089, 22 note 56, 32 note 66, and 263-264. The “it”, s, refers to Hermopolis.

The word used is hnt. Is “southern boundary” meant?

Gardiner, “Piankhî’s Instruction to His Army.” 221 note c is still useful.

Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pî(ankhy) au Musée du Caire. JE 48862 et 47086-47089, 34 note 78 and 237-239.

Hence, Pianchy’s army followed their instructions to a tee.

Meffre’s two important studies that directly relate to this matter are referred to in note 17 above. In addition, see Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pî(ankhy) au Musée du Caire. JE 48862 et 47086-47089, 220 and 223; Dieter Kessler, “Zu den Feldzügen des Tefnachte, Namlot und Pije in Mittelägypten,” Sāk 9 (1981): 227-250; and Spalinger, “The Military Background of the Campaign of Piye (Piankhy).”

There is the problem with the key word jtrw; see Kessler, “Zu den Feldzügen des Tefnachte, Namlot und Pije in Mittelägypten,” 245 and note 97.

Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pî(ankhy) au Musée du Caire. JE 48862 et 47086-47089, 40. The number was never added to the hieroglyphic account, and that should mean that it neither was contained in the hieratic Vorlage. I presume that one waited for the data but it was never given or else forgotten.


See Grimal, *La stèle triomphale de Pi(ankhy) au Musée du Caire. JE 48862 et 47086-47089*, 209-219, an excellent summary, but now to be revised somewhat with respect to the dynasty designations.


Although the subject of royal sisters, mothers, and king’s wives during the Kushite-Napatan Period is immense, one important study us crucial to cite: Lohwasser, *Die königlichen Frauen im antiken Reich von Kusch: 25 Dynastie bis zur Zeit des Našasen* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz; 2001).

By re-analyzing the captions and correcting some of the copies, Brand has shown that members of the royal family outside of the king’s sons were present in the pharaoh’s camp at Kadesh. One awaits his study “Ramesses II: Egypt’s Ultimate Pharaoh.” This case thus parallels Pianchy’s.

Indeed, it would take time to carry much of their items from the ships.


*Urk. IV* 652.13 (*rs mnh m j mw*) as well as 655.15, 1303.13 (*htp m j mw*). See Hoffmeier, “Tents in Egypt and the Ancient Near East.”

Török, *The Image of the Ordered World in Ancient Nubian Art*, 17. His basic study is “Ambulatory Kingship and Settlement


But not by investiture or combat. After the surrender of Hermopolis the ruler of Heracleopolis went to Hermopolis with his peace offerings.

It is fair to conclude that Hermopolis, Heracleopolis et al., were manned and run by Egyptians alone.

At this point I translate mš’ as “host” rather than “army” or “troops.”

See Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pi(‘ankhy) au Musée du Caire. JE 48862 et 47086-47089, 111 notes 309-311 and 237-238.

Grimal, ibid., 111 note 309; but especially see Spalinger, “Notes on the Military in Egypt During the XXVth Dynasty.”

Namely: mš’, hnw, and tpy nb m mš’ =f. Note that the determinative for mš” is written the new way.

Darnell, “Two Sieges in Aethiopic Stelae,” in: Mendel and Claudi (eds.), Ägypten in Afro-orientalischen Kontext. Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pi(‘ankhy) au Musée du Caire. JE 48862 et 47086-47089, 228-229 (with an important remark in note 694 concerning the absence of details concerning the internal make-up of the Kushite army) and 233-237, equally provides detailed commentary on this logistic situation.

Fitzenreiter, “Piye’s Conquest of Egypt (about 727 B.C.E.) and the Making of a Great Event (about 727 B.C.E. and Beyond).”

Eyre, “Is Historical Literature ‘Political’ or ‘Literary’?,” in: Loprieno (ed.), Ancient Egyptian Literature. History and Forms, 422, who considers the “contamination” of fish-eaters to be an insult as well as a “direcť political statement.” Add Martin Fitzenreiter,

56 Fitzenreiter, “Piye’s Conquest of Egypt (about 727 B.C.E.) and the Making of a Great Event (about 727 B.C.E. and Beyond)”, 111.

57 For the language, see Ritner, *The Libyan Anarchy. Inscriptions from Egypt’s Third Intermediate Period*, 491-492 note 18; Logan and Westenholz, “*Sḏm.f* and *sdm.n.f* Forms in the Pey (Piankhy) Inscription,”; Spalinger, “The Negatives $\text{pch}$ and $\text{pt}$ in the Piye (Piankhy) Stela”; and Cara Sargent, *The Napatan Royal Inscriptions: Egyptian in Nubia* (New Haven: Yale University PhD Thesis; 2004), *passim*. The last study is very important and should be used at all times. See Chapter 5.

58 He may be depicted cowardly in the stela. His actions, however, were very wise. Tefnacht manages to get into Memphis despite Pianchy (!), stays there for a short period of time in order to rally opposition, and then leave quickly in order to secure further support against Pianchy. As adumbrated in the text I assume that he eventually wished combat in the field with the Kushite monarch owing to an expected prolonged siege.

59 I suspect that a major undertaking concerned with the literary aspects of the Great Stela — one more detailed that that of Grimal, *La stèle triomphale de Pi(‘ankhy) au Musée du Caire. Je 48862 et 47086-47089*, 284-294, would not find too much new.

60 I have done this, partly, as a summary, in Chapter 10 of my *The Persistence of Memory in Kush: Pianchy and His Temple* (“Uniqueness Versus Tradition and Innovation in Pianchy’s Great Temple”) in which this situation is described both archaeologically and textually. There is a now good and very recent review of this issue in Török, *The Periods of Kushite History from the Tenth Century BC to the AD Fourth Century*, 21-31.

61 *Inter alia*, see Aidan Dodson, “The Coming of the Kushites and the Identity of Osorkon IV,” in: Elena Pischikova, Julia Budka, and Kenneth Griffin (eds.), *Thebes in the Firṣḥ*
Millennium BC (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing; 2014), 3-12.

62 Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature III, 84 note 99; see Grimal, La šîle triomphale de Pi(‘ankhy) au Musée du Caire. JE 48862 et 47086-47089, 228-229.

63 This is too dramatic a term. See nonetheless Grimal, ibid., 254, with some justification.

64 Ibid., 241-242.

65 NB: Ritner, The Libyan Anarchy. Inscriptions from Egypt’s Third Intermediate Period, 491 note 5: “The names of Piye’s commanders, Lamersekny and Pawerem, are often considered Libyan, but the latter is a late spelling of the purely Egyptian name and title.” By “commanders” he means the men who were a jmj-r mš or a “general.” We can thus observe that Pianchy’s armies had “generals” as well as “commanders,” tsw.

Historical observations on three military personalities
We are now ready to summarize, but also to explicate further, the variegated aspects of the military personalities of our three prime examples of generalship. Keep in mind that I am not establishing a paradigm for any additional Egyptian or Kushite pharaoh other than the three covered previously. I chose them because each has left one extant war record that is lengthy, detailed, and replete with side aspects of military leadership. Hence, it is possible to speak of their natures in order to discuss their warfare. Each of the three reveal separate individual characteristics that indicate different facets of temperament and charisma. We are able to view Thutmose chastising his army for a lack of a decisive and conclusive battle, and Ramesses II doing the same, but with so much fervour and emotion that we fully well appreciate the deception that was played upon him. Pianchy may laugh and act henceforth with no small degree of sang froid, but he is quick to let us know how angry he was over the failure to defeat Namlot by his army that was stationed in Egypt. All show what they feel at some point in their accounts, but any military failure on their part has to be carefully evaluated by the modern scholar. Each one of the main inscriptions of these kings has its own dramatic zenith. With Thutmose it is at Yehem, the site of his war conference. Ramesses II’s crisis point when he learned of the Hittite chariot offensive in his bivouac. And Pianchy’s surely was his confrontation with the ruler of Hermopolis, Namlot, and outside of that city. Not, I hasten to add, his later success at Memphis.

In all three occasions it is in the middle of the narrative when these key events unfold. Further events will nonetheless transpire until the end of the story is reached. This method of literary presentation is rather elemental, but that does not mean that the accounts suffer for it. Quite to the contrary, to a striking degree we encounter the king’s personal nature at these specific junctures. This, is I feel, what the authors of wanted us to realize and to witness. Individually, each general-pharaoh had himself drawn and recorded in a certain manner that cannot but impress the outsider, ancient or modern. I fully realize that my analyses depend upon the key inscriptions that each ruler has provided for us. After all, what else are we able to consult in order to draw up a reasonable and multi-faceted study of their military qualities? (The other source material is very limited in order to even adumbrate their spirit in war.) So that I am not misunderstood, I do not necessarily adhere to the frequently employed premise of “the idolatry of the document,” so well criticized by the great Spanish historian Rafael Altamira y Crevea.
As an Egyptologist I tend to be content with what we possess, but I am always keenly interested in newly discovered data that can further assist me in my quest on ancient Egyptian society.

**A. Thutmose III**

It was James Henry Breasted who was to first to respond strictly concerning “the injustice of the criticism that the Egyptians were incapable of giving a clear and succinct account of a military campaign.”² In his careful and very lengthy introduction to Thutmose III’s “Annals” he provided the basis for future research concerned with the ephemerides of the Egyptian military scribes.³ The situation for us is to interweave this interpretation — one followed henceforth in Egyptology — with the pharaoh’s aspect of leadership. First and foremost it ought to be remarked that there are some pointed directions provided by the author or authors to the reader. On one occasion, an addition to the basic narrative of the Megiddo campaign is given by means of a reference to subsequent military, political, and economic manoeuvres: “Total of what was taken later [by the king] from the estate property of that vile one which [was in Ye]no’am, in Nuḫaše’e, and in Harenkaru.”⁴ In addition, when the army obeyed its commander’s order by commencing to set up the siege we are informed that “Now all that his majesty did to this town and to the wretched foe and his wretched army was recorded on its day by the name of the sortie and by the name of the troop-commander.”⁵ Clearly, additional facts with regard to Thutmose’s campaign could be found elsewhere: “They are recorded on a roll of leather in the temple of Amun to this day.” The hieroglyphic account as recorded in the inner area of Karnak is called a nḫtw-text at the start (column 3), but much has been attached to a bare-bones narrative of the king’s campaign against Megiddo.⁶ The account, as Breasted and others have surmised, is a boon for historian owing to its employ of the war diary, and can be — indeed has been more than once — contrasted to the lengthy royal Ramesside accounts of wars such as Ramesses II at Kadesh or Ramesses III in Medinet Habu.⁷ But the use of the ephemerides as a narrative scaffold ought to alert the reader to a style and approach that is not “serious literature,” or perhaps support the claim that Dynasty XVIII royal war accounts were less literary and very different than Ramesside ones.⁸ Neither assertion appears to be valid. The refreshing study of Colleen Manassa may be brought into court as counter-evidence, but then
there is the extremely important analysis of Stauder with regard to mid Dynasty XVIII royal inscriptions (temp. Hatshepsut and Thutmose III). Most definitely, rather long historical hieroglyphic accounts containing little, if any, daybook orientations, were assembled by him to show a certain style of royal narrative presentation that can be analyzed from vocabulary as well as through linguistic patterning.

Stauder addressed the literary creativity of Dynasty Eighteen and, in the words of Christopher Eyre, identified “the back hole of the 13th and the 18th Dynasty” as a source of literary creativity, an approach which he called “an hypothesis.” With regard to our lengthy military texts of that era, Stauder pointed out the “innovative expressions” may be found in the “Annals” as well as others dated to Thutmose III and his son Amunhotep II. He further observed that “the immediate context in “Annals” is more generally replete with innovative expressions of various sorts,” stressing that these newer aspects of language were embedded in a military narrative, where the presence of new subject pronouns can be overtly seen.

I find his commentary on the cluster of these innovations in a narrative hieroglyphic inscription worthwhile to quote and discuss here. To quote him: “Innovative expressions are mainly in Thutmose’s Annals and Amenhotep’s Syrian Campaigns. In “Annals” they cluster in the military council before the Megiddo battle.” No doubt this is not unexpected, being that direct speech is involved, but whether or not one may argue for differing registers at this point is another matter. The main issue concerns the importance of the council of war. At this point the dramatic intensity of the story nears its apex. To Thutmose his enunciated policy, one not proposed by any of his troops, was the most important proceeding in the entire campaign. At Yehem he dramatically ordered, and not merely proposed, a third path, one that succeed. He allowed, I suspect purely for oratorical effect, the soldiers to choose whether they would follow him or not. (I am not interested in whether his words were ever spoken this way, irrespective of the shame implication.)

The Yehem conference is soon followed by the advance through the Aruna Pass. Here, too, there is a heightened feeling of suspense and danger. One immediately becomes aware of the pharaoh’s vital decision, one that no one up to now — presumably us, the readers — was aware of. Or, if it was part and parcel of the cultural background of mid Dynasty Eighteen Egypt that this event was known, indeed the well-known hallmark of Thutmose in war, the profound and hazardous undertaking still remains the climax of the plot. I would join both of these events
in the written Megiddo drama and propose a parallel in the assassination of Caesar combined with the funerary speech of Mark Antony in Shakespeare’s play. Both there, and in the “Annals,” the climax of the narrative is achieved before the end of the tale. (In fact, close to the middle.) Hence, one ought not to be disappointed by the later non-emotional or non-theatrical descriptions concerned with the king’s arrival at Megiddo, the battle plans before combat on day twenty, or even more by the short narration of the battle itself. All of these lack the personal excitement earlier when the key decision-making point was reached. In fact, of those three, the last is as short as the former two are undramatic. The brief remarks in the account during the night preceding battle provide a setting that is a common topos in military fiction, and Thutmose most definitely insured that his kingly encouragement to his army was included in his narrative. But after the Aruna Pass the climatic nature of the entire history is lessened. At Kadesh, the king must fight in person and all alone after his crisis in the camp passed, but there too the crucial event is placed in media res. For Pianchy, it is the submission of Namlot at Hermopolis that truly mattered, and thus once again the effective “end” of the royal military showmanship and dramatic spectacle occurs before the curtain goes down on the royal narrative.

The preference for the military ephemerides had its use earlier, of course, and even at the commencement of Dynasty XVIII Ahmose Son of Ebana shows us that a simple blow-by-blow narrative with an infinitival style present, was already in use. But it is self-evident to any researcher concerned with economic texts of an accounting nature that this bare-bones approach, one based on entry jottings, was commonplace ages before Thutmose set out in his twenty-second year for Megiddo. All armies need accountants and diarists. How the decision was made to employ these entries as headings is unknown to us although, as many other hieratic texts on papyri show us (inter alia, P. Bulaq 18 and the bread accounts of Seti I), their use was strictly defined. Within the military context the key elements to be recorded were the day and location, with perhaps specific times of the day added. Most certainly there would have been a “tally list” that had the number of captures and/or dead written down as well as booty or impost delivered to the pharaoh. These facts, too, reflect an accounting mentality even if they were necessary evidence of the king’s success. Yet many additional details were necessary, and the famous conference heading of Thutmose at Yehem provides the essential portion of the narrative, exactly what the author wished.
Thutmose tells us at the start of his royal “Annals” that each enumerated campaign plus its plunder (ḥꜣq) obtained by the king were set down. But this title-introduction does not tell us the stylistic approach of the author with regard to the Megiddo campaign. The day-book entries follow immediately in the middle of column 6 when Thutmose is at Sile. They conveyed the narrative in a simplistic fashion. By presenting a ratchet-approach of chronological development, one that is fully “rational” insofar as these entries establish a step-by-step, or day-by-day pattern with regards to what the king and army do. Key episodes are provided because not all of the day entries in the original log were of equal value to the writer. He felt no reason to provide material that ignored his monarch’s overarching importance. In other words, only when the figura of Thutmose was significant would the composer of this account provide the necessary chronological matrix into which Thutmose acted in a significant fashion. This implies that the king’s military capabilities, his heroic deeds or his logistic planning, were all important, as in face we would automatically expect. They were the means of emphasizing Thutmose’s personality here and there, by which the reader is allowed to see the specific characteristics of his generalship.

But the ephemerides approach nonetheless serves to direct attention to a sawtooth method of historical reconstruction. It is impersonal yet logical, and one can raise the issue whether this preference for the war diary reflects the pharaoh’s mind. The accounting nature of these diary records on the march are logistically oriented. Reveille, for example, as on day twenty-one on the first month of shemu, necessarily was an automatic memorandum. On day nineteen previously Thutmose III, had to include the egress from the Aruna Pass. Indeed, the entire report of the campaign to Megiddo is starkly written by means of its systematicatization of the king’s aims and procedures. In a true sense it reflects what Thutmose considered himself to be: a master in logistic planning and execution. As the ephemerides are coherent and straight-forward, so was the pharaoh, or at least as he wished us to view him in these “Annals.” The use of the diary extracts confirms my suspicion that there is a decided pharaonic influence upon the narrative. I see the king’s personality, a major and significant planner at work, and the reason why we envisage Thutmose III as a major and significant architect of war surely is a result of the relatively straight-forward literary presentation offered in the Megiddo narrative.

By highlighting certain occurrences on each of the predetermined days we are set in media res and expect an important situation to be told. Date plus location precede the keystone circumstance. Thutmose
first reaches Gaza. There, the northern march, or jump, occurs, exactly as he wished. On day sixteen he is at Yehem and goes into consultation. The matter under consideration is, of course, which road to take to Megiddo. Hence, there was the necessity on the part of the writer to expand this portion of the narrative in order to demonstrate Thutmose’s role as a mastermind. Yet the importance lies in his superb logistic capabilities and not in any heroic advance into combat. The Aruna daybook heading carries us to the king’s departure into the narrow pass, but also highlights his careful management of his army when it has left the canyon. From the war diary was also the later significant entry commenting upon the time of day — the seventh hour having been passed.  

But what about the slower baggage train, local difficulties such as breakage of war material, other commands of Thutmose (such as to his scouts), or even references to the onlookers and camp followers? I am sure that some details of these matters and people could have been written down in the official diary if not elsewhere, but they were not included in the final publication of the narrative. As has been obvious to scholars for many years, there was a pre-selection of what diary entries to include and what ones not to record. Far more telling of the literary quality of the account are the “artificial” speeches of Thutmose, and other decisions made by the pharaoh.

I cannot but feel that Thutmose not only had his finger in the final product of the Megiddo narration, but also more significantly chose (or at least preferred) the diary style approach. That method of written exposition allowed the author to choose certain days on which something important took place, a circumstance through which he, the writer, could portray Thutmose as a perfect executive in war and logician in planning. Was not the choice of the Aruna Pass later to become so much a remembered-event that it became some type of military topos? Finally, soon after we awake with the king at Megiddo the almost instant victory passes quickly, with Thutmose complaining against his army’s desire for plunder. Day twenty-one presents a rather historically brief and two-dimensional recounting of the Egyptian success. Perhaps it is not too daring to compare that section of the account to the frequent Ramesside depictions of warfare in which we see the victorious king in combat. The actual event is standard, even if some special characteristics are provided.

The style and language of the Megiddo story may be described as Late Middle Egyptian, even though some Late Egyptians occur. (E.g., the famous use of bn within the address of the army leaders.) The speeches reveal
far more complexity than the narrative skeleton, and have been explicated by Stauder in his study which I referred to in detail in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, it is fair to maintain that the narrative approach is not constructed with a high degree of complexity even if the linguistic level tries to maintain an artificial Middle Egyptian procedure. Excluding the internal war diary structure, I do not feel that the narrative was difficult to compose. One telling example is that Thutmose’s addresses as well as those of his soldiers lack the complexity, literary and dramatic, of Ramesses II’s in his camp at Kadesh.

The king is painted without much of the hues of a hero. His self-centeredness, or egotism, does not attain the strong and virile likenesses of Ramesses II or Pianchy. In contrast to the former Thutmose is straightforward in design and conduct. True, he had no crisis as Ramesses encountered. His trials and tribulations were dependent upon successful preparation, knowledge of how to use terrain, surprise, and a preponderance of troops but not a result of faulty intelligence on his part. These basic aspects of generalship are given in Thutmose’s account. With regard to the Kushite pharaoh he avoids any discussion of sieges, long or short. He is also not interested in complex manoeuvrings around the enemy. The vector of his advance was unambiguous, and I feel also to his enemy. Moreover, the manifestations of his generalship were more of an operational nature than Ramesses’s. But so too were Pianchy’s. Yet unlike that leader Thutmose is on the go always. Of course, the Megiddo situation was unlike that encountered in Egypt by Pianchy or by Ramesses at Kadesh, but all three pharaohs at the start were far distant from the later theatre of operations.

There are no poignant overtones in this Megiddo account such as those reported in the Kadesh Poem. The drama, so effectively presented there, is stronger than either that recounted by Thutmose or Pianchy. Again, this has to do with the historical continuum of all these campaigns, but it is worthwhile to stress Thutmose’s absence of key personality traits. Unlike Pianchy and Ramesses II he is depicted more as an operational manager than anything else. This, in fact, what we end up remembering. The narrative culmination was his choice of the Aruna Pass road. Therefore, I can understand the author’s desire to de-emphasize his king’s victory somewhat—not of course to minimize Thutmose’s combat success in person but to impress upon the reader his earlier brilliant tactical decision.

Thus we arrive at a final stage in our evaluation of this mid Dynasty XVIII pharaoh, and it is the common historiographical problem of assessing individuals. Thutmose wanted us to read, digest, understand,
and appreciate his role in the Megiddo campaign. He arranged that one major facet of his personality would be publicized. He did not prefer to be seen here as a solitary heroic figure. He leads his soldiers by expressed command to be sure, but remains rooted at Aruna. Was he not an effective actor there?25 To evaluate his personality otherwise is, I feel, to do harm to this portrayal in the “Annals.” One can naturally belittle the enemy’s abilities or mistaken assumptions vis-à-vis their Egyptian opponent. Similarly, it is equally possible to depreciate somewhat the hazardous nature of his undertaking from Yehem to Megiddo, at the minimum by stating that the possibility of a major enemy attack in the defile was minimal. Yet the decisive act of the campaign occurred before the potential battlefield outside Megiddo was ever seen. Thutmose got there without any serious opposition, little, to be honest. The show of force was at Megiddo but the decisive event occurred earlier.

It is unfortunate that we read little about the king’s scouts and spies along the way, but they have to have existed and surely were employed. Similarly, the arrangement of his troops is not given to us. His rate of progress is easy to calculate, avoids the imponderabilities of baggage trains, feeding troops and animals, and the like. (But to be fair so do all other Egyptian military accounts.) The army proceeds across Palestine just as the later armies of Amunhotep II, Seti I, and Ramesses II are recorded in the same way, for the most part fast and not interrupted.

His desire was to record this important campaign in detail at Karnak, and his later ones as well. It is possible that the Megiddo narration was also produced, if that is the correct work, on soft copy or papyrus.26 Most certainly, Thutmose wanted his great victory to be memorialized, learned, perhaps recited, and his success proclaimed. But the model he chose immortalized him as a great logistical commander, and that is his contribution to Egyptian war history.

B. Ramesses II

With the Poem, and that is what I wish to concentrate upon, we encounter a very complex royal nṯtw text.27 It is considerably lengthier than Thutmose’s accounts of the Megiddo campaign, even if we add the additional reports of his subsequent wars, thereby supporting Eyre’s statement with regard to Ramesside literature.28 But in this case
there is no doubt that the narrative circulated in soft copy, a point which Eyre also makes. It was carved as a monumental discourse in five of the great temples of Egypt.

The Abydos version was the first to be inscribed. Abu Simbel in Lower Nubia provides a summary or condensed version of the pictorial representations but omits the Poem. The remaining religious edifices on whose walls the Poem was carved include the Ramesseum, Luxor, and Karnak. There are more than one versions of the text in many of the temples. At Luxor there are three, including an earlier one now erased (L1, L2, L3, and Lp), whereas the Ramesseum has only one and Karnak two (K1 and K2). The literary and basic philological commentary remains that of Thomas von der Way, to which I contributed a later study on the Papyrus version, P. Sallier III plus P. Raifé, there was also a rather abominable hieratic copy of portions of the account, P. Chester Beatty III (verso).

In von der Way’s study the reader will find all of the background information in order to provide a sophisticated analysis of the literary qualities of the composition. He depended to no small degree upon the 1967 unpublished PhD Thesis of Thomas Hartman, but did not concentrate upon the use of Late Egyptian to any extent. A subsequent analysis by Jean-Marie Kruchten who covered the verbal “development” of the $sdmn=f$ to the $sdmf$ can be brought into discussion, as it indeed refines many of our previous, and partly confused, knowledge of the narrative verbal formations so frequent in Ramesside texts. The monumentality of the Poem was somewhat of a straightjacket because it “forced” or required the author dealt with a literary structure inherited from centuries past. See, for example, the “chapter” headings using $j\tilde{t}$ (extremely frequent), $hr\ jr\ dr$, and $’h.n$ with $dd.n$. The daybook system of narration is followed at the beginning, at least up to P 40 inclusive, and P 333 (for the second day), if we follow von der Way.

We need not pursue his literary analysis as I shall reflect on the heroic figure of the pharaoh instead. But it is again necessary to mention Assmann’s significant contribution to the purport of the entire composition as well as the personal piety of Ramesses. For John Baines, the “strongly dramatized Qadesh record” has “no real parallel in earlier times.” Loprieno provides some pointers with respect to the Poem’s complexity in formal structure, wherein there is an integration of different textual norms. My purpose is otherwise, even though I recognize the incredibly well-worked out system of narration, the segmentation of the various themes, the effective use of Classical verbal narrative
constructions notwithstanding the Late Egyptians, and the combined, mixed, levels of linguistic behavior so apparent in this Dynasty Nineteen composition. As has been brought up in Chapter 3 my focus is on the heroic stand of Ramesses in his camp opposite Muwatallis. He was caught and knew it, but was able to react successfully and repel the Hittite chariot onslaught. His martial and virile military reaction is presented within a series of verbal addresses, first to Amun and then afterwards, when the second charge of the enemy chariots came, he further rallied Menna as well as his troops.

It is suggestive of personality that Ramesses’s first allocution is solely with his father-god Amun. He, the greatest of the king’s personal deities, is involved, and von der Way calls the king’s words to Amun a “prayer” (Gebet), following Assmann. However, the role of Amun thereafter disappears. This is because the Poem is a literary composition that is specifically aimed at providing the great occasion of the pharaoh’s nḥtw. Ramesses is not merely the center of everything, even to the point of conveniently (or otherwise) omitting his grave tactical error, he is the champion in battle. Indeed, a sizeable portion of the Poem is devoted to Ramesses in battle and therefore parallels his scenes of warfare as well as those of other New Kingdom Egyptian rulers. The written military exposition thus provides the reader what was expected — namely, the King in battle defeating his foe — separate from the Gebete to Amun.

The courageous resistance that Ramesses showed proves his mettle more than a thousand regurgitated or perennially reused literary topoi. The innermost section of the Poem offers an intimate depiction of his warrior-pharaoh, one that demonstrates more than just the king’s piety. The latter issue issue — a major one to be sure — is but one facet of the entire composition. I believe, following Assmann, that it is unique, but so too was the contingency of history — the trap into which Ramesses fell. The Poem reveals his extraction from the quicksand of despair and defeat. Does not the monarch sound like an extremely threatened man?:

See! Amun has given to me his strength!
When infantry were not with me, nor chariotry.
He caused every distant land to see my victory
through my might,
when I was alone and
there was no leader (sr) around me.
Everything contained in these few sentences divulges the fundamental message. But nothing is complex about the personality of Ramesses under siege nor his victory. Amun “called out from behind me (with n-ḥꜣ=j) as from face to face” (P 125). And then Amun, hand in hand with his son Ramesses, prepares to go with Ramesses into the fray. He says a few additional words, all of great import (P 126-127), but then the acting role of the chief deity of Egypt ceases. Is it not correct to view the god as a true deus ex machina? Amun is called forth and then disappears, as if he were a deus absconditus.

Once more nḫt is chosen as the crucial word: “I am the Lord of nḥt, one who loves power (qnt)” (P 127). Clearly, and without difficulty, the reader can grasp the aim of the narration. The king’s nḥtw was always derived from his godhead, even if he performs alone. During the initial stages of preparation for war an Egyptian pharaoh of the New Kingdom went to see Amun in the Holy of Holies and was granted success by him through an oracle. He then left to war, with the Blessing of Victorious Thebes, having been granted military success.

All ultimately depended upon Ramesses’s abilities, and thus his military deeds mattered. The following sections, including two later rallying shouts of Ramesses to his army and to Menna, depict the pharaoh charging “alone” into the enemy lines again and again. His heroic character is now revealed to all and sundry, those that are presently reading the narrative and his troops earlier in combat. These accomplishments prove that the monarch is a true victor, as he was meant to me. In addition, it is not a self-evident conclusion that Ramesses is merely heroic. All pharaohs were. But upon a specific day and in a defined location he triumphed under dire circumstances. The historical record of the Poem blatantly indicates this event and its positive outcome. Here and now one is able to see the pharaoh as a hero par excellence. The proof is his remarkable courageous and successful “recovery.” Was not that victory achieved through Ramesses’s courageous personality when he was alone and isolated in an extremely precarious situation, not merely through his troops, Na’arn included?

Bypassing the adulatory nature of this literary piece, let me conclude with a description of the final conference of Ramesses and his army on the second day. In that hyperbolic account Ramesses receives the message of Muwatallis. He orders that all of his army leaders of his infantry and chariots as well as the officers, learn of the Hittite king’s wish to cease hostilities (P 323-326). It is interesting that at this final point in the action there is an official war council, and even more significant, that the key
army men were summoned and not the ordinary troops. This is the second conference serves as a coda to the combat on both days, and effectively leads the narrative to the departure of Ramesses from Kadesh.

If one wishes to compare and contrast both Thutmose III and Ramesses II I believe that it is best to elucidate the observable nature of both Egyptian rulers in their role of as generals. Undisguised is Ramesses’s self-portrayal, but his earlier compatriot similarly presents an invincible persona in combat. Yet Thutmose’s “Face of Battle” differs considerably from Ramesses’s. Perhaps I am over-emphasizing the contingent by emphasizing the pivotal events of both: conference and isolation. But did not Ramesses face destruction at Kadesh while Thutmose confronted not a defeat but rather the conundrum of choice? The urgent dilemmas given were very different. With Ramesses annihilation was a very possible outcome whereas with Thutmose the issue hung upon a path of advance. The two high-priority situations hung upon very different, if not antithetical, historical events. But the Poem, presenting an excellent piece of literature unlike the Megiddo account of Thutmose, greatly heightens the drama by explicitly covering the electrifying isolation of Ramesses, his Gebete to Amun, and his repeated counterattacks. None of this is present in the war report of Thutmose.46

C. Pianchy

“A general knows that the course of no battle is entirely foreseeable; that while his orders must be carried out obediently and loyally, in the whirl of a battle they cannot be expected to be carried out with exactitude.”47 These acute words need to be applied to Thutmose, Ramesses, and our final commander-in-chief, Pianchy. His Great Stela, which was carved on all its sides, presents an intriguing literary presentation of the Kushite ruler’s methodically planned campaign of regnal year twenty. Its background of composition remains murky even though the overt employ of simple Middle Egyptian literary constructions is a hallmark.48 But there are some strong indications of a scribal dependence upon pre-existent literary compositions,49 and I find it significant that they are not of the Ramesside Period. At best, some date from Dynasty Eighteen.50

Verena Lepper, following Fritz Hintze, employed a scientific approach in order to analyse this composition which she correctly saw as a literary one, as well as others.51 The vocabulary itself is large, as was further
argued by Simon Schweitzer who used Hintze’s study of lexicostatistics to determine the richness of the lexicon.52 (Note that the statistics used covered the length of a text and the word frequencies.) Pianchy’s Great Stela came out to be very copious indeed, but in my opinion it is not at all grand or elegant.53 I suggested recently, but only as a possibility, that a Memphite, rather than a Theban literary scribe was the composer of this lengthy narrative. This was dependent upon the plethora of Middle Egyptian reflexes in the source material as well as the commonly simple constructions of ‘ḥ. n- and $dm \; pw \; jr. n= f$. The use of original daybook reports may be seen as well, albeit transformed into a flowing narrative, and the early Dynasty Eighteen introductory topos $ju.tw \; rd \; n \; hm= f$ is evident in the account.54 All in all, I see a rather long rendition that reflects the early period of the New Kingdom. The later Ramesside monumental discourse was avoided, and the entire structure is in rather good Middle Egyptian. The linguistic structure, “en égyptien de tradition,” to quote Pascal Vernus, nevertheless reveals a few “intrusions” of the contemporary spoken language.55 But when all is said and done. Pianchy’s style indicates an Eighteenth Dynasty approach by the author.

In her rarely-consulted Yale Thesis Cara Sargent analyzed the linguistic structure of Pianchy’s Great Triumphal Stela here and there, but preferred not to provide a separate chapter on its contents owing to the large amount of previous research.56 Throughout her study one will discover intriguing linguistic sidelights on Pianchy’s account, such as the “expected” assumption that the $sdm= f$ and $sdm. n= f$ can be neatly divided with the former indicating nominal use,57 the $sdm= f$ of $rdj$ being always $dj$,58 the non-initial $sdm. n= f$ can be circumstantial (and thus not “good” Late Egyptian),59 $wnn + \text{First Present}$,60 and $wn.jn + \text{First Present}$.61 Owing to the extensive nature of this work, and even more because it is not a historically-oriented study, let me henceforth by-pass her specific linguistic remarks but observe that she regards the Great Steal as a brilliant piece of literature.62 Sargent placed this inscription within her corpus of “Classical Egyptian Napatan” (CEN) texts, as it was evident to her that Pianchy’s war narrative was dependent upon a classical linguistic register of the Egyptian language. I have further discussed its linguistic orientation within the context of Pianchy’s relief work at Gebel Barkal.63 By and large the composer was well versed in presenting a narrative that possessed a simple structure, but one by no means bland or linguistically crude. The entire story is vividly rendered, and this results from the monarch’s personal attitudes being accentuated repeatedly.
The narrative set-up in the Great Stela is rather easy to understand owing to its straightforward nature. The author purposely included many direct speeches of the pharaoh as well as others’ such as the words Namlot’s wife, Namlot himself, and Tefnacht. By doing so he expanded on what would have been a relatively forthright and smooth chronological progress through time and space, and one that would have been more or less unemotional. The elementary substructure of the work was thus vitiated by the personality of all of the participants, especially that of the Kushite monarch. He pervades the text as do the pharaohs in their royal inscriptions, but here in an individual and striking manner, and one quite distinct from Thutmose or Ramesses. The distinct characteristic that I find in the Great Stela is his practical disposition. I used the word engineering in the previous chapter in order to fasten the reader on the sieges, battlements, battering rams, and the like. I see this aspect repeated in the historical record. In addition, Pianchy’s attitudes, be they Egyptian or Kushite, are most keenly felt when he reaches Hermopolis and has to deal with Namlot. The interrelationship between pharaoh, the enemy’s queen, and Namlot himself are not sketchily presented. To the contrary, this act of the drama is given a reasonable amount to space in order that the reader perceive the martial and peaceful attitudes of the king as well as his own singularity.

But his individuality is likewise apparent at the beginning of the story. Pianchy seems to expect that his soldiers— or armies in this case — will solve the problems in the north. They do not. To be sure, their lack of success engenders the king to move north, and so creates the reason for the campaign and afterwards the written account. The literary technique is rather overt, especially at Hermopolis. To enhance Pianchy’s later victories one downplays the role of his troops, even to the point of chastising their inability to defeat Namlot. Even more, they have allowed him to retreat into his nome citadel. As a rule, the progressive heightening of tension right from the start allows us to maintain a keener interest into finding out what happened to Namlot.

As presented in the fourth chapter I also underlined Pianchy’s quite careful and well-organized tactical and strategic mind. He did not stay in Thebes for some time merely to perform various religious activities. He had to have assembled his flotilla there, prepared his troops and war material, and work out carefully his progress downstream and where he would engages his foes. Remember that even if Namlot was besieged in Hermopolis and could not escape — thanks to Pianchy’s army
of course — other cities to the north were still opposed to Kushite domination. To me, his logistic character is continually revealed in the text, just as is his Kushite nature. (E.g., possibly the love of horses, the situation of Namlot’s wife.) Brief but also detailed remarks are frequently offered that allow us to see Pianchy’s abilities in sieges and tactical advances. The events at Memphis especially provide good support for this interpretation.

It is useful when evaluating personalities that the anger, or despair — two examples of strong emotional reactions — of the royal protagonist is portrayed. Pianchy, just as Ramesses and Thutmose, has much to say on this matter. But he reveals little with regard to his ultimate goals, his strategic objectives, one of which was the removal of Namlot as a hostile piece on the chess board. This also means that Pianchy had to reach and capture Memphis, if only because all of the metropoleis north of Hermopolis (Per-Sechemkheperre, Lisht, etc.) were still aligned with Tefnacht or, at the best, not favorable to the Kushite. It is considerably easier to recognize the ultimate goals of Thutmose and Ramesses, but with Pianchy it is far more difficult. (For Thutmose the geopolitical strategic aim was Megiddo, and for Ramesses Kadesh.) One may assume that he always had Tefnacht in mind, and the Great Stela purposely sets the Saite king as the main enemy. But when the Saite ruler appears there is virtually no backgrounding of his and Pianchy’s characters, or even any strategic aims. Tefnacht reached Memphis by night, rallied the city, and then departed on a horse, much, it seems, to Pianchy’s cynical (?) amusement.64

Did Pianchy attempt to conquer the West Delta? I suspect not. In fact, he knew the limitations of power, especially the constraints of warfare. Lichtheim correctly maintained that he was forceful, shrewd, and generous.65 Generous may be too positive a term to employ if only because Pianchy does play with people and words: see his characterization of Tefnacht, his relationships with Namlot and his wife, his association with Pediese, and of course his commands to his soldiers as well as his complaints regarding their military failures.

Roberto Gozzoli has pointed out the theological issues inherent in this narrative, stressing the “concept of sin” evident. This, he believes, can be found “in the way the war narrative develops in the entire text.”66 For him, the figure of Namlot differs from that presented by Grimal. The latter calls the Kushite narrative a “crusade,” and at this point he definitely means warfare.67 Then too, let us not forget Martin Fitzenreiter’s recent coverage of Pianchy’s special association with horses and the detestation
Morality and religiosity are clearly assumed. I do not wish to deny the religious orientation of the Kushite ruler and the ignore the cases where this aspect rises in the narrative. In essence, however, the Great Stela records a war into Egypt, concluding at the apex of the Delta. Call it a crusade, following Grimal. Pianchy's narrative is martial, after all, and what Fitzenreiter, Gozzoli, and others have pinpointed are yet additional sides of the war leader's temperament. Although overlapping and relating to his warfare, they still are something ancillary to any evaluation of evaluation gener alship. I find it revealing that Gozzoli, after explicating finely Pianchy's "epiphany," nevertheless states that the stela is a triumphal one. Robert Ritner likewise argues that the account follows a "holiness code," and argues that the king reveals this religious aspect in his itinerary and that he directs this innermost feeling to his soldiers. But his triumphs in this case involve success in warfare. That we possess more than one side of the ruler's nature — piously religious in this analysis — detracts not a whit from the narrative's reflection of the king's military talents. And let me signal out his ability to physically stop and not proceed further. He shows caution and a willingness to obtain his goals progressively rather than hastily.

At some point Pianchy knew that he did not have the ability to conquer the West Delta. But was that in his original strategic plan? In essence, his conquests — or re-conquests to be more correct — were specific and defined. True, ambitions often exceed original intents. The Great Stela's narrative assumes at the beginning that Tefnacht is the principal enemy and that he has secured control of the northern portion of Upper Egypt. (Is it not easy to identify just one antagonist as the main cause for disturbance?) In turn, the stela's factual style allow us to examine carefully the armies' directions and the king's advances by the geographic specifics provided. By and large, I interpret Pianchy's arrival at Athribis, the capitulation of his immediate enemies, and the later presumed acquiescence of Tefnacht indicating a judicious, non-combative, reaction after his capture of Memphis. Pianchy does not appear bloodthirsty. Memphis had shut itself up, I am sure expecting immediate military support from Sais, but that did not occur. Its almost immediate fall and passivity thereafter implies that Pianchy achieved what he wanted quickly. The same may be said with regard to Hermopolis. In time, the city surrendered without bloodshed.

It is fascinating that Pianchy's military exploits seem more oriented to a chess player than anyone else. Unlike Thutmose III he is not disposed to provide the reader with any major logistic conundrum.
Differing from Ramesses II he avoids the emotional aspect of a self-centered hero, although to be sure he did not face such a crisis as that pharaoh did. According to László Török, the narrative of stela “has roots in the traditions of Egyptian New Kingdom belles lettres but is not a purely Egyptian literary work for the discourse it presents on the ordered world unites Egyptian kingship dogma with Kushite concepts of kingship.”

This sentence is the conclusion to his detailed and worthwhile study of the Great Stela. But by no means it is exhaustive, and the lack of a linguistic-literary analysis is a weakness even if Török has carefully remarked upon the literary nature of Pianchy’s narrative, and this implicitly reflects upon the personality of the Kushite monarch.

I have had recourse to Sargent’s Thesis and used it extensively when covering the various war records of the Kushite, Napatan, and post-Napatan rulers. I wanted to address the “foreign” non-Egyptian nature of some of the account and its literary backdrops, scenes of confrontation, and speeches. Here is part of that chapter where I discuss the later monumental record of Nastasen.

“Nastasen’s stela came from Gebel Barkal. Török felt that it, and the earlier companion of Harsiotef, were drawn up in the scriptorium of the Amun Temple at Napata. The best attempt to resolve the problems associated with their discovery is that in 1862 Harsiotef’s stood in B 501 in front of Pylon II or was found outside of the temple leaning up against Pylon I. All of this implies that some type of literary tradition, even if it were simplistic, was still at work in Napata during the fourth century BC. I do not see this as a creation reflecting totally, or near so, the ‘Kushite mind.’ But it equally could have been the product of an age-old Egyptian process which could have been transmitted, carried on, and written by Egyptians, or their descendants, who may have married into the hierarchy of Napatan society, especially into the temple hierarchy.

Einhard’s Vita Karoli Magni relies heavily, to say the least, upon Suetonius, and was written in Latin. It shows massively the influence of the Classical Roman literary mind. Yet Einhard was not Roman, and his non-Latin and frequent non-Roman treatment of his master is self-evident.
If this example is known to all, then consider the biography of the Holy Roman Emperor Friedrich I by Otto of Freising, *Gešla Friderici Imperatoris*. Or, rather examine the continuation of the original biography, because it was never finished, by Rahewin.\(^77\) The latter’s command of Latin was astoundingly poor, and I have often felt that a modern study needs to be written concerning Rahewin’s mother language (German) in relation to his Latin.

I have brought forward these two examples, not to provide parallel data to buttress an exhaustive study of these two important Napatan stelae, but instead to show the interested reader what are the difficulties with assuming, as Sargent does, simple ‘up-to-dateness,’ or with Török, the persistence of the ‘Kushite Mind’ in the crania of these editors, or even, and finally, the stress on their linguistic horizon.\(^78\) I cannot see that the argument for Egyptians, as maintained by Heinrich Schäfer, holds owing to the non-Egyptian nature of the actual text (Not the script, of course.) But I definitely see the continuation of models of military presentations, even if the hoary and oft repeated *Egyptian* phrase “Then a great slaughter was made” can be found as early as Dynasty XVIII in the Egyptian war records of the New Kingdom pharaohs. The author-redactors of *all* of our hieroglyphic monumental war records, from Pianchy on, were following set patterns. The quantity of previously used written literary terms, phrases, including the ruler’s military conduct,\(^79\) may not be so great in the later Dynasty XXV corpus, but they are still there. (Note that I am not discussing the existence of archival material which was the source for the kings’ campaigns of an earlier date.) This matter though interesting and touched upon by many, including Török, is not my theme."\(^80\)

My main point in the above selections was to indicate the necessity of proceeding carefully when analysing any Kushite or Napatan text. Pianchy’s Great Stela reflects significantly on his personality and specifically on his role as commander of an army. But his generalship is my theme, not his Kushiteness. I am aware that Charlemagne was no Caesar, and even
in Einhard’s Latin he was not. Yet the war narrative of Pianchy is not an “instruction,” as Török claims, but rather a “command,” a royal wd (line 1), which is spoken by the ruler. Its literary qualities, though not minor, were far less heightened, and considerably less effulgent than those exhibited in the Kadesh Poem of Ramesses II. Throughout his narrative Pianchy is not awe-inspiring, and his piety seems very cultic and official, lacking none of the intimate piety of Ramesses at Kadesh. The technical side of warfare, on the other hand, permeates the inscription, and the king’s logistic capabilities seem on a par, if not greater, than Thutmose III’s during the Megiddo campaign. His ultimate or final strategic goal appears less fixed or final than either Thutmose or Ramesses’, but as with all of our three major accounts, we can only interpret from what we possess. I called Pianchy “multi-tasked” because his military-oriented mind ably encompassed strategy, but also involved logistics to a great degree. He was able to stop, or at least compromise his desires, and one feels that Ramesses could not do that.

D. Last Words

This study was not meant to provide some additional data for a future biography of any of these three rulers of Egypt. (Can ever a biography of a pharaoh be written?) It originally was intended to ascertain certain characteristics of the military natures of all three, but I acknowledge, as a historian must do, that my orientation is to understand their personalities in battle. Generalship, the leadership of armies, is my theme. In this final chapter I have circled around the structural issue of the major three hieroglyphic compositions more than I did previously. This was to provide a conclusion to the essentials drawn up earlier and to emphasize the complexity of the historical issues upon which we moderns have to rely. The limitations in these texts which we possibly decry, yet see with some degree of sympathy, need to be articulated. Despite the separate orientations of these three inscriptions, all three rulers’ actions emerge with enough clarity so that an analysis of their military leadership can be written.

If the dramatic intent was purposely arranged so that all three major inscriptions reach their climax of action in the middle of their story, surely this was done overtly and with full knowledge by the writer. To refer to the old analysis of Gustav Freytag, there is an internal pyramidal structure of tension in each. With Pianchy’s Great Stela, however,
even though the events at Hermopolis are a turning point in the narration, lacking is the severe crisis-laden scenario of Ramesses II, or even the logistic options presented in Thutmose III’s account. We are presented with the operational nature of that pharaoh’s mind whereas the Kadesh Poem deals with Ramesses’s personal reactions when under immediate threat.

Allow me to press Freytag’s well-known analysis somewhat further, even if it was concerned with Greek and Shakespearean drama. He set up a narrative pyramid in which the five stages can be recognized: exposition, complication, climax, falling action, and denouement. His system bears examination here if only due to the obvious lessening of tension, or falling action, of Ramesses II on the second day. Thutmose’s “Annals” does not fit so well within this analysis, but it is the decision at Yehem and march through the Aruna Pass that provide the reader with the most powerful segment of the narrative. With Pianchy we have a clear-cut diminution of tension at the Athribis conference and thereafter.

He, as well as Ramesses, provide us with a short “return scenario” in which the Ramesside pharaoh comes home from the north and the Kushite ruler travels upstream, away from the Delta. By and large, I see Freytag’s arrangement serving especially well the purposely intended dramatic narrative of the events at Kadesh, and this is due to the considerably heightened literary and linguistic approach taken in the Poem at the time of decision. I shall leave any further analysis to future scholars who may wish to traverse this path.

To put the final coat of paint upon this work it may be useful to draw up a few schematic comparisons among the three texts. The following order is from small to large or simple to complex, and does not claim finality. Thus “<” refers to “less than.”

A. Length
   Thutmose III < Pianchy < Ramesses II86
B. Literary Style
   Thutmose III < Pianchy < Ramesses II87
C. Drama
   Thutmose III < Pianchy < Ramesses II88
D. Dramatic Apex
   All three provide the crucial event in the middle of the narration. All three involve the king’s speeches.
E. Speeches
Thutmose III < Pianchy < Ramesses II

F. Virulence of Protagonist
Pianchy < Thutmose III < Ramesses II

G. Complaint
Thutmose III: directed against his army
Ramesses II:
   a) against his foreign administrators and other overseers
      (after hearing the real whereabouts of the Hittites)
   b) against his army (when in battle)

Pianchy:
   a) against his second army
      that did not annihilate Namlot
   b) reiterates this to his troops
      when he is at Hermopolis
   c) rebukes Namlot (not military)

H. Kindness of Protagonist
Ramesses II < Thutmose III < Pianchy

I. Wisdom in War
Ramesses II < Thutmose III < Pianchy

J. Use of Underlying Ephemerides
Ramesses II < Pianchy < Thutmose III

K. Language Discourse
Thutmose III: Very good Late Middle Egyptian set within the royal monumental discourse; Late Egyptianisms extremely rare.
Ramesses II: Monumental “langage de tradition” of the Ramesside Period; attempt is still stylistically close to the earlier epochs.
Pianchy: Derived from relatively simple Dynasty Eighteen antecedents, but appears to be based on literary models and not the royal hieroglyphic war inscriptions of that period.
I conclude this study with a very brief evaluation of all three generals. Thutmose, Ramesses, and Pianchy had fought in battle before they confronted their major military encounter of their lives. Thutmose had seen action in Nubia during the middle years of his joint stewardship of Egypt with Hatshepsut. Ramesses met combat in his fourth regnal year, and Pianchy campaigned against locals early in his life. Yet on the basis of their three key lengthy historical narratives an epigrammatic evaluation may be presented. The first two had a reputation to make. Pianchy had a reputation at stake. He appears smug.
notes

1 Let me provide a helpful and interesting parallel. Imagine a study of the personalities of the following chess masters: Paul Morphy (post bellum failure in life), Wilhelm Steinitz (lived in poverty), the great Emanuel Lasker (mathematician and philosophical author), the brilliant José Raúl Capablanca, Aron Nimzowitsch (!), Mikhail Botvinnik (long lasting), Bobby Fischer (later a reclusive), et al. One relies on their games that are published and some extraneous information about their personal lives, none of which is very detailed. The adulatory nature of most “biographies” of these chess players is deafening. “Savantism” best explains most of them, and Nabokov’s “The Luzhin Defense” provides a helpful commentary on the personalities of such chess masters.

Some generals were almost born to their role (Wolfe, Grant, Patton, Manstein, and even “Panzer” [Kurt] Meyer), others not. Egyptian pharaohs of the New Kingdom were most certainly trained in the art of war at any early age.

2 Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt II, 163.


5 I am following Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature II, 33.


See Eyre, “The Accessibility of Ramesside Narrative,” and his earlier study, “Is Egyptian Historical Literature ‘Historical’ or ‘Literary’?”


Stauder, *ibid.*, 51 (with note 210) and 393.

Stauder, *ibid.*, 51. Note the parallel between the war records of Amunhotep II (Karnak and Memphis Stelae: *Urk. IV* 1299-1316), and the Megiddo campaign account.

I mean that the choice, if ever offered, was no choice.


Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*, 8, revises the edition of Sethe, *Urk. IV*, 647: for columns 5-6 h₂q [jn. n hm=f m nḥt m h₂št] nḥt. Note that it is the sun god Re who has given to Thutmose his success.

One is always in need of MacMullen, “The Roman Emperors’ Army Costs,” *Latomus* 43 (1984), 571-580, and especially note 21 on pages 576-577, a very important statement concerning costs
Leadership under fire

of an army’s movement. Naturally, none of these details would be included in any royal Egyptian account.

18 Parker, “Some Reflections on the Lunar Dates of Thutmose III and Ramesses II.”

19 MacMullen, “The Roman Emperors’ Army Costs.” He discusses baggage trains, a factor that has not been examined thoroughly in the Egyptological scholarly literature, including myself.

20 It also may be argued that the style may have been based upon the lack of any fully-developed literary means of narrating such royal military accounts at this time. I add this remark as a possibility and nothing more.


22 Add of course the phrase (X.)tw hr sḏm: Stauder, Linguistic Dating of Middle Egyptian Literary Texts, 392.

23 Stauder, Linguistic Dating of Middle Egyptian Literary Texts.

24 See note 12 in Chapter 3 for commentary on the Bulletin (B). I shall not discuss it here.

25 The choices given for the road to Megiddo by the high military officers — are they not window dressing for the pharaoh’s courageous decision?


27 P1 = Krt II 3.2/5; Spalinger, Aspects of the Military Documents of the Ancient Egyptians, Chapter 6 (“The King as Hero: The Literary Reports”).

28 Eyre, “The Accessibility of Ramesside Narrative,” 92, and his earlier study, “Is Egyptian Historical Literature ‘Historical’ or ‘Literary’?”


Immediately thereafter we are presented with the location of the Hittite camp in P 41, the Egyptians’ camp in P 56, the attack of the enemy in P 65, and then the immediate reaction of Ramesses to the crisis in P 75 — all commencing with ħṣt.

Von der Way, *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses' II. zur Qadeś-Schlacht*, Chapter II.

Assmann, “Krieg und Frieden im alten Ägypten. Ramses II. und die Schlacht bei Kadesch.”

John Baines, “Classicism and Modernism in the Literature of the New Kingdom,” in: Loprieno (ed.), *Ancient Egyptian Literature, History and Forms*, 169. This assertion may be correct, but it depends upon the absence of data.

Loprieno, “Defining Egyptian Literature: Ancient Texts and Modern Theories,” in: Loprieno (ed.), *Ancient Egyptian Literature, History and Forms*, 52. The discussion centers on the Poem as well as the Bulletin. He further asserts that the Poem, rather than the Bulletin, is closer to the *Königsnovelle*. The situation is exactly the opposite. The Bulletin is the narrative *Königsnovelle* of the Kadesh records. See Loprieno,

39 Von der Way, Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht, 302 and especially pages 150-153 and 203-218.

40 Amun’s nḥtw becomes Ramesses’s, and remember that the account is specifically called a nḥtw (text).

41 Nḥtw is used again, and it is followed by ḫpš. This is a simple juxtaposition.

42 The Egyptian compound preposition m-sꜣ is to be understood in partial contrast with the of P 125. The second word, ḫꜣ [Gardiner, “On the Meaning of the Preposition 𓊠𓊚”, PsBA 25 (1903): 334-336] does not only mean “behind,” but also has the sense of enveloping on the two sides, as the wings of the Horus falcon do when surrounding the rear head of the pharaoh. Note that Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature II, 68, translates sr as “captain.”

43 Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, 72 note 16, is useful to consult. She translates the end of this line on page 66 as “from face-to-face.” Cf. Von der Way, Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht, 307; Kitchen, Ramesside Inscriptions. Translated and Annotated. Translations II, 7, parallel’s Lichtheim with his “face to face.”

44 And qnt plus nḥt are juxtaposed frequently enough in Egyptian war inscriptions, and significantly at the beginning of war narrations. There is nothing complex about this issue.

45 Von der Way, Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeš-Schlacht, 297 note e. On page 333 he translates Ḥ#wtjw as befindlichen Soldaten,” with which I cannot agree. “Leaders” of the two main sectors of the Egyptian army of this epoch — infantry and chariotry, is surely meant. See Spalinger, Aspects of the military Documents of the Ancient Egyptians, 95, 96 note 64, and 109. Kitchen also follows this better interpretation: Ramesside Inscriptions. Translated and Annotated. Translations II, 13 (“high officials”).
Paul Frandsen, in his review of Loprieno, *Ancient Egyptian Literature, History and Forms*, JESHO 43 (2000): 197 and 200 notes 8 and 9, discusses this matter in light of the studies present in the volume. He refers mainly to social diglossia, but the edited book covers very well the issue of linguistic diglossia in the Ramesside Period.


See Stauder, *Linguistic Dating of Middle Egyptian Literary Texts*, on Neferty (if his argument be followed) and the Story of Neferkare and Sisene.


57 Ibid., 66.

58 Ibid., 22.

59 Ibid., 30, following Logan and Westenholz, “sḏm.f and sḏm.n.f Forms in the Pey (Piankhy) Inscription,” 118.

60 Sargent, *The Napatan Royal Inscriptions: Egyptian in Nubia*, 60.

61 Ibid., 61.

62 Ibid., 15. The reader will find some commentary on two typical military phrases jw.tw r dd n ḫm=f and jr ḫ j ḫ t which have not escaped her. See also page 61 note 171 referring to Vernus, “Deux particularités de l’égyptien de tradition: nṭy jw Present 1; ṣnn.f hr sḏm narratif,” in: *L’Égyptologie en 1979. Axes prioritaires de recherche I* (Grenoble: Editions du Centre national de la Recherche scientifique; 1982), 87-89, contrasting ṣnn.jn=f ḫ r sḏm which introduces new phases of action — Priese, “Zur Sprache der ägyptischen Inschriften der Könige von Kusch,” 116, noted this for the Napatan texts — and sḏm.n.f which often has consecutive value.


64 One more note the equid reference. Even with Tefnacht horses appear.
Historical observations on three military personalities

65 Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature* III, 66. Oddly, her commentary and translation are often overlooked.


67 Grimal, *La stèle triomphale de Pi(‘ankhy) au Musée du Caire.* JE 48862 et 47086-47089, 295-320. In § 3 of Chapter IV the king’s piety as well as the progression of the military crusade are covered.

68 Martin Fitzenreiter, “Piye Son of Ra, Loving Horses, Detesting Fish.”


70 Ritner, *The Libyan Anarchy. Inscriptions from Egypt’s Third Intermediate Period,* 466. His further point that the invasion was a “religious pilgrimage designed to ‘cleanse’ a debased aristocracy” is speculation. I see no evidence for the latter assertion.


72 *Ibid.,* 368-398. I find that he overstresses the presence of the Egyptian sub-genre, the Königsnovelle.


74 *The Image of the Ordered World in Ancient Nubian Art,* 447.

75 *Ibid.,* 309.


79 However, Pianchy’s account is considerably greater in length that Tanwetamani’s, and he saw much military action which he purposely recorded.

80 Although to hypothesize archives of a secular nature, and not those in temples, opens issues not covered by Török, Sargent, and others.
Hence, the emphasis on the Königsnovelle, which I have criticized earlier, is but another of the postulated literary aspects that remains poorly analysed.


83 The edited volumes of Eric Cline and David O’Connor (eds.), *Thutmose III. A New Biography*, and *Ramesses III. The Lives and Times of Egypt’s Last Hero* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan; 2012), may present empirical proof that the attempt cannot be made for Egyptian kings.

84 “To understand,” rather than “to ascertain,” avoids the scientific perspective of certainty.


86 Lest it be forgotten, one needs to add the Bulletin and the Reliefs (and thus their captions). If we exclude the latter, as I feel we must, then Ramesses’ Poem is still the greatest in length of all three. It was, after all, a self-standing piece of literature as P. Sallier III (Bm 10181) + P. Raifé (Louvre E4892) prove.

87 Thutmos’s “Annals” is “bare bones” for a while, then the Yehem conference expands the narrative. Immediately thereafter we are given a somewhat breathtaking description of the march in the Aruna Pass, and wind up at the battle outside Megiddo. Redford’s *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III* does not cover deeply the literary aspects of the inscription. For Ramesses’s Poem see von der Way’s study, *Die Textüberlieferung Ramses’ II. zur Qadeś-Schlacht*. There is no doubt in my mind, and I am sure likewise in other scholars’, that the Poem is a superb piece of Ramesside monumental literature. The “Annals” is not, despite the account of the Yehem conference and the king’s caustic words to his army at Megiddo.
Pianchy’s stela appears to be dramatically between these two compositions.

The “bias” here is due to the surprise which Ramesses faced at Kadesh. But, equally, this was the aim of the composition — namely, to depict the pharaoh alone in his camp and to provide his immediate deeply-held reactions to the Hittite onslaught. Hence, as Assmann first saw (“Krieg und Frieden im alten Ägypten. Ramses II. und die Schlacht bei Kadesch”), the piety of the king becomes significant to no small degree.

But in the last case Ramesses’ words are verily a literary masterpiece.

Can we say with regard to Ramesses: no doubt a result of the severe plight into which the pharaoh found himself?

With Pianchy this is best seen in the events preceding the capture of Memphis in lines 85-86. “Kindness,” is, of course, highly subjective.

Pianchy knew the art of restraint. But keep in mind that I am not interested in any of the rulers’ diplomatic abilities. 


They are of minor import to the Kadesh Poem as they were not necessary. We are essentially set on one day for the important events. For Pianchy the ephemerides style is present but not so obtrusive as elsewhere, such as with the daybook citations in the “Annals” Pianchy’s narrative system possesses a higher literary bent than Thutmose’s. See Spalinger, *Aspects of the Military Documents of the Ancient Egyptians*, 185-190; and Török, *The Image of the Ordered World in Ancient Nubian Art*, 385-388.

plates

II  Seti I Campaigning against the Shasu at Gaza (Karnak, Exterior East Northern Wall of the Hypostyle Hall, Photograph Courtesy Peter Brand). [page 23]


IV  Trajectory of Thutmose’s Megiddo Campaign (Schematic Plan Courtesy Brett Heagren). [page 81]


VI  The Aruna Pass (Photograph Courtesy Australian War Memorial, B 3202). [page 83]


IX  Kadesh Campaign of Ramesses II: Final Stages (Diagram Courtesy of Claude Obsomer). [page 139]

X  Scene from the Kadesh Reliefs of Ramesses II, Abu Simbel (Photograph Courtesy of Claude Obsomer). [page 139]

XI  Front of the Great Stela of Pianchy (Photograph Courtesy of Claude Obsomer). [page 203]


XIV  Top (Lunette) of the Great Stela of Pianchy (Photographs Courtesy of Claude Obsomer). [page 222]
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Li Bai (701-762), “The Long War”

They fought last year by the upper valley of Son-Kan,
This year by the high ranges of the Leek Mountains,
They are still fighting… fighting!…
They wash their swords and armor in the cold waves
of the Tiao-Chih Sea;
Their horses, turning loose over the Tien Mountains,
Seek the meagre grasses in the white snow.
Long, long have they been fighting,
full ten thousand li away from home;
Their armor is worn out, the soldiers grown old…
Oh, the warlike Tatars!
To them manslaughter is their plowing,
Plowing, oh from ancient times, in the fields
of white bones and yellow sands!

It was in vain that the Emperor of Chin built the Great Wall,
Hoping to shut out those fiery hordes.
Where the wall stands, down to the Han Dynasty,
The beacon fires are still burning.
The beacon fires keep on burning;
The war will never cease!…
The soldiers fight and die in death-grapple on the battlefield,
While their wounded horses howl in lamentation,
Throwing up their heads at the desolate sky;
The gray ravens and hungry vultures tear,
And carry away the long bowels of the dead,
Hanging them on the twigs of lifeless trees…
O soldiers who fight long —
Their blood varnishes the desert weeds!
But the generals who lead them on —
They have accomplished nothing!
The investigation of the personal aspects of ancient Egyptian pharaohs is a hazardous undertaking owing to the purposeful orientation of our textual records. Most studies on their reigns concentrate upon the series of monuments and written accounts which have been left to us as well as the numerous high ranking private individuals who worked and performed their duties under the aegis of various rulers. Yet, as is known to every Egyptologist, all of the royal material is particularly difficult to analyze owing to their purposeful orientations. Specifically, what the monarchs wanted to publicize was not their innermost feelings at any specific time and place as we would wish but instead indicate certain reactions to specific events, usually for them very important ones, and most certainly not a psychological summary of their identities. Researches therefore have to sift through a quantity of disparate sources in order to limn the monarch’s persona. On the other hand, so long as the royal accounts are detailed enough some distinct characteristics of a pharaoh can be discerned. Fortunately, when it came to war, the New Kingdom pharaohs, and Pianchy of Kush as well, were determined to provide extensive records of their major campaigns, both pictorially and textually.

The following chapters attempt to do just that. This volume expressly avoids extensive linguistic coverage of the key narratives, partly because of the theme but equally due to the already well-researched historiographic studies that appear.